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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the widely acknowledged contention that pollution control measures would be less 
financially beneficial than pollution prevention technologies in the long run, pollution control 
approaches remain a popular solution for organizations seeking, or coerced, to engage in 
corporate environmentalism.  Drawing on the conceptual underpinnings of the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour as an integrative framework, this study combines the tenets of five major 
management theories - institutional, stakeholder, planned behaviour, resource-based view, 
and life-cycle management - to examine how and why small and medium sized manufacturing 
enterprises (SMMEs) embrace dissimilar approaches to implementing green initiatives (GIs) 
under different circumstances.   This research adopted a nested, multiple-case design to 
explore why some organizations have been able to obtain beneficial effects from their GI 
implementation while others have not.  The findings, based on the experiences of seven 
SMMEs, which implemented a total of 27 GIs in their production operations, reveal that 
legislative requirements, stakeholders’ expectations, organizations’ natural environmental 
orientation, as well as their environmental resource base and capabilities, jointly drive 
corporate environmental strategies.  The case study found that the higher the external 
pressures, a combination of legislative requirements and stakeholder expectations, the more 
likely it was for SMMEs to adopt quick-fix, off-the-shelve solutions, which typically carried 
limited short-term benefits with associated high long-term costs.  By contrast, less intense 
external pressures offer firms the opportunities to explore plausible options and exploit 
internal resource capabilities to advantage, giving rise to the adoption of more sustainable 
approaches. The study further discover that experiential learning, i.e., a firm’s ability to learn 
from its GI implementation experience, separates SMMEs capable of capitalizing on the 
values of their implemented GIs to gain competitive advantages and redefine competition 
from those that are immersed in a cognitive lock-in, unable to free themselves from an 
unproductive green wall.  The findings suggest that nurturing organizational learning among 
environmentally resistive firms could transform them into environmentally responsible 
enterprises.  The study concludes by interpreting its findings into a number of theoretical 
propositions for theory building in corporate environmental management. 
  1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Business performance and environmental concerns 
Environmentalism has become one of the most significant forces shaping national economies 
in recent years (Murphy et al., 1996, p. 191; McIntyre et al., 1998, p. 58). It has also emerged 
as one of the most important issues businesses have to grapple with (McDonough & 
Braungart, 2002). Since the publication of the Brundtland Report (World Commission on 
Environment and Development, 1987), the introduction of the sustainable development 
concept at the Rio de Janeiro’s Earth Submit in 1992, and, more recently, the screening of the 
Oscar-winning documentary “An Inconvenient Truth” featuring former US. Vice President Al 
Gore’s lectures on global warming, “green” issues have gained substantial prominence in 
political and economic domains (Prasad & Elmes, 2005; Jermier et al., 2006; Lockett et al., 
2006). Sustainability issues have also found their way to many boardrooms’ deliberations 
(McDonough & Braungart, 2002). 
Endeavours business organizations undertake to minimise environmental impacts resulting 
from product creation and service operation are popularly termed green initiatives (Klassen & 
McLaughlin, 1996) (GIs). These endeavours include efforts expended by organizations to cut 
pollution or emission (Freedman & Jaggi, 1988), to reduce wastes (McEntyre, 2001; Boiral, 
2005), to comply with legislations governing environmental quality (Dechant & Altman, 
1994), to reduce violation records (Hughes et al., 2001), and to avoid environmental lawsuits 
(Deegan & Rankin, 1996). Firms’ efforts to green their operations are, however, not 
necessarily best reflected by pollution reduction, legislation compliance, violation record 
reduction, and lawsuit drop (Decker & Jalbert, 2003). They encompass business strategies to 
incorporate environmental issues, such as proposals to invite supply chain partners to 
participate in  environmental management (Walton et al. 1998), or to “green-jack” other 
aspects of business operations (Walley, 2000), to attain competitive advantage (Lee & Ball, 
2003), to promote “enviropreneurial” marketing (i.e., environment as commitment, 
environment as opportunity, and environment as righteousness) (Barker & Sinkula, 2005), 
and to develop environmental capabilities in manufacturing strategies (Crowe & Brennan, 
2005). Such strategies are also not confined to operations within the firm but could extend to 
the firms’ supply chain partners (James et al., 1999; Beamon, 1999). The green purchasing 
practices that reduces wastes, promotes recycling and reusing as described in Min and Galle 
(2001), the introduction of environmental criteria screening for suppliers’ products featured in 
Murray (2000), as well as the collaboration effort with suppliers to reduce impacts generated 
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during transportation and end-of-life disposal documented in Light (2002) are examples of 
GIs that extend into a firm’s supply chain. 
Needless to elaborate, the impact that GI implementation has on organizational performance 
has also become a prime concern of businesses as well as academia.  Since the 1990s, there 
has been a proliferation of studies discussing the relationships between GIs and organizational 
performance (see for example Hunt & Auster, 1990; Porter & van der Linde, 1995; Miles et 
al., 2000; Lankoski, 2007). Within the environmental management literature, the relationship 
has been examined both as a direct link between GIs and organizational performance 
(Greenan et al., 1997; Miles & Covins, 2000; Aragon-Correa et al., 2008), and separately as a 
link between GIs and environmental performance (Green et al., 1998; Hughes et al., 2001; 
Russo & Harrison, 2004; Annandale et al., 2004) or between environmental performance and 
organizational performance (Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996; Edwards, 1998; Knudsen & 
Madsen, 2001). 
Broadly, five sets of factors have been identified as influencing the three sets of relationships. 
First, environmental resources, capabilities and competencies are regarded as important to the 
implementation of GIs and the accrual of competitive advantage (Knudsen & Madsen, 2001; 
Gonzalez, 2005). Organizations with strong environmental capabilities, such as the ability to 
deal with complex environmental issues, may adopt a proactive approach to extend their 
existing proficiencies in pollution prevention (Gonzalez, 2005). These efficiencies tend to 
increase with continual environmental management, and operational improvement (Claver et 
al., 2007). Second, the introduction of GIs is found to be associated with reputational 
advantage (Miles & Covin, 2000) and the improvement of quality of products and services 
(Greenan et al., 1997). This suggests that firms using GIs to gain reputational advantage were 
also able to derive quality improvement in their product and service offerings. Third, 
shareholders’ preference on environmental investment limits is a factor that could influence 
the allocation of resources for GI implementation. Shareholders’ imposition of an 
environmental investment threshold is found to act against environmental and financial 
performance (Kock & Santalo, 2005), resulting in a negative effect on the relationship. 
Fourth, there seems to be differences between product-focused GIs and process-focused ones 
(Gilley et al., 2000; Christmann, 2000; Vanchon & Klassen, 2006). Product-driven GIs may 
lead to immediate sales improvement, whereas the benefits of process-driven GIs were not 
immediately realised (Gilley et al., 2000). Hence, Gilley et al. (2000) concluded that investors 
reacted more positively toward product-driven GIs than process-driven ones. Fifth, a long-
term vision and entrepreneurial orientation toward environmental issues could make 
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substantial differences to firms’ GI implementation (Hart, 1995; Aragon-Correa et al., 2008). 
Firms having a long-term vision and entrepreneurial orientation toward environmental issues 
tend to adopt proactive green approaches, which have been found to be associated with a 
consistent reduction in environmental impacts and organizational costs (Aragon-Correa et al., 
2008). 
Despite the huge array of studies into multiple aspects of the relationship, findings remain 
inconclusive about whether GIs hold a positive, negative, or independent relationship with 
organizational performance. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996), Russo and Fouts (1997), 
Stanley et al. (1997), and Knudsen and Madsen (2001), for example, reported that greening 
business activities result in improvements in organizational performance. Chen and Metcalf 
(1980), Miles and Coven (2000), and Sarkis and Cordeiro (2001), however, noted the reverse: 
GIs have a negative effect on organizational performance. Interestingly, Schaltegger and 
Figge (2000) contend that there are no significant co-relations between greening and 
organizational performance.  
The equivocal findings led to efforts being made to unravel the conditions under which 
environmental initiatives may result in gain or loss of profitability. Studies (see for example 
Gonzalez, 2005; Wagner, 2001; Cordeiro & Sarkis, 1997) reporting that firms achieving 
positive results with their environmental initiatives tend to have a relatively long-term record 
of engaging in environmentalism. Those that only implement environmental programs for a 
short time do not seem to experience comparable achievements (Wilkinson et al., 2001).  As 
such, even though there is evidence demonstrating that environmental proactiveness can have 
a negative impact on corporate performance (Cordeiro & Sarkis, 1997), Wagner (2001) 
argued that such negativity is only of a short-term (1-5 years) nature.  
According to Klassen and McLaughlin (1996), the reason behind the inconclusive result 
surrounding the “GI–organizational performance” relationship is because the “environmental 
management literature is prescriptive and anecdotal in nature with few linkages to existing 
management literature” (p. 1200). Russo and Fouts (1997) also provided a number of 
explanations for the contradictory findings, including the employment of small, single-
industry samples, relying on self-reported data, failure to control predictors of profitability, 
and failure to reason how, and in what ways, the social policies examined directly affected 
companies’ bottom lines. In particular, Russo and Fouts (1997) and Pulver (2001) pointed out 
that the relationship between GIs and firm performance is beyond a simple calculus - higher 
implementation cost does not necessarily lead to lower profits. To explore whether 
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methodological choice could be a contributing factor to the findings, Wagner and Wehrmeyer 
(2002) carried out a literature review by categorising studies (covering a wide range of 
industries) into two groups: those using portfolio studies and those employing multiple 
regression analysis.  The review shows that while portfolio studies uncover a positive 
relationship between environmental and economic performance, multiple regression analyses 
report mixed results. Wagner and Wehrmeyer (2002), therefore, concluded that: 
It seems not possible to assess to what degree the variability encountered in the results 
… is due to methodological artefacts (p. 158) 
While the relationship between environmentalism and corporate performance remains a 
conundrum (Knudsen & Madsen, 2001; Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001; Schaltegger & Figge, 
2000), Fabian (2000) asserted that companies are now being held responsible not only for 
their own performance but also for the performance of their suppliers, distributors and 
customers. The pressures on adopting GIs whilst maintaining positive financial performance 
has been mounting to the extent that companies are pushed to create competitive advantage 
from embracing environmentalism (Delmas, 2001; Rondinelli & Vastag, 2000). Obviously, 
many factors do influence the causal direction of the relationship between GIs and 
organizational performance. In other words, the effect that GIs have on organizational 
performance could certainly assume any outcomes, depending on a host of factors, as has 
already been demonstrated. It may, therefore, be unproductive to continue to explore the 
causal effects that GIs have on organizational performance. More importantly, perhaps, 
questions should be directed to examining how and why some GIs could lead to beneficial 
outcomes, while others do not; and why do organizations opt for a particular approach over 
others when implementing GIs. 
 
1.2 Research questions 
Although numerous studies have investigated how organizations gain competitive advantages 
from GI implementation (for example, Porter & van der Linde, 1995; Christmann, 2000), few 
have attempted to analyse why firms choose to adopt a particular GI technology at one time 
but opt for another approach on another occasion. Whether the adoption of an end-of-pipe 
(EOP) approach, for instance, always impact negatively on a firm’s performance, as some of 
the earlier studies (see for example Klassen & Whybark, 1999) have suggested? Alternatively, 
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would a pollution prevention (PP) approach necessarily bring benefits to an organization, as 
have been revealed previously (see for example, Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996)? These are 
questions requiring further elucidation. In addition, even though a number of factors have 
been found to moderate the relationship between GIs and organizational performance, the 
contextual issues underpinning the formation of the perceived relationship as well as the 
circumstances leading to the implementation of a particular GI, for instance, have not been 
adequately investigated. This study seeks to examine the contexts and mitigating 
circumstances surrounding GI implementation. In particular, it focuses on three main research 
questions: 
1. Why did some GIs fail to achieve positive outcomes while others were able to 
even acquire competitive advantages from their implementation? What were the 
circumstances under which GIs might lead to positive outcomes? 
2. Given that some GIs could lead to positive outcomes, why wouldn’t organizations 
embrace the “winning” approaches when implementing GIs? Why would and how 
did organizations select a particular approach when deciding to implement a GI? 
3. What were the approaches and conditions that could ensure positive outcomes 
from GI implementation? How do organizations approach the implementation of 
their GIs to achieve positive impacts or even gain competitive advantages? 
These research questions are exploratory in nature. They will be investigated using a multiple 
case-study approach within the context of the manufacturing industry, an economic sector that 
accounts for the largest environmental impact, after agriculture and mining, and is the second 
highest source of greenhouse gas emissions in Australia, after the electricity industry 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2002).  The target case companies will be small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs), typically defined as companies with less than 250 employees 
(Simpson et al., 2004). SMEs, despite their size, are reputed to be key drivers of employment 
and economic growth, and have contributed positively and disproportionately to innovative 
activities (Acs & Audretsch, 1990).  Concomitant with their economic importance is SMEs’ 
unduly large effects on the environment.  SMEs are among the greatest polluters.  Though 
unsubstantiated, SMEs’ contributions to global environmental pollution have been widely 
quoted as bandied around 70% (Hillary, 2000).  SMEs are also responsible for 60% of the 
world’s carbon emissions (Marshall, 1998).  Unfortunately, lack of public interest in SMEs 
(Scott, 1990), coupled with difficulty of obtaining requisite data from SMEs (Rutherfoord et 
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al., 2000), have suppressed the needed attention afforded to understanding SMEs’ efforts in 
greening their operations.  
Given SMEs’ economic significance and their pollution contribution to the environment, the 
focus on small to medium, manufacturing enterprises (SMMEs), therefore, would 
complement many of the studies on the effects of GIs on organizational performance, which 
largely focus on multi-national corporations (see for example, Porter & van der Linde, 1995; 
Lanen, 1999; Pulver, 2001). The broad nature of the topic and the exploratory focus of the 
research questions justify the adoption of multiple case studies as the best suited research 
strategy (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). Multiple case design with the use of a replication 
logic can confirm or refute inferences drawn from individual cases (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). In this regard, it offers a stronger base for theory building than single case 
study. With the varied nature of empirical information available, multiple case design permits 
induction of more robust, as well as reliable propositions through cross case analysis 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The outcome of this thesis would be an explanatory 
framework showing how the interactions of different factors would contribute to shaping the 
relationship between GIs and firm performance, particularly those that could help generate 
competitive advantages.   
 
1.3  Organization of thesis 
This thesis continues, in Chapter 2, by reviewing the mainstream literature on GIs, covering 
definition, classification, implementation approaches, resource implications, and studies that 
explore the relationships between GIs and firm performance.  Focusing on the use of a multi-
theoretic framework, the literature review in Chapter 2 also examines the contribution of five 
major management theories – institutional theory, resource-based theory, stakeholder theory, 
theory of reasoned action, and life cycle management theory – to explaining plausible 
organizational responses to environmental imperatives.  
Chapter 3 presents the methodology employed to carry out the research. It discusses the 
multiple case study approach selected, describing the theoretical sampling process, case 
selection, data collection and analysis procedures carried out to build and extend theory. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the within case analysis, centering on the circumstances 
leading to and surrounding the implementation of production-related GIs in the seven case 
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companies.  The corresponding environmental orientation, resources and capability of the 
case companies at the stage of implementing each of the GIs are also highlighted, together 
with the outcomes of the GIs implemented. 
Insights emerging from the results of the within case analysis are captured in the cross-case 
analysis in Chapter 5, which compares and synthesizes the circumstances surrounding the 
implementation of GIs in the seven case companies. The Chapter will develop constructs that 
explain the reasons for companies to embrace different implementation approaches at 
different times. 
Chapter 6 concludes by discussing how this study has drawn on five theories to examine 
SMMEs’ responses to environmental imperatives and how the results of the research has 
contributed to extending extant theory, summarizing some of the limitations and suggesting 
directions for further study in this exciting area of corporate environmentalism. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
While the literature on GI implementation is large and diverse, it has yet to generate 
reasonably consistent and generalizable findings with respect to outcomes (Bansal & Gao, 
2006). Many questions remain with respect to definition, types, and processes of GI 
implementation in theory and in practice. This chapter reviews the concepts, types of GIs, and 
how alternative GI implementation approaches could lead to dissimilar outcomes. The review 
will highlight the use of data types, industry sectors investigated, organizational factors, and 
methodology employed by past studies. The objective is to identify gaps in past studies and 
the appropriate research methodology to be employed for this study.  
Despite the vast array of conceptual perspectives that have been used to examine GI 
implementation, the empirical literature tends to focus mostly on validating single theories, or 
testing competing explanations (Bansal & Gao, 2006). Few have explored GI implementation 
using a multi-perspective framework. This chapter will review five mainstream management 
theories – institutional, stakeholder, resource-based, life cycle management, and planned 
behaviour - to examine GI implementation at two levels: intra-firm and inter-firm. Using the 
theory of planned behaviour as the integrating framework, a behavioural model indicating 
how a firm might response to GI implementation is developed. The behavioural model 
provides the theoretical foundation upon which the case analyses in this study are conducted.   
 
2.1 Notions of GIs  
2.1.1 Definition of GIs 
GIs are processes and activities undertaken to reduce wastes and emissions (Walton et al., 
1998; Schaper, 2002). They range from isolated incidents like switching off lights or 
machines, whenever possible, to systematic patterns of practices, such as automating 
production lines to improve productivity and reduce wastes. In business operations, GIs can 
start with changes in business strategies (Sarkis, 1998; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998), leading 
to innovations of product designs (McCloskey & Maddock, 1994; Gupta, 1995 Porter & van 
der Linde, 1995), renovations of production processes (Hart, 1995; Pujari et al., 2003), and 
modification of production technologies (van Hoek, 2001). In these instances, GI 
implementation typically requires firms to devise supporting strategies and expend resources 
(Handfield et al., 2005). 
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In the context of manufacturing, GIs  would include activities that reduce waste generation, or 
minimize waste by-production, reduce energy consumption, enhance or reduce  material 
utilization, minimize occupational health hazards and safety, and improve workplace safety 
(Lin et al., 2001). Typical examples include recyling used materials, reusing packaging, 
installing new production technology or integrating environmental features into product 
designs (Porter & van der Linde, 1995; Banerjee et al., 2003). 
GI implementation in business process has heralded a growth of green-related concepts, 
including life-cycle analysis (Hagelaar & van der Vorst, 2001), integrated supply chain 
(McIntyre et al., 1998), and environmentally responsible manufacturing (Curkovic et al., 
1999). Explaining the eco-development of various green-related concepts, Gupta (1995) 
argues that the greening process, whether continuous or discontinuous, affects a range of 
business operations, such as purchasing input materials, managing production processes (for 
example, air emission, pollution control, and waste disposal) and handling outputs (green and 
clean products). The greening process, in a sense, is comparable to environmentally 
responsible manufacturing (Rusinko, 2007). Further, since companies are dependent on their 
suppliers and distributors on some activities, Meyer and Hockerts (2000) and Walton et al. 
(1998) suggest that the green process would involve these stakeholders, culminating in 
improvements in relationships with customers, distributors, and suppliers. In this regard, the 
concept of Gi is analogous to integrating a supply chain operation (Vanchon & Klassen, 
2006). 
In short, GIs can take different forms: from efforts to comply with environmental legislations, 
to endeavours to continually improve production and business processes. While organizations 
may perceive and implement GIs in different ways, the ultimate mission of GIs is to “develop 
green technologies and to implement strategies that drastically reduce the environmental 
burden” (Hart, 1997, p. 76).   
 
2.1.2 Types of GI 
Broadly, GIs adopted by manufacturers could be classified into four categories: end-of-pipe 
or pollution control measures; pollution prevention approaches aiming at compliance; 
pollution prevention aiming at competitive advantage; and value seeking strategies. The 
features that distinguish them are in the technologies employed (Klassen & McLaughlin, 
1996), resources required for implementation (Russo & Fouts, 1997), the time frame of 
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benefits realization (Cordeiro & Sarkis, 1997),  and the range of stakeholders involved 
(Buysse & Alain, 2003), as summarized in Table 2.1.   
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TABLE 2.1 –TYPES OF GIs: A SUMMARY 
 End-of pipe/ Pollution Control 
Pollution 
Prevention for 
Strategic 
Compliance 
Pollution Prevention for 
Competitive Advantage Value Seeking 
Purpose Strict Compliance Compliance Gain competitive advantage Not only seek benefits for adopting firms but also for other stakeholders 
Resource 
requirements 
Usually involve only tangible 
assets 
Both tangible and 
intangible assets 
- Both tangible and intangible 
assets 
- A pool of capabilities and 
competencies 
- Organizational culture 
supporting GIs 
- Both tangible and intangible assets 
- A pool of capabilities and 
competencies 
- Organizational culture supporting 
GIs 
- A vision larger than firms’ initial 
resources & capabilities 
Time frame of 
benefits  Short-term Short-term Short-/ Long-term Short- and Long-term 
Beneficiaries Typically limited to adopting firm only 
Typically limited 
to adopting firm 
only 
- Adopting firm 
- May be extended to 
suppliers, distributors, 
customers 
- Adopting firm 
- May be extended to suppliers, 
distributors, customers, and other 
stakeholders 
Process 
modification No 
Usually involve 
minor changes to 
existing process 
Usually involve major 
changes to existing process 
Usually involve major changes and 
may involve process redesign 
Product 
modification No No 
Some changes to existing 
product design 
Total changes to product design and 
development 
References 
- Porter & van der Linde (1995) 
- Russo & Fouts (1997) 
- Jones & Klassen (2001) 
- Zotter (2004) 
- Klassen (2000) 
- Lee & Rhee (2005) 
- Handfield et al. (1997) 
- Hart (1995) 
- Klassen & Whybark (1999) 
- Murphy et al. (1996) 
- Lee & Rhee 
(2005) 
 
- Porter & van der Linde 
(1995) 
- Russo & Fouts (1997) 
- Jones & Klassen (2001) 
- Zotter (2004) 
- Klassen (2000) 
- Lee & Rhee (2005) 
- Handfield et al. (1997) 
- Hart (1995) 
- Klassen & Whybark (1999) 
- Handfield et al. (1997) 
- Hart (1995) 
- Porter & van der Linde (1995) 
- Sharma & Vredenburg (1998) 
- Christmann & Taylor (2004) 
- Sroufe et al. (1998) 
 
Pollution control or end-of-pipe measures 
This approach is associated with investments in devices to capture pollutants or harmful 
products at the end of manufacturing processes (Klassen, 2000). Typically, it involves adding 
or attaching end-of-pipe production technologies such as air filters to the manufacturing 
process, to reduce output pollutants before wastes are discharged or further treated. End-of-
pipe technologies can be decoupled from the production system (Zotter, 2004). These 
features, attachment to a singular product cycle stage and ability to stand alone from the 
system, distinguish end-of-pipe measures from the other three approaches. 
Being detachable from mainstream production processes, the operation of end-of-pipe 
technologies does not require the involvement of multiple departments in firms. Further, the 
implementation of end-of-pipe technologies engages mainly tangible assets (Gonzalez, 2005; 
Klassen & Whybark, 1999), such as machineries, warehouses, and computerised network, and 
does not entail extensive uses of intangible knowledge and information resources and 
capabilities from a firm’s resource bundles. For instance, Murphy’ et al. (1996) found that 
 12 
“environmentally conservative” firms (i.e., firms which considered environmental issues less 
important than business targets) were less likely to have to employ a large number of 
strategies compared with “environmentally progressive” firms (i.e., firms that regarded 
environmental management as part of business operations), which employed a doubled 
number of environmental strategies. Additionally, environmentally progressive firms were 
found less likely to use conventional strategies such as reducing consumption, reusing 
discarded materials and recycling wastes to manage environmental impacts of their 
operations.   
Pollution control or end-of-pipe measures are typically adopted to meet regulatory 
requirements (Klassen, 2000). Adopting end-of-pipe measures is a manifestation of a 
compliance attitude that regards environmental issues as extra burdens on top of other 
activities that firms have to carry out (Gonzalez, 2005). They have little or no effect on 
production outputs, processes, and raw material inputs, and tend to result in more cost than 
benefits (Klassen & Whybark, 1999). 
 
Pollution prevention approaches 
While end-of-pipe measures do not integrate GIs into manufacturing process, pollution 
prevention approaches provide firms an opportunity to create changes to the production 
processes. Pollution prevention approaches aim at fundamental modifications of products and 
processes to reduce or eliminate pollution at sources, and require substantial investment in 
resources and capabilities for implementation (Hart, 1995; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Christmann 
& Taylor, 2004). Their implementation also involves multiple processes or stages of the 
product life cycle, cannot be decoupled from the production system, as Zotter (2004) 
explained: 
“The production process and solution to improve environmental performance 
form one physical, process and control unit… Every production process, 
independent of its actual usefulness in the improvement of environmental 
performance, could be called a process-integrated environmental 
conservation solution” (p. 687) 
Therefore, pollution prevention approaches are also known as process-integrated solutions. 
They create new relationships between additional, or new, processes and the existing 
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production system. The addition of new processes or the alteration of existing processes, or 
both, increases the complexity of the production system. With increasing process 
complexity, firms will need to develop new capabilities to operate their production system. 
At the same time, firms may also need to destroy their current competencies (Leonard-
Barton, 1992), including core system components and system architecture (Jones & 
Klassen, 2001). Fundamental changes to products and processes could involve 
reconfiguring the entire manufacturing operation, implying a significant level of 
destruction to existing know-hows. For example, shifting from organic based solvents to 
water-based finishing in furniture industry requires changes to existing product design, 
installation of new application equipment, employee training provision for new application 
techniques, and improvement of drying capacity (Jones & Klassen, 2001).  
The process of capability building and competence destruction are closely intertwined 
(Jones & Klassen, 2001). In fact, a firm’s decision to embrace either end-of-pipe or 
pollution prevention approaches would depend on not jus the environmental orientation of 
the firm, but also its ability to build new competencies by destroying existing competences. 
Jones and Klassen (2001) illustrated the differences in capability requirements between 
end-of-pipe and pollution prevention approaches by describing the approach undertaken by 
a furniture manufacturing firm. If an end-of-pipe solution, such as the installation of an air 
filtration system, was adopted to reduce VOC (volatile organic compound) emissions, 
product design and process operation were virtually unaffected. The selection of a more 
environmentally friendly option of using an efficient spraying equipment, by contrast, 
would entail a minor reformulation of finish material and training for some workers. If 
managers wished to adopt a more innovative program by substituting the use of finishes 
containing organic solvents with water-based solutions, the whole product design and 
process operations would have to be changed. Since water-based finishes have different 
appearance and durability from organic-based mixes, the appearance of the product would 
be virtually altered. This change would have prompted a need to retrain workers since 
water-based finishes take longer time for drying, and are more difficult to apply in 
practice.  Therefore, Jones and Klassen (2001) concluded that firms adopting the pollution 
prevention approach would require a high level of competence destruction compared to 
those that embrace pollution control.  
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Pollution prevention for strategic compliance versus pollution prevention for competitive 
advantage 
Lee and Rhee (2005) point out that there are two variants of pollution prevention 
approaches: pollution prevention for strategic compliance and pollution prevention for 
competitive advantage.  According to Lee and Rhee (2005), the main difference between 
the two lies in their focus with respect to the scope of activities covered.  Pollution 
prevention approaches aiming at strategic compliance essentially confine their 
consideration to activities within product manufacturing. Pollution prevention strategies 
for competitive advantage, by contrast, take into consideration activities beyond the 
manufacturing process, including plausible changes in product designs that have cascading 
effects on subsequent stages of product life cycle. By incorporating GIs into more stages of 
the product life cycle, firms are not only able to reduce wastes, generate more product 
outcomes but also capable of creating values for more than one stakeholder, such as 
consumers or the environment. Implicitly, this implies that benefits accruing from 
implementing pollution prevention approaches for strategic compliance would be confined 
only to the adopting firm, whereas returns generated by pollution prevention strategies for 
competitive advantage could be spread to other supply chain partners. 
Lee and Rhee (2005) further observe that all pollution prevention approaches require an 
extensive use of both tangible and intangible assets (human and culture assets) to create 
pools of capabilities and competencies. What differentiates the pollution prevention for 
strategic compliance and pollution prevention for competitive advantages is firms’ 
decisions to either upgrade these competencies into core competencies or just to maintain 
these competencies at existing levels. Therefore, firms’ objectives such as legislative 
compliance, process or product renovation or competitive advantage creation in their 
environmental management strategies will determine the level of competencies they would 
build. Firms aiming at achieving competitive advantage will be more likely to develop 
more and greater level of competencies than those seeking merely to comply with 
regulations.  
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Value seeking GI strategy 
As a variant of pollution prevention, the value seeking approach also requires the 
engagement of an extensive level of tangible and intangible assets during the planning and 
implementation phases. If pollution-prevention oriented firms perceive that their GI 
investment carries a risk (i.e., short-term financial burden) as well as an opportunity to 
achieve competitive advantage in the longer term (Hart, 1995), firms adopting the value 
seeking approach would most likely see green investment as an opportunity to create and 
reap superior performance in both short- and long-terms (Porter & van der Linde, 1995). 
This crucial attitudinal difference between the two approaches provides different initial 
settings for value seeking firms: they start investigating what the market needs, in terms of 
GIs, and incorporate their understandings of green demands into product management 
(Hart, 1995). By doing this, GIs become a part of quality management and an opportunity 
to create values not only for firms in the supply chains but also for end-users, the 
community at large, and the environment eventually. By implication, the cost involved in 
this comprehensive tactic would be massive. On the other hand, the benefits obtained 
would also be far-ranging in comparison with the other three approaches. 
Each of the four GI approaches presents different implications on firms’ resource 
allocation, stakeholder requirements, and institutional pressures. The adoption of the end-
of-pipe approach requires environmental resources in the form of tangible assets, such as 
machineries, and computerised networks, to implement GIs (Gonzalez, 2005; Zotter, 
2004). The end-of-pipe approach entails no or minimal changes to the production 
processes, making it a quick-fix solution for adopting firms to respond quickly to 
environmental regulations (Hart, 1995; Singh, 2000). In terms of environmental impact 
reduction, end-of-pipeline solutions “do not take away any of the causes of environmental 
impact” (van Hoek, 1999, p.131).  
The pollution prevention approach is often adopted when potential firms have time 
exploring options and spend resources for developing GIs (Tolbert & Zucker, 1994). From 
the institutional perspective, when firms have opportunities to explore a number of GI  
options already practised by other organizations (Tolbert & Zucker, 1994), it is likely that 
the GIs adopted are effective, as these structures have been implemented and pre-tested by 
other firms (Zucker, 1977). The adoption of pollution prevention measures requires the 
utilization of both tangible and intangible resources (Klassen, 2000), including the 
capabilities to operationalize the measures (Lefebvre et al. 1996). Compared with the end-
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of-pipe approach that requires mainly tangible resources, firms adopting pollution 
prevention measures, as such, are likely to develop more capabilities during the adoption 
and implementation of GIs, leading to improved competencies and competitive advantage 
(Javidan, 1998).  
Entailing either process or product changes, or both, pollution prevention measures are 
more effective in reducing environmental impacts compared with the end-of-pipe 
approaches. As Porter and van der Linde (1995) explain, the effectiveness of this approach 
is due to the “reduction at source” nature, which helps firms achieve either compliance or 
competitive advantage or both. The differences between the pollution prevention strategy 
aiming at compliance and the one aiming at competitive advantage lies in the incorporation 
of environmental goals in business strategies (Lee & Rhee, 2005), and the coverage of 
stakeholders’ interests (Hoffman, 1997; Nilsson & Fagerstrom, 2006). The pollution 
prevention approach aiming at competitive advantage usually has environmental goals as 
an integral part of the business strategies (Lee & Rhee, 2005); the benefits accruing from 
implementing such GIs are usually extended to other supply chain partners (Beamon, 
1999).  
The value seeking approach can be regarded as a variant of the pollution prevention 
strategy, as it also requires an extensive level of tangible and intangible assets to be 
engaged during the planning and implementation phases (Handfield et al., 1997; Hart, 
1995). Compared to pollution prevention approach, the value seeking approach is more 
advanced, as it can generate both short- and long-term benefits (Hart, 1995). Value seekers 
do not tend to start with the environmental impact analysis. Instead, they start investigating 
what market needs are in terms of GIs, and incorporate their understandings of green 
demands into product management (Hart, 1995; Handfield et al., 1997). By doing this, GIs 
become a part of quality management and an opportunity to create values not only for 
firms but also their partners in the supply chains (Hart, 1995). If end-of-pipe approach is 
normally adopted to respond to coercive pressures, the value seeking approach is most 
likely exercised when stimulated by cognitive external pressure (Scott, 2004). Porter and 
van der Linde (1995) also contend that the influence of regulatory forces on value seeking 
firms is negligible, as these firms are principally driven by their visions of a long-term 
growth and profits and value addition along the product life cycle (also see Hart, 1995; 
Handfield et al., 1997).    
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The value seeking approach can involve a large number of stakeholders (Hart, 1995), such 
as customers and suppliers during the early stages of product development. Its 
implementation also pervades all aspects of a firm’s business functions, as Angell and 
Klassen (1999) intended that: 
Considerations related to the natural environment are integrated into all 
transformation processes, at both strategic and tactical levels, so that these 
processes are increasingly efficient and effective, thereby creating value for 
all stakeholders (p.594) 
As such, apart from reducing environmental impacts, actions to incorporate waste reductions 
into organizational processes could bring values to stakeholders. In short, the value seeking 
approach has the most far reaching implications on resource consumption, stakeholders’ 
involvement, and environmental impact reduction (Porter & van der Linde, 1995; Handfield 
et al., 1997).  
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2.2 GIs and business performance – Empirical perspective 
Though large and diverse, the literature that explores the relationships between GIss and 
organizational performance can be classified into three groups. The first group suggests that 
GIs complement organizational performance. Implementation of GIs would lead to positive 
business outcomes. The second group sees GI implementation bearing a trade-off effect on 
organizational performance. Adoption of GIs would incur more costs, rather than benefits for 
organizations. The third group contends that GIs and organizational performance are not 
causally related. GI implementation neither improves nor debilitates business performance. 
 
2.2.1 Complementarism 
The first group is grounded on the assumption that the environmental regulations will become 
more stringent, pushing companies to take actions to reduce environmental impacts 
(Reinhardt, 1999). This offers an opportunity for organizations to improve their productivity, 
production processes and cut down on waste generation at the same time (Porter & van der 
Linde, 1995). The basis of their argument is that pollution reduction can increase production 
efficiency, increase demand from environmentally sensitive consumers, discourage 
stakeholder activism, and allow a firm to attract better workers (King & Lennox, 2001). This 
school of thoughts maintains that the implementation of GIs can complement and support 
organizational business pursuits (Edwards, 1998; Murphy, 2002).  
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TABLE 2.2 (a):  SELECTED EMPIRICAL STUDIES SUPPORTING A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GIs AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
No. References Nature of data Industry type GI variables Organizational performance variables Methodology Results 
1 Spicer (1978) 
18 firms listed on New York 
Stock Exchange, 
environmental records from 
Council on Economics 
Priorities, monthly stock price 
from Compustat  - pollution 
records collected in 1970 and 
1972; financial data collected 
during 1969-1971 and 1971-
1973 periods 
Pulp and paper 
industry Pollution control indices 
Profitability, size, total and systematic 
risk, price/earning ratio.  
Multiple 
regression & 
portfolio 
Companies with top-ranking pollution 
control records were linked with larger  size, 
lower total risk, lower systematic risks, and 
higher price/earning ratios than companies 
with bottom-ranking pollution control 
records 
2 
Konar & 
Cohen 
(2001) 
321 publicly traded firms from 
the S&P 500 list, data 
collected in 1989 
Multiple 
industries 
Toxic chemical 
emission per dollar 
revenue, number of 
environmental lawsuits 
Market value –Tobin’s q (based on 
market share, industry concentration 
ratio, sales growth, advertising 
intensity, research and development 
intensity, firm size, import intensity for 
firm products) 
Multiple 
regression 
10% lower Toxic Release Inventory 
emissions level correlated with a $34 million 
larger intangible asset value 
3 
Stanwick & 
Stanwick 
(1998) 
102-125 companies listed on 
Fortune magazine’s Corporate 
Reputation Index between 
1987 and 1992 
Multiple 
industries 
Total toxic emission 
levels 
Yearly profits, firms’ rankings on 
Corporate Reputation Index 
Multiple 
regression 
A significant positive correlation between 
high annual profits and low pollution 
emissions for 5 of the 6 years tested.  
 
4 Ziegler et al. (2002) 
300 European firms from 
stock exchange evaluated by 
Swish bank Sarasin & Cie in 
Basle during 1996-2001 
period 
Multiple 
industries 
Environmental and 
social performance 
ratings developed by 
Swiss bank Sarasin & 
Cie. 
Shareholder value (monthly stock 
return) 
Multiple 
regression 
High environmental performance is 
significantly associated with increased 
shareholder value. However, improved 
social sector performance is insignificantly 
associated with average monthly stock 
returns. 
5 
King & 
Lennox 
(2001) 
652 public firms, 
environmental data obtained 
from U.S. EPA's Toxic 
Release Inventory and Dun & 
Bradstreet, financial data 
obtained from the U.S S&P 
Compustat database during 
1987-1996 
Multiple 
industries 
Toxic pollution 
emission relative to firm 
size (with separated 
effect of industrial 
pollution position from 
effect of poor pollution 
management).  
Market value- Tobin’s q- (based on 
equity value, book value of long-term 
debt, net current liabilities) 
Multiple 
regression 
Reduced pollution emission is associated 
with higher market values 
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TABLE 2.2 (b): SELECTED EMPIRICAL STUDIES SUPPORTING A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GIs AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE (CONTINUED) 
No. References Nature of data Industry type GI variables Organizational performance variables Methodology Results 
6 Russo & Fouts (1997) 
243 firms, environmental 
ratings obtained from Franklin 
Research Development 
Corporation, financial data 
obtained from Compustat 
during 1991-1992 
Multiple 
industries 
Environmental ratings 
(based on compliance 
records, expenditures, 
initiatives to meet new 
demands, reduce wastes 
and support 
environmental 
protection 
organizations) 
Return on assets Multiple regression 
Firms increased their quintile rankings over  
1991-1992 period also experienced 
statistically positive increases in return on 
assets.  
7 
Stone & 
Wakefield 
(2000) 
244 US. Firms from Dun & 
Bradstreet database, 
environmental and business 
performance are obtained 
from the survey questionnaire 
Manufacturing 
Firms’ response to 
ecological issues (based 
on top management 
environmental 
emphasis, 
interdepartmental 
cohesiveness) 
Business performance( based on 
public image, profitability, market 
share) 
Multiple regression 
Firms with high scores on response to 
ecological issues had higher business 
performance scores. 
8 Montabon et al. (2002)  
94 U.S firms, data extracted 
from online reports 
Multiple 
industries 
Operational practices 
(i.e., recycling , 
proactive waste 
reduction), tactical 
practices (i.e., early 
supplier involvement, 
environmental standards 
for suppliers), and 
strategic practices (i.e., 
corporate policy, 
environmental mission 
statement) 
Financial indicators (returns on 
investment, sales growth), 
innovation indicators (product 
innovation, process innovation) 
Multiple regression 
Environmental performance measures such 
as recycling, remanufacturing, 
environmental designs and surveillance of 
the market for environmental issues were 
positively related to firm performance 
measures (i.e., product renovation, sales 
growth). 
9 
Lefebvre & 
Lefebvre 
(1999) 
368 Canadian small and 
medium size firms  
4 industries: 
wood 
products, 
printing, 
fabricated 
metal 
products, 
electric and 
electronic 
products 
LCA-based 
environmental score, 
environmental 
management system 
(EMS) and 
environmental research 
& development 
Innovations (product innovation, 
process innovation, managerial 
innovation); competitiveness (cost 
containment, revenue generation, 
liability management and corporate 
image). 
Multiple regression 
Product life cycle management score was 
positively correlated to innovation and 
competitiveness scores in the electric and 
electronic, wood, and fabricated metal 
product industries.  
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TABLE 2.2 (c):  SELECTED EMPIRICAL STUDIES SUPPORTING A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GIs AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE (CONTINUED) 
No. References Nature of data Industry type GI variables Organizational performance variables 
Methodolog
y Results 
10 Cohen et al. (1995) 
Data obtained 
from the S&P 500 
list during 1987-
1989 period 
Multiple industries 
Pollution portfolios (based on superfund 
sites, number of compliance penalties, 
dollar value of compliance penalties, 
volume of toxic chemical releases, number 
of oil spills, volume of oil spills, number of 
chemical spills, number of environmental 
litigate 
Return on assets, return 
on equity Portfolio 
In terms of risk-adjusted stock returns, "low 
polluter" portfolio reported higher performance 
scores than "high polluter" portfolio 
11 Leal et al. (2003) 
320 valid 
responses from 
environmental 
managers of 
Spanish 
companies, data 
obtained via a 
survey during 
1999-2000 
Multiple industries Implementation of Environmental Management System (EMS) 
Competitive advantage 
score (based on opinions 
of the effects of EMS on 
competitiveness) 
Portfolio Implementation of EMS has positive effects on competitiveness scores. 
12 Edwards (1998) 
London Stock 
Exchange listed 
companies of 8 
industries from 
JERU (Jupiter 
Environmental 
Research Unit) 
Approved list 
during 1992-1995 
8 industries: 
building materials 
and merchants, 
healthcare, 
engineering, 
electrical and 
electronic 
equipment, support 
services, food 
retailers, general 
retailers, and paper, 
packaging and 
printing. 
Environmental performance (based on 
corporate environmental policies, 
environmental management systems, 
monitoring environmental impacts, trading 
partner assessments, energy efficiency, 
environmental responsibility, 
environmental communication) 
Return on capital 
employed and return on 
equity 
Portfolio 
Companies that have high environmental 
performance scores in 5 industries (building 
materials & merchant, electrical and electronic 
equipment, support services, health care and 
engineering) were linked with higher return on 
capital employed and return on equity compared to 
their non-green counterparts. 
13 Ahmed et al. (1998) 
655 responses 
from US. 
companies 
Multiple industries 
Environmental consciousness (based on 
environmental policy, environmental 
reporting system, environmental databases, 
environmental information system, and 
decision support system for corporate 
environmental strategy) 
Performance scores based 
on market share, sales 
volume, product quality, 
new and improved 
product introduction, 
annual earnings, 
profitability, return on 
investment, improvement 
in employee skills 
Portfolio 
Companies that reported high environmental 
performance scores were also associated with high 
performance scores. 
14 Stanley et al. (1997) 
300 U.S. largest 
public companies Various industries 
Environmental management system & 
performance (policy, planning process…) Firm value, share price 
Multiple 
regression 
Environmental improvement  score was associated 
with perceived risk reduction and 5% stock price 
increase 
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TABLE 2.2 (d):  SELECTED EMPIRICAL STUDIES SUPPORTING A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GIs AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE (CONTINUED) 
No. References Industry type GI variables Organizational performance variables 
Methodolo
gy Results 
15 Gabrynowicz (2003) 
A beer 
manufacturer reutilized disposed material and recycled waste water 
Water consumption, product 
losses, cost savings 
Case 
illustration 
- Reduced filling losses of 200,000 litres of beer 
per anum 
- Achieved production cost savings of AUD 
$40,000 pa 
- Lessened water costs by AUD $60,000 pa 
16 
Porter & van 
der Linde 
(1995) 
Various 
manufacturing 
industries 
- Built an evaporation ponds, reduced caustic wastes, 
redesigned production processes to utilise material 
wastes 
- Changed product coating to water-based type, 
developed a quick test for product quality 
- Redesigned products for reusability and recyclability 
- Material consumption, 
product losses, cost 
savings 
- Market position of the 
product, lead time for 
product development, 
hazardous waste 
discharge 
- Material utilization, 
disposal cost 
Case 
illustration 
- Reduced caustic soda material and waste, 
achieved annual savings of US. $ 2.4 million 
- Gained early-mover advantage with water based 
solutions, shortened lead time, reduced 
hazardous wastes by 110 tons pa at no further 
cost, which was equivalent to US. $200,000 
savings pa. 
- Reduced the number of parts in a washing 
machine by 16%, and cut down number of parts 
in vacuum cleaners by 30%, which led to lower 
disposal costs and facilitate material recovery 
processes 
17 Palmer (2000) A chemical manufacturer 
- Minimised energy consumption 
- Conserved water use  
- Reduced effluent generated 
Energy consumption, water 
usage effluent generation, total 
savings, business growth 
Case study 
- Reduced energy consumption 
- Decreased water use 
- Reduced effluent generation 
- Saved £250,000 (which was equivalent to 0.16% 
of turnover) for 5 years 
- Increased business growth by 12% pa on the 
average 
18 
Mohanty & 
Deshmukh, 
(1999) 
A 
multidisciplina
ry company 
- Designed improved seals to prevent leaks in kiln pyro-
processing system, established strict monitoring of 
operating parameters, sealed compressed air pipeline 
leakages, introduced variable speed drives in kiln fans, and 
added fly ash at cement mill outlet 
- Disposed surplus and obsolete stores and spares, reduced 
coal stocks to 15 days consumption 
- Utilized the return trip of empty bulkers to transport 
cement 
Reduced inventory storage and 
freight, operational process 
improvement,  total savings 
Case study 
- Improved operational process (i.e., saved RD 6 
million/year from monitoring of operating 
parameters). 
- Reduced inventory (i.e., saved RD 20 
million/year from disposing surplus storage 
space) 
- Reduced freight 
19 Worthington & Patton (2005) 
A printing 
company 
- Installed cleaning and recovery equipment  
- Changed raw materials  
- Provided regular trainings for staffs 
Production process 
improvement, product 
recyclability, waste reduction 
Case study 
- Improved production processes and product 
recyclability 
- Reduced ink wastes 
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TABLE 2.2 (e):  SELECTED EMPIRICAL STUDIES SUPPORTING A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GIs AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE (CONTINUED) 
No. References Industry type GI variables Organizational performance variables Methodology Results 
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Thorpe & 
Prakash-Mani 
(2003) 
A chemical 
manufacturer 
- Modernized its plants through quality, technology and process 
improvements 
- Captured and utilized energy generated during carbon black 
process.  
- Sponsored external research and development with universities 
to develop best cost-benefit alternatives 
Product cost competitiveness, 
manufacturing capacity, 
relationships with stakeholders 
Case study 
- Became a low-cost producer to meet 
tightened environmental regulations 
under NAFTA 
- Expanded manufacturing capacity  
- Established relationship with a 
leading world chemical producer to 
reach niche markets. 
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Noci & 
Verganti 
(1999) 
A truck wheel 
manufacturer 
- Introduced a package recycling system. Packaging were sent 
back from customers and reused in subsequent deliveries. The 
installation of this system entailed a total investment of US 
$525,000 
- Replaced solvent-based paint with water-based one and cleaner 
painting technology 
- Implemented a material and weight reduction program 
Product quality improvement, 
waste disposal cost, payback 
time, energy consumption of 
product, material consumption 
Case study 
- Improved product quality due to 
protection enhancement provided by 
the new packaging system. 
- Lowered paint consumption and 
disposal costs, and shorter payback 
time 
- Material and weight reduction 
helped cut down on users’ energy 
consumption, and lessened material 
usage, benefiting both the company 
and its direct customers 
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Tables 2.2 (a) to 2.2 (e) display selected empirical studies that suggest GI complement 
organizational performance. Of the 23 studies reviewed, 14 explored the relationship 
quantitatively, while nine adopted a qualitative or case study approach. The data analysis 
techniques used in the quantitative studies are either multiple regressions and/or portfolio 
methods. The data sources were drawn either from primary surveys, such as the national 
survey of Spanish firms in Leal et al. (2003), or commercial databases, such as 
COMPUSTAT used in Russo and Fouts (1997) and magazine listings, such as Fortune 
Magazine’s 1987-1992 Corporate Reputation Index in Stanwick and Stanwick (1998). The GI 
variables used range from direct measures of environmental practices, such as recycling and 
waste reduction (Montabon et al., 2002), to proxy measures of such practices, like pollution 
control indices (Spicer, 1978), to highly aggregated measures, such as environmental and 
social performance ratings (Ziegler et al., 2002). The organizational performance variables 
employed also take various forms, from financial indicators, such as returns on assets (Russo 
& Fouts, 1997), to imputed indices, like corporate rankings on Corporate Reputation Index 
(Stanwick & Stanwick, 1998).  While the organizational performance variables used are 
among the common financial yardstick employed for assessing profitability, the GI variables 
adopted, other than the direct measures of green practices, are largely surrogate measures of 
GI practices.  Evidently, the surrogate measures would not offer sufficient insights into the GI 
practices adopted by the sampled companies. Even for the direct measures, such as recycling, 
developing environmental standards for suppliers (Montabon et al., 2002), the information 
provided merely indicate whether such a practice is in existence and not how such a practice 
is being implemented or the extent of the implementation.  
GI management is deemed a construct (Beamon, 1999), as it consists of both process and 
outcome dimensions (Ilinitch et al., 1998). As such, the use of a few measures (e.g., pollution 
emission) to proxy GI management might not be able to fully capture its effect on 
environmental performance (Stanwick & Stanwick, 1998). Singh (2000) cited a case of an 
organic chemical company that, in coping with new regulatory requirements, shifted the 
production of some products to its overseas plant and dropped two non-profitable products 
that were producing significant amounts of pollutants. Evidently, the use of pollution 
emissions as a proxy could demonstrate a change in business operations in this case. 
However, it will not be able to reveal the state of GI management as mentioned in Singh 
(2000). Furthermore, Walsh (2005) maintains that proxy measures “are incomplete in that 
they possess only a limited set of the attributes needed to define performance” (p.39). As 
Schaltegger and Wagner (2006) argue, correlations found between environmental indicators 
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and economic performance indicators do not provide any insight to the management process, 
which remains a black box. 
Compared to quantitative studies, the qualitative studies summarized in Tables 2.2 (d) and (e) 
are more illuminative in tracing the resultant effects of each GI adopted by the implementing 
organizations. For example, in Palmer (2000), three GIs – minimised energy consumption, 
conserved water use, and reduced effluent generated were found to have impacts on both 
environmental and organizational performance. The effects of the three GIs on environmental 
performance include reduced energy consumption, decreased water use, and reduced effluent 
generation. As a result, the case organization achieved a saving of £250,000 for five years, 
and an annual 12% business growth on average. In this regard, the qualitative approach 
appears to be a more insightful means in unravelling the cause-effect relationship of GIs and 
organizational performance. Though limited in terms of generalizeability, qualitative studies 
do suggest there is a causal connection between GI implementation and organizational 
performance. Yet, these qualitative reports have not address the changes of business 
operations and resource requirements needed for implementing GIs. Information on how 
organizations improve their capabilities and competencies over time by implementing GIs is 
still lacking. 
 
2.2.2 Trade-offism 
Studies in the second group assert that the function of business systems is to produce 
economic goods and profitability, and investments in resources for non-economic activities 
exert adverse impacts on corporations’ economic health. The role of managers is to maximise 
returns on investments and avoid non-economic costs for short-term gains (Anshen, 1980,), 
because managerial performance is typically assessed on tangible accomplishments (Petts, 
2000). This school of thought is exemplified by studies that regard GIs as threats to firm’s 
financial well-beings (Sroufe et al., 1998; King & Lennox, 2001; Wagner et al., 2002). 
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TABLE 2.3 (a):  EMPIRICAL SELECTED STUDIES SUPPORTING A NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GIs AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
No. References Nature of data Industry type GI variables Organizational performance variables 
Methodolog
y  Results 
1 Freedman & Jaggi (1988) 
U.S firms, data collected from 
U.S Securities and Exchange 
Commission during 1973-1974 
period 
Paper and 
pulp, oil 
refining, steel 
and chemical 
industries 
Pollution disclosure index (based on 
EPA standards for current emissions 
and firm’s performance, future/ 
current/ past capital expenditures)  
Return on assets; return on 
equity, cash basis returns on 
assets, cash basis return on 
equity, operating ratios. 
Multiple 
regression 
A negative relationship was found 
between pollution disclosure and 
economic performance scores 
2 Wagner et al. (2002) 
10 German firms during 1995-
1997, 7 Italian firms during 
1995-1996 and 9 Italian firms in 
1997, 8-9 Neitherland firms 
throughout 1995-1997, 9 
English firms 1995-1997 
Paper industry 
Environmental indices (based on 
COD emission -Chemical oxygen 
demand, sulphur dioxide emission, 
nitrogenous oxide emission) 
return on sales, return on equity, 
and return on capital employed 
Multiple 
regression 
The relationship between 
environmental indices and economic 
performance scores was uniformly 
negative. 
3 Cordeiro & Sarkis (1997) 
523 firms in SIC codes, 
environmental data collected in 
1991-1992, financial data 
collected in 1993 
Multiple 
industries 
Total emissions ( based on fugitive 
non-point air emissions, stack air 
emissions, discharges to water 
bodies, underground injection on-
sites, releases to land) 
1-and-5-year earnings per share Multiple regression 
High environmental performance 
scores were significantly negative to 
1-and-5-year earnings per share 
forecasts 
4 Sarkis & Cordeiro (2001) 
482 US. Firms, environmental 
performance obtained from 
EPA database, financial data 
obtained from SEC disclosure 
database for 1992 
Multiple 
industries 
Total emissions ( based on fugitive 
non-point air emissions, stack air 
emissions, discharges to water 
bodies, underground injection on-
sites, releases to land…) 
Return on sales Multiple regression 
- The relationship between 
environmental efficiency scores 
and ROS was negative, 
- Pollution prevention measures 
had a more significantly negative 
impact on financial performance 
than end-of-pipe measures. 
5 Filbeck & Gorman (2004) 
24 S&P 500 companies from 
1996 to 1998 
Electric 
industry Environmental performance indices 
Holding period returns 
(monthly, annually) Portfolio 
There is a negative relationship 
between environmental performance 
measures and holding period returns 
for 3 years tested. 
6 
Walley & 
Whitehead, 
(1994) 
n/a Chemical industry Hazardous waste reduction 
Capital budget, time spent on 
the project 
Case 
illustration 
- Two thirds of capital budget 
was spent on environmental 
expenditures, starving other 
projects (plant upgrades). 
- 80% of engineers’ time was 
drawn on finding ad-hoc 
solutions or environmental 
projects to deal with waste 
emission. 
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TABLE 2.3 (b):  EMPIRICAL SELECTED STUDIES SUPPORTING A NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GIs AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE (CONTINUED) 
No. References Nature of data Industry type GI variables Organizational performance variables 
Methodolog
y  Results 
7 Singh (2000) n/a 
An organic 
chemical 
company  
Copper waste reduction Reduced legal costs related to copper waste discharges Case study 
An annual loss of US. $500,000 was 
eliminated. However, the company 
suffered a net loss of US. $700,000 
and a penalty of approximately US. 
$1 million. 
8 Singh (2000) n/a 
A small 
chemical 
commodities 
plant 
Developed a pollution control 
facility, which was ineffective to 
treat organic and inorganic waste 
volumes generated 
Reduced violation costs, 
effectiveness of waste treatment 
facility 
Case study 
- The production of several of the 
newly introduced chemicals had 
to cease because the wastes 
generated were too complicated 
for the treatment system. 
- The plant violated its discharge 
limits and incurred in penalties 
of US$200,000 between 1991 
and 1994 for an organic product 
that generated complex wastes. 
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Tables 2.3 (a) and (b) present eight selected studies which found a trade-off effect between GI 
and business performance. Similar to those that found a complementary effect between GIs 
and organizational performance, these studies employed a mix of both quantitative (multiple 
regressions, portfolio approach) and qualitative methods (case study): five quantitative and 
three qualitative. Again, all of the quantitative studies employed proxy measures, such as 
pollution disclosure indices (Freedman & Jaggi, 1988) and total emission indices (Cordeiro & 
Sarkis, 1997) to denote efforts expended to introduce GI. According to Decker and Jalbert 
(2003), the levels of greening are not reflected best by pollution reduction, legislation 
compliance, violation record reduction and lawsuit drop because firms’ efforts to green their 
activities are not limited to these activities. The organizational performance measures are 
largely financial data, such as returns on sales (Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001) and holding period 
returns (Filbeck & Gorman, 2004). These studies provide limited information on the GIs 
implemented, and how the implementation of GIs could have a negative effect on 
organizational performance during the periods examined.  
The targeted samples selected by studies that found the trade-off effects were from a wide 
variety of industries, ranging from a single to multiple industries. There are two issues raised 
by these five studies. First, it is the choice of environmental technologies. Sarkis and Cordeiro 
(2001), for instance, found that the relationship between GI management and organizational 
performance was more negative statistically with the adoption of pollution prevention 
method, compared to pollution control approach. Second, it is the time frame for which data 
were collected. Cordeiro and Sarkis (1997) found a negative association between 
environmental performance and short-term (1 to 5 year) share forecasts.  
In qualitative studies, Singh (2000) argues that the investments required for implementing 
pollution prevention based GIs were more intensive for a short-term period (2 years), 
compared to pollution control based GIs (Hart, 1995). This signals that perhaps the future 
investigation should focus on an extended timeframe of data collection. Singh (2000) also 
found that the adoption of ad-hoc GI solutions, such as developing pollution treatment 
facilities without thoroughly accounting for its maximal capacity when increasing production 
volumes, were time consuming and not effective in treating the causes of environmental 
problems.  
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2.2.3 Neutralism 
The last group argues that corporate environmental practices, per se, neither stimulated nor 
reduced economic performance of organizations (Schaltegger & Figge, 2000). According to 
Schaltegger and Figge’s (2000), only environmental management practices that increases 
shareholders’ value, and improves revenues through product differentiation and process 
enhancement (i.e., reducing costs and increasing eco-efficiency) can be linked to higher 
economic performance.  
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TABLE 2.4:  SELECTED EMPIRICAL STUDIES SUPPORTING A NEUTRAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GIs AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
No. References Nature of data Industry type GI variables Organizational performance variables Methodology  Results 
1 Molloy et al. (2002) 
339 US. Public firms 
from S&P 500 list, 
financial data obtained 
from Compustat, 
Research Insight 
database in 1999, 
environmental data from 
Investor Responsibility 
Research Centre's 
(IRRC) Corporate 
Environmental Profile 
database 
Manufacturing 
industry 
Emissions Efficiency 
Index and Compliance 
Index. Both indices were 
developed by IRRC 
Holding period return, market share, 
industry concentration ratio, sales 
growth, advertising intensity, 
research and development intensity, 
firm size, import intensity.  
Multiple 
regression 
There is no significantly positive nor negative 
relationship between environmental 
performance variables and profitability 
variables.   
2 
UK. Business in 
the 
Environment 
(2000) 
UK public companies, 
environmental data 
collected from Business 
in the Environmental 
during 1996-2000, 
financial data obtained 
from Datastream 
database from 1999 to 
2000 
Multiple 
industries 
Corporate environmental 
engagement index 
Stock price return, total shareholder 
return, dividend yield, stock price 
returns volatility, and risk-adjusted 
performance measure 
Portfolio High environmental scores are linked insignificantly with low stock returns 
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Empirical support for Schaltegger and Figge’s (2000) argument come from two studies 
(Molloy et al., 2002; UK. Business in the Environment, 2000), both of which found no 
statistically significant relationship between GI management and business performance (Table 
2.4). In Molloy et al. (2002), the GI variables used are Emissions Efficiency Index and 
Compliance Index developed by the US. Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC), 
and the primary organizational performance measure employed is holding period returns. In 
the second study by UK. Business in the Environment (2000), the GI variable used is 
Corporate Environmental Engagement Index developed by UK. Business in the Environment, 
and the organizational performance measures employed are stock price return, total 
shareholder return, dividend yield, stock price returns volatility, and risk-adjusted 
performance measure.  Again, the GI variables used in both studies are only proxy measures. 
From the three sets of tables presented, it is obvious that none of the studies could provide 
sufficient evidence to explain the complex cause-effect linkages between GIs and 
organizational performance. Rather, they found a correlational link between environmental 
performance and organizational performance (i.e., Stanwick & Stanwick, 1998; Konar & 
Cohen, 2001). Another problem is that all the studies assume that the relationship between GI 
adoption and environmental performance is positive and causal. According to Schaltegger and 
Wagner (2006), corporate environmental performance could be a result of corporate 
environmental management. Therefore, if past research found an association between 
environmental performance and organizational performance (i.e., Spicer, 1978; Stanwick & 
Stanwick, 1998; Konar & Cohen, 2001), these studies must be built on the assumption that 
any effort on GI management led to an environmental performance.  In reality, this 
relationship is yet to be ascertained (Hertin et al., 2004).  
Studies that have developed causal connections between GI management and organizational 
performance (i.e., Palmer, 2000; Worthington & Patton, 2005) employed case illustration and 
case study approaches. In these studies, an organization may adopt a number of GIs. 
Individual GIs had different outcomes. This suggests that the conflicting findings in past 
studies could be due to the cancelling out effect between the GIs that have positive results and 
those that have negative outcomes.  
The examinations of GIs in the studies reviewed were performed via two pathways: 
environmental outcomes (for example, King  & Lennox, 2001; Konar & Cohen, 2001; 
Montabon et al., 2002), and environmental and organizational outcomes (for example, Konar 
& Cohen, 2001; Montabon et al., 2002). None of these studies examined GIs solely in both 
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environmental and organizational outcomes. It also indicates that the relationship between GI 
management and environmental performance is more obvious and extensively studied than 
the link between GIs and organizational performance (Bansal & Gao, 2006). 
In sum, the literature review suggests that the relationships between GIs and environmental 
performance are still short of theoretical support derived from empirical findings. What have 
been established are the correlational relationships between GIs and organizational 
performance, which were conceptually argued but not empirically established. 
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2.3 GIs and business performance – Theoretical perspective 
Organizations operate under various ideologies to carry out different roles. As business 
entities, organizations are expected to create wealth and maximise profits (Friedman, 1970; 
Kolstad, 2007), to secure their existence, and satisfy their stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995). As social entities, organizations are expected to comply with standards set by the 
societies in which they are embedded (Storz, 2007). As members in supply chains, 
organizations are expected to nurture their linkages with other organizations for mutual 
benefits (Maheshwari et al., 2006; Storey et al., 2006), and gain competitive advantage 
(Handfield et al., 2005). In this sense, organizations’ responses to environmental issues, 
expectedly, would reflect their business, social and self identities. The multiple roles that an 
organization is expected to simultaneously fulfil suggest that a number of different 
mechanisms are at work, which shape an organization’s responses to implement GIs. This is 
schematically illustrated in Figure 2.1.    
The multiple roles that an organization has to fulfil are underscored by the plethora of theories 
that have been developed to explain organizational behaviour in different contexts. In terms 
of applying some of these theories to examine how organizations respond to environmental 
issues, Bansal and Gao (2006) observed that many of those studies tend to focus “exclusively 
on a single disciplinary domain, whether it be organizational behaviour, strategic 
management, finance and so forth (p. 473).  
To explore how organizations would respond to environmental issues within the context of 
multiple roles they need to fulfil, this study has identified five mainstream management 
theories to serve its purpose: stakeholder theory, institutional theory, planned behaviour 
theory, resource-based theory, and life cycle management theory. Stakeholder and 
institutional theories, together, provide insightful information on the salience of firms’ 
external factors shaping their environmental responses (Delmas & Toffel, 2004). Theory of 
planned behaviour offers insights into firms’ environmental behaviours (Cordano & Frieze, 
2000). Resource-based theory sheds light on organizations’ internal resources (Barney, 1991), 
which could be a key to organizations’ environmental management decisions (Bhatt, 2000). 
Organizations do not operate in isolation, but in the connection with other supply chain 
organizations. In this sense, life cycle management theory can offers explanation on 
organizations’ behaviours toward environmental issues arising in the supply chains.    
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Stakeholder theory stipulates that organizations have a social responsibility that requires them 
to consider the interests of all parties affected by their decisions (Freeman, 1998). 
Organizations feel threatened by the possibility of being selected out, if not being isomorphic 
or similar to other successful firms (Gomes, 2006). In other words, the theory assumes that 
organizations need to be proactive and anticipatory of their stakeholders’ interests (Hund et 
al., 2002).  
Institutional theory asserts that organizations, to maintain their legitimacy status, adopt 
practices that are similar to what other firms implement (Deegan et al., 2002; Scott, 2004). In 
this regard, the role of imitation is essential to organizations when it comes to adopting a 
practice.  
Theory of planned behaviour contends that intention is the immediate antecedent of 
behaviour.  Intention is a person's cognitive readiness to perform a given behaviour.  It is a 
function of two attributes:  a person’s attitude toward a specific behaviour, and his or her 
subjective norms (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen & Madden, 1986). 
Resource-based theory emphasizes the importance of resource attributes in achieving 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). Organizations require a resource base for 
implementing practices. The theory also stresses that organizations will be able to further 
develop their resources after adopting such practices. (Pandza et al., 2003)  
Life cycle management theory addresses the environmental impacts generated by a product or 
a process from a cradle-to-grave perspective (Brent & Visser, 2005). Environmental impacts 
are tackled not only at the firm level, but also at the level of supply chain, and the level of 
entire product life cycle (Beamon, 1999). 
 
 35 
FIGURE 2.1: FIVE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON GI ADOPTION. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory explains how organizations within an industry sector adopt similar 
structures or practices (Tolbert & Zucker, 1994; Scott, 2004; Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995). 
For example, Delmas and Toffel (2004) argue that firms in the same industry subject to 
similar coercive forces (regulatory requirements and enforcement) are likely to adopt 
comparable practices. Organizations adopt similar practices to achieve and maintain their 
legitimacy, without which their existence will be endangered (Deegan et al., 2002). 
Institutional theory posits that organizations are significantly dependent on their environment, 
such as rules and believes (Delmas, 2001). As believes and rules change overtime, 
organizations adjust their structures accordingly. 
External forces, varying from coercive, normative or cognitive in nature, shape organizations’ 
imitation of practices (Scott & Meyer, 1983; Zucker, 1977; Deegan, 2002). When external 
forces are coercive (i.e., regulatory pressure is strong), organizations are institutionalised by 
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copying or reproducing formal structures that are highly used by other organizations (Zucker, 
1977). If external forces are normatively dominant (i.e., influences of professional standards 
and professional communities are strong), organizations are expected to conform to standards 
of professionalism and adopt systems and techniques considered to be legitimate by relevant 
professional bodies (Scott, 2001). These norms are conveyed through education and training 
of professionals and certification processes accredited by the relevant professional 
associations (Scott, 2004). When the cognitive element takes hold, organizations imitate 
behaviours that they deem as best practices that will lead to positive outcomes. Guided by 
these best practices, firms engage in the process of constructing their social identities (Scott, 
2004). 
Responding to various external forces, organizations may imitate other firms’ practices in one 
of several ways (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). When a practice is adopted based on what is 
most often employed by others in the industry, the approach is termed “frequency-based”. As 
organizations copy or reproduce formal structures that are highly used by others (Zucker, 
1977), they could become highly inefficient. Scott and Meyer (1983) contended that 
“organizational conformity to the institutional environment simultaneously increases positive 
evaluation, resource flows, and therefore survival chances, and reduces efficiency” (p. 141). 
The inefficiency results from in structural elements being decoupled from other activities and 
from each other. Roberts and Greenwood (1997) argue that organizations, in seeking guidance 
from other compatible organizations in terms of successful design adoptions, tend to scan for 
known alternatives, leaving remaining alternatives unexplored. As such, firms may look for 
highly used practices, because the legitimacy of such practices is enhanced. In this regard, the 
imitation follows a frequency-based fashion: adopting the most frequently used structures. 
Haunschild and Miner (1997) maintain that since commonly used practices become taken for 
granted. Firms could adopt them without thinking. Consequently, Zucker (1977) regarded this 
type of imitation as a “constrained and systematic” process (p. 446). This kind of imitation is 
characterised by imitation with little necessity of innovation perceived by the adopting 
organizations. 
Alternatively, if a practice is chosen based on one used by organization with comparable 
characteristics, such a practice is referred to as “a trait-based approach” (Haunschild & Miner, 
1997). This often happens when external forces become normative, pushing firms to rely on 
internalization process. During this process, organizations may use a variety of information 
sources (e.g., market needs, or competitors’ activities) to evaluate the risks associated with 
adopting a new structure (Tolbert & Zucker, 1994). The evaluation results provide 
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implications on structural changes. Examining structures pre-tested by other organizations 
that have similar traits with the adopting firms presents less challenges, as managers of 
adopting firms can observe the relative costs and benefits involved based on the experiences 
of other organizations. Zucker (1977) argues that the diffusion of a potentially selected 
practice is highly dependent on the extent to which such a practice directly affects firms’ 
reputation. For that reason, firms may adopt a practice due to its reputation despite its cost 
implication. Tolbert and Zucker (1994) point out that when a given practice becomes more 
widespread, it is very likely that potentially adopting firms would regard it as the optimal 
choice.  
A practice could be selected based on its outcomes achieved by other organizations. This kind 
of selection, known as an outcome-based approach (Haunschild & Miner, 1997), is typical in 
organizations dominantly influenced by cognitive forces. In other words, these organizations 
rely on deeply entrenched beliefs and assumptions when choosing practices for imitation 
(Scott, 2004). Organizations may use a variety of information sources (e.g., market needs, or 
competitors’ activities) to evaluate the risks associated with adopting the practices that are 
new to them. This mode of selecting practices differs from trait-based type. Organizations 
employing trait-based imitation tend to look for characteristics of other firms, and follow their 
practices. The outcome of those practices used by comparable firms is not important with 
trait-based imitation. When following outcome-based imitation, organizations tend to 
establish their decision (to select a practice) on the known outcomes of those practices that 
have been implemented by others. In this sense, outcome-based imitation is highly reliant on 
‘vicarious learning” of organizations (Haunschild & Miner, 1997, p. 476). As Zucker (1977) 
put it, organizations that have more embedded routines and structures for their vicarious 
learning would have a higher tendency to adopt these activities. In other words, when 
organizations are under a cognitive influence, they appear to have more leeway to imitate 
others’ practices. It is very likely that a cognitive environment could trigger an outcome-based 
imitation, as cognitive effects of external forces allow firms to select best suited practices 
from the pool of previously adopted practices (Scott, 2004). Outcome-based imitation is a 
selective process based on practices that have generated successful outcomes (Haunschild & 
Miner, 1997). 
Whether coercive, normative and cognitive external forces could be linked to frequency-
based, trait-based or outcome-based imitation, the key to what creates heterogeneity in firms’ 
practice adoption lies in managers’ interpretations and the institutional fields within which 
firms operate. Delma and Toffel (2004) argue that institutionalism can encourage 
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heterogeneity via managers’ understanding and interpretations. Institutional forces are 
transformed when they permeate organizational boundaries. There are two reasons for this 
transformation. First, institutional forces may contain conflicting institutional pressures, 
which require managers’ prioritization. Second, firms may operate in several institutional 
fields; hence, they are exposed to different sets of institutional practices and norms (D’Aunno 
et al., 2000). Therefore, no matter how similar institutional conditions facing firms may be, 
organizations’ responses to institutional pressures vary greatly based on managers’ 
interpretations and priotization as well as the standards of practices firms have been exposed 
to.  
In brief, institutional theory asserts that organizations have to imitate other firms’ practices, to 
maintain their legitimacy to ensure their survival. During this imitating process, organizations 
could be exposed to coercive, normative, or cognitive external environments. When exposed 
to these influences, firms would respond by imitating most frequently used practices, 
practices implemented by other organizations with similar traits, or practices that have been 
demonstrated to deliver successful outcomes. Institutional theory also suggests that managers’ 
understanding and interpretation is significant in creating differences among firms’ practice 
implementation.  
 
2.3.2 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory proposes that organizations have to satisfy not only their shareholders, but 
also other agents such as customers, employees, and suppliers, who have a stake in the 
organizations’ objectives, and performance (Freeman, 1998). Organizations are expected to 
consider the interests of all stakeholders who could be affected by organizations’ business 
activities and decisions (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). At the same time, organizations’ 
response to market dynamics is also influenced by their stakeholders’ interests (Mitchell et 
al., 1997). 
To understand how organizations would react to possible conflicting interests held by 
different stakeholder groups, Clarkson (1995) suggests that stakeholders be classified into two 
types: primary and secondary. Primary stakeholders are those that without whose participation 
the corporation can not survive as a going concern. Examples of primary stakeholders are 
employees, investors, customers, and suppliers. Secondary stakeholders are defined as those 
who influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by the corporation, but they are not in 
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direct transactions with corporations and not essential for firms’ survival. Examples of 
secondary stakeholders are the media, research institutes or special interest groups. Joyce 
(1999) also recommends a checklist for analysing stakeholders’ influences as a means to 
enable organizations to prioritize their response to different stakeholder groups accordingly: 
- identify stakeholders 
- identify how stakeholders influence organizations 
- identify what organizations need from each stakeholder 
- identify criteria used by stakeholders in evaluating organizations 
- rank stakeholders in an order of importance 
In Mitchell et al.‘s(1997) view, the most important stakeholders have three attributes: a power 
to influence organizations, legitimate relationships with organizations, and the urgency of the 
claimed issues. Of the three attributes, the power to influence is the most crucial, as revealed 
in Freeman (1984), Nasi et al. (1997) and Agle et al. (1999) who all found that organizations 
responded to issues held by the most powerful stakeholders’ issues. Jawahar and McLaughlin 
(2001) extended Mitchell et al.‘s (1997) argument, pointing out that the importance of 
stakeholders and their inquiries change over time. Organizations are expected to employ 
different strategies to deal with different stakeholders’ demands at different times. This 
suggests that the relationships among organizations, stakeholders, and stakeholders’ inquiries 
are dynamic.    
Donaldson and Preston (1995) contend that stakeholder theory can be used in three ways: 
- to describe, and sometimes explain specific corporate characteristics and behaviours. This 
is termed a descriptive aspect of stakeholder theory. 
- to identify the connections or lack of connections between stakeholder management and 
achievement of traditional corporate objectives. This feature is an instrumental approach of 
stakeholder theory. 
- to interpret the function of companies and identify moral guidelines that should be 
followed with regard to corporate operation and management. This is a normative 
perspective of stakeholder theory.  
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Branco and Rodrigues (2007) argue that the instrumental and normative approaches are 
contradictory. The instrumental aspect regards stakeholders as “means” (i.e., how 
stakeholders’ interests can be considered in a way that improves corporate profitability and 
efficiency), whereas the normative perspective views stakeholders as “end” (i.e., one of 
organizations’ objectives is to maximise wealth for shareholders and satisfy the needs of other 
stakeholders).  
Stakeholder theory assumes that organizations have a responsibility to consider the interests 
of any agents that could affect and be affected by organizations’ activities. Stakeholders’ 
interests could be viewed as both “means” and “ends” to corporate performance. In this 
regard, the gist of stakeholder theory asserts that organizations need to actively identify the 
important stakeholders who may become influential to organizations. There are a number of 
ways of analysing stakeholders’ influences: first, identifying them through their power to 
influence, legitimate relationships and claimed inquiries. Second, organizations can categorise 
their stakeholders based on their primary or secondary influences set on the organizations. 
Third, organizations can follow the checklist developed in Joyce (1999) to analyse 
stakeholders’ salience.  
 
2.3.3 Resource-based Theory 
The centre of resource based theory is the explanation of firm superior performance based on 
its resource bases. This theory hinges on the assumption that resources of firms are readily 
available, heterogenous and immobile (Barney, 1991). Firms can build competitive advantage 
by strategically leveraging on resources they identify as advantage generating. Barney (2001) 
identifies two main streams of resource based theory: resource-picking and resource building 
(see also Makadok, 2001). The focus of resource picking theory is on how firms exploit their 
valuable, rare and costly to imitate resources and capabilities to generate rents. Resource 
building theory, on the other hand, aims at understanding how the capabilities of firms change 
overtime and the competitive implications of these changes. 
Resource picking theory 
At the firm level, resources can be harnessed to create competitive advantage, depending on 
their features (Barney, 1991), the strategies adopted to capture and deploy them (Wernerfelt, 
1984; Wright et al., 2001), and their inclusion of factors prompting innovation and product-
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related strategic linkages (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000). Barney (1991) identifies four 
characteristics of potential advantage generating resources: value, rareness, hard-to-imitability 
and difficult-to-substitutability. To generate competitive advantage, a resource has to be 
valuable “in a sense that it exploits opportunities and/or neutralises threats in a firm’s 
environment” (Barney, 1991, p. 105). That resource must also be rare to the extent that it is 
only possessed by few firms. A valuable and rare resource can only be a source of 
competitive advantage if firms that do not possess this resource can not obtain it. Regarding 
the difficult-to-substitutability feature, Barney (2001) rationalises that “there must be no 
strategically equivalent valuable resources that are themselves either not rare or imitable” 
(p.111). Resources with these features are expected to generate competitive advantage for 
firms, given that firm resources are heterogeneous and highly immobile. Carmeli and Cohen 
(2001) have found that resources that lack one or more of these characteristics can still be a 
source of competitive advantage.  
Having resources of advantage generating qualities does not, however, consequentially confer 
competitive advantage (Castania & Helfat, 2001). The way in which firms acquire, deploy 
and utilise such resources to accrue competitive advantage is just as critical. The absence of 
either barrier, product entry or resource position, will not ensure the gaining of profits. As 
Wernerfelt (1984) rationalises, “an entry without a resource position barrier leaves the firm 
vulnerable to diversifying entrants, whereas a resource position barrier without an entry 
barrier leaves the firm unable to exploit the barrier” (p. 173). Wernerfelt’s (1984) comment 
calls on a duality of two resource characteristics that produce profits. Firms need to recognise 
and employ resources that can sustain entry barriers.  
Wright et al. (2001) suggest that firms may acquire and employ resources by building up core 
competence, focusing on aligning skills and motives with organizational systems, structures 
and processes to achieve capabilities at the organizational level. Wright et al.’s (2001) 
proposed a model encompassing three main components: dynamic capability, knowledge 
management and intellectual capital. According to this model, dynamic capability denotes 
processes to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources. These components enable 
organizations to build and maintain firms’ competitive position. Wright et al. (2001) seem to 
suggest that the maintenance of competitive advantage from core competences at the firm 
level overtime is closely tied to constant renewal, which enables firms to stay ahead and 
maintain competitive positions when market changes. 
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Putting together the views of Wernerfelt (1984) and Wright et al. (2001), it is obvious that 
building up core competence is as important as maintaining barriers to protect organizations 
from resource access by rival firms. Supporting this point, Prahalad and Hamel (1990) argue 
that a firm’s core competency would become a source of competitive advantage and long-
term superior economic rents when it helps that organization to perform better than rival 
firms, and if barriers exist to prevent other firms’ from accessing this resource or imitating 
this competency. The argument of Prahalad and Hamel (1990) implies that a firm’s core 
competencies would drive corporate strategies and diversification.  
Javidan (1998) contends that competitive advantage may evolve from firm resources via four 
processes: conversion of resources into capabilities, changes of capabilities into 
competencies, alternations of competencies into core competencies, and transformation of 
core competencies into competitive advantage. While having pools of resources (i.e., physical 
assets, human resources), not all corporations can put their resources into best uses, hence the 
rate of utilizing resources at each firm varies. The higher this rate is, the more likely that firms 
are able to acquire capabilities from resource pools. A cross functional integration and 
coordination of capabilities gives rise to a competency. At this stage, capabilities are 
transformed into a competency. The conversion of a competency into a core competency at 
the next step requires interactions between different business units’ competencies through 
integration and harmonization of organizational learning, involvements and commitments. At 
the end of the core competency conversion process is the creation of competitive advantage 
(see also Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). 
Resource building theory 
Under no influence of market dynamics and a prolonged time frame, the resource-picking 
theory could be considered as a sufficient theoretical framework to explain ways to create and 
sustain competitive advantage. The generation of competitive advantage from distinctive 
capabilities or routines undergoes a combination of turbulences like “force majeure from the 
environment, predictably or not, for better or worse” (Winter, 2003, p. 992). Viewed from this 
angle, resource-building theory extends resource-picking theory to include the factor of 
market dynamics.  
From resource picking theory, distinctive capabilities or routines are built from the firm’s 
capability pool (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Teece et al., 1997; 
Zott, 2003). This process of building up distinctive capabilities or core competencies takes 
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time (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Day, 1994). That means, the time factor has to be accounted for 
in the examination of competitive advantage (i.e., how resource pool and capabilities that 
form the basis of competitive advantage change over time). While the time factor is silent in 
resource picking theory, it is the centre of discussion in resource building theory (Makadok, 
2001). Resource building theory has two distinctive features: analyses of market dynamic, and 
assessment of time frame.  
The resource-building theory is underscored by three studies: Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), 
Fiol (2001), Helfat and Peteraf (2003). As Helfat and Peteraf (2003) indicate, the bulk of the 
resource-based theory literature focuses on changes in firms’ capabilities (also see Teece et 
al., 1997; Nelson, 1991; Nelson & Winter, 1982).  Since firms’ capabilities are analogous to 
products which have development patterns, firm capabilities develop through recognizable 
stages: founding, development and maturity. ‘Firms’ capabilities’ from the life cycle 
perspective demonstrate that while some capabilities may deal specifically with adaptation, 
learning and change processes, all capabilities equally have potential to accommodate change 
(Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). Learning, change, and adaptation do not necessarily require the 
intervention of dynamic capabilities as intermediaries. The reason lies in the evidence that 
some versions of capability are better than others. Wal-Mart has superior logistics, Toyota 
manufactures highly energy-efficient cars compared to other auto-makers. Helfat and Peteraf 
(2003) argue that even though many companies have tried to copy these capabilities of Wal-
Mart and Toyota, their service and products remain superior compared to others’. 
Fiol (2001) indicates that the unique routines that generate advantage do have life-cycle like 
feature (build, destroy, and rebuild). Both resources or capabilities and the way firms use core 
competencies must constantly change, regardless of how inimitable, rare, valuable and 
difficult to substitute, the resources are to generate of continuously changing temporary 
advantage. In a hyper-competitive environment, competitive advantage cannot be predicted, 
hence superior rents must be derived from the ability of firms to destroy and rebuild routines 
or core competencies overtime. For this reason, Fiol (2001) suggests the use of “renewable 
competitive advantage” in preference to “sustainable competitive advantage”.  Fiol (2001) 
argues that in the more competitive environment, firms’ resources and the way firms employ 
resources must constantly be changed to produce continuously changing temporary 
advantages. This argument implies that competitive advantage can not be sustained, since 
they are changing all the time. Therefore, the state of advantage is temporary. Superior rents 
are derived from firms’ ability to destroy and rebuild unique routines overtime. In other 
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words, Fiol’s view (2001) questions the accrual of competitive advantage due to any fixed 
sets of core competencies?  
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argue that dynamic capabilities are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for competitive advantage because the functionality of dynamic capabilities can be 
duplicated across firms, and competitive advantage is created from resource configurations, 
not from capabilities. In a moderately changing market, routines as dynamic capabilities are 
detailed, analytic, and stable processes with predictable outcomes. The focus of a moderately 
changing market is to have effective routines or capabilities via small and frequent variations 
through related experience. In a highly changing market where selection is the focus, routines 
are simple, highly experiential and fragile processes with unpredictable outcomes. In high 
velocity conditions, dynamic capabilities are challenged and exposed to collapse, firms’ 
strategy is to add, recombine, and drop resources to create short-term and unpredictable 
advantage.  
In sum, resource-based theory proposes that organizations need resources to develop 
competitive advantage. Only resources with uniqueness, rarity, value, and difficulties to 
imitate and substitute can help organizations achieve competitiveness. Having advantage-
generating resources does not confer competitiveness, organizations still need to develop 
strategies to create and maintain such advantage. The resource-based theory emphasizes the 
importance of efficient and effective routines or dynamic capabilities in helping organizations 
maintain competitive advantage. These dynamic capabilities could be changed or destroyed to 
serve the purpose of sustaining competitive advantage. 
 
2.3.4 Life Cycle Management Theory 
Life cycle management theory, under the umbrella of life cycle assessment (Chalfant, 2001; 
Cohen & Guess, 1994) or product life cycle management (Xie et al., 2006), contends that a 
product exerts impacts on the environment at each stage of its life cycle, from material 
extraction through to manufacturing, disposal, and recycling (de Jonge, 2003). The impact 
varies from environmental consequences, costs, risks or values (Cohan & Guess, 1994). To 
address the impacts a product may have, the management of such impacts should be applied 
at all stages of that product’s life cycle (Xie et al., 2006). The sum of impacts identified at 
each stage, and by each supply chain player is the total impacts of a product. Therefore, Mont 
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(2004) even argues that actions taken at each stage and by each supply chain player would 
lead to optimal outcomes (i.e., the least environmental impact).  
Much of life cycle management literature focuses on analysing environmental impacts, costs 
and benefits. According to Fabian (2000), companies are now held responsible for not only 
their performance but also the performance of their suppliers, subcontractors, distribution 
outlets, and ultimately the disposal of their products. What a supply chain member is doing at 
one end of the supply chain may mean more or less work at the other end for other supply 
chain members. For example, the material selection and component designs determined by 
printer manufacturers may mean less work for recycling contractors when products are 
disposed of or remanufactured. From this perspective, environmental issues and supply chain 
related costs have become a reality that companies have to deal with. 
A number of cost models in product life cycle management literature have been developed, 
including Johnson (1990), Greenwood and Reeve (1992), and De la Garza and Rouhana 
(1995). These models only accounted for the costs that manufacturers could control. Asiedu 
and Gu (1998) proposed that the total cost involved from a product life cycle perspective, is 
the sum of all costs incurred during three parallel cycles: product, process and logistic 
support. The costs involved in each cycle could be further broken down, depending on the 
processes they resulted from (i.e., design, manufacturing or disposal costs), and who were 
responsible for those costs (manufacturers, end-users or the society). Asiedu and Gu’s (1998) 
framework extends the costing analysis from the within-manufacturer’s scope to include the 
costs that other stakeholders (distributors, consumers, or remanufacturers) might incur.  
The relationship between costs and benefits is extensively discussed in the life cycle 
management theory, with more emphasis on the reviews of costs rather than the analysis of 
benefits (Schaltegger & Muller, 1997). Perhaps, cost is more straightforwardly quantified than 
benefits. Rigby (1996) contends that benefits can be evaluated in both qualitative and 
quantitative terms. Qualitative benefits may take the form of reduced time to market, and 
improved responsiveness of suppliers, whereas reduced production cost and increased market 
shares are examples of quantitative benefits. Rigby (1996) implies that qualitative benefits 
can be translated into quantitative benefits (financial benefits), for example, reduced time to 
market leads to total product cost reduction. Supporting this point, McLaren et al. (2002) 
argue that the net benefits of collaborative supply chain management should be derived from 
both costs and benefits, including the total cost of ownership, the opportunity cost of 
inflexibility, and the benefits resulting from enhanced market responsiveness and reduction of 
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supply chain cost reduction. Therefore, both Rigby (1996) and McLaren et al. (2002) indicate 
that benefit analysis of product life cycle management should include an examination of the 
cost element. 
In brief, life cycle management theory proposes that a product creates some impacts at each 
stage of its life cycle. It could be environmental consequences, costs or benefits. In an 
increasingly integrated world, manufacturers are more responsible for their decisions with 
regards to the product design and production. Cost models were developed to facilitate the 
analysis of environmental impacts, costs and benefits.   
 
2.4 Toward a framework of GIs and firm performance 
2.4.1 A Multi-theoretic View of GI Implementation 
The foregoing review of institutional theory, stakeholder theory, resource-based theory, and 
life cycle management suggest that each of them has a slightly different perspective of how an 
organization may be affected by different sets of factors in its decision to implement a GI.  
The stakeholder theory predicts that firms only respond to the most important stakeholders 
(i.e., primary stakeholders with regards to GIs, or the ones with the strongest power to prompt 
the organization in its adoption of GIs).  Institutional theory anticipates that firms can imitate 
either a frequency-based, a trait-based or an outcome-based solution, depending on the 
relative strength of the external forces – coercive, normative or cognitive.  Resource-based 
theory would predict that organizations with strong environmental resources and capabilities 
would adopt a proactive approach, while firms with weak environmental capabilities would 
most likely embrace a reactive posture. The life cycle management theory expects that the 
adoption of GI could extend benefits to supply chain partners, if a product’s impacts on the 
environment could be taken into consideration during the design and manufacturing stages.  
While each theory is useful in enlightening the relevant effects on GI implementation, there is 
yet a body of knowledge that could address the potential interactions of the forces considered 
by the four theories.  Recent attempts to assess the drivers of GI adoption (e.g., Henriques & 
Sardosky, 1996; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998; Bakker et al., 2002), intervening and 
mediating factors of GI-organizational performance relationships (i.e., Russo & Fouts, 1997; 
Klassen & Whybark, 1999; Sharma, 2000; Gonzalez-Benito & Gonzalez-Benito, 2005; 
Rueda-Manzanares et al., 2007) suggest that existing theories explaining the multi-faceted 
aspects of GIs (Margerum & Born, 1995; Bansal & Gao, 2006) should be integrated into a 
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multi-theoretical framework (Bansal, 2006).  For example, when the external forces are 
dominantly normative in nature, i.e., when the external influences are abundant with 
professional standards such as ISO 14001, Total Quality Management (TQM), Environmental 
Management System (EMS), organizations could leverage their resources by anticipating 
potential stakeholders’ requirements with regard to a product’s environmental impacts, and 
incorporating these requirements into their GI implementing process.  The synergy between 
four theoretical perspectives - external pressures (environmental standards), stakeholders’ 
requirements, organizations’ resources, and a product’s overall environmental impacts - 
demonstrates the importance of examining the possible interactions of the theories. Table 2.5 
summarises the key interactions among the four theoretical domains. 
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TABLE 2.5 POSSIBLE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN FIVE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES: A SUMMARY 
 Institutional Theory 
(Coercive, Normative, Cognitive) 
Resource-based Theory Life Cycle Management Theory 
(Impacts considered during Manufacturing, 
Impacts considered beyond Manufacturing) 
Stakeholder 
Theory 
 
- Under coercive forces: firms respond to primary 
GI stakeholders 
- Under Normative forces: firms could respond to 
both primary and secondary GI stakeholders 
- Under Cognitive forces: firms could respond to 
both primary and secondary GI stakeholders 
- Strong environmental resource base: firms could 
respond to primary and secondary GI 
stakeholders 
- With weak environmental resource base: firms 
respond to primary GI stakeholders 
- Impacts considered during manufacturing: firms 
are likely to respond to primary GI stakeholders 
only 
- Impacts considered beyond manufacturing: firms 
respond to both primary and secondary GI 
stakeholders 
Institutional 
Theory 
 
 - Under coercive forces and weak resources: firms 
may adopt command-and-control GIs (i.e., 
Pollution Control) 
- Under coercive forces and strong resources: 
firms may adopt voluntary GIs (i.e., Pollution 
Prevention) 
- Under normative forces and weak resources: 
firms  may adopt command-and-control GIs (i.e., 
Pollution Control) 
- Under normative forces and strong resources: 
firms may adopt voluntary GIs (i.e., Pollution 
Prevention) 
- Under cognitive forces and weak resources: firms  
may adopt command-and-control GIs (i.e., 
Pollution Control) 
- Under cognitive forces and strong resources: 
firms may adopt voluntary GIs (i.e., Pollution 
Prevention) 
- Under coercive forces: firms are likely to 
consider impacts generated during manufacturing 
- Under Normative forces: firms may consider 
impacts generated during and beyond 
manufacturing 
- Under Cognitive forces: firms could consider 
impacts generated during and beyond 
manufacturing 
Resource-based 
Theory 
  - Strong environmental resource base: firms could 
consider impacts beyond the manufacturing 
scope 
- With weak environmental resource base: firms 
may consider impacts generated during 
manufacturing. 
Source: Compiled from Jennings and Zandbergen (1995); Delmas and Toffel (2004); Oliver (1997); Clemens and Douglas (2006) 
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The interactions between two theoretical domains (Table 2.5) suppose that each decision to 
adopt a particular GI approach is tied to specific contexts of external pressures, stakeholder 
requirements, resource base, and a product’s environmental impacts that organizations are 
under. For example, Jennings and Zandbergen (1995), and Delmas and Toffel (2004) 
maintain that the triggering force to embrace voluntary environmental practices could be 
explained by the combination of the institutional and stakeholder theories. Coercive (e.g., 
regulatory requirements) and normative pressures (e.g., competitive forces) can trigger 
organizations to approach GI implementation differently (Delmas & Toffel, 2004).  However, 
the way in which organizations would respond to these pressures depends on managers’ 
perception of these pressures as well as organizational characteristics of the manufacturing 
plants (Delmas & Toffel, 2004).  Under strictly enforced conditions, organizations could be 
pushed to respond promptly to environmental issues (Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995).  With a 
narrow timeframe for environmental responses, these organizations may only address the 
requirements of the most important stakeholders, such as regulators (Lober, 1996). When the 
pressures become less coercive, organizations may have more flexibility to select the best 
suited GIs, and incorporate more stakeholders’ requirements in their decisions (Jennings & 
Zandbergen, 1995). 
Oliver (1997) and Clemens and Douglas (2006) have offered explanations for the interactions 
between resource-based and institutional theories.  Oliver (1997) argues that organizations are 
constrained by its institutional settings and choices of resource allocation. On the one hand, 
organizations, to secure its legitimacy, have to make irrational choices when imitating others’ 
practices.  On the other hand, they have to make rational resource choices in pursuit of 
economic rents.  As Oliver (1997) suggests, GI implementation is crucially dependent on 
organizations’ rational resource allocation decisions, and institutional factors influence such 
decisions.  Organizations are regarded as having both resource and institutional capitals.  
Resource capital encompasses value-enhancing assets and competencies of organizations, 
while institutional capital refers to the contexts surrounding resource capital that enhances or 
inhibits the optimal uses of resource capital.  Discussing the use of resources, Clemens and 
Douglas (2006) posit that organizations under a strongly regulated environment would be 
likely to adopt a reactive mode with regard to GI implementation.  Clemens and Douglas 
(2006) explain strictly enforced regulatory conditions focus on “means” (i.e., conforming to a 
standard) rather than on “ends” (i.e., environmental improvement).  This approach would 
discourage firms from working with regulators to find a superior solution (Tenbrusel et al., 
2000). 
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The above explanations, however, only explain how the combinations of two theories, such as 
institutional pressures and stakeholder requirements (Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995; Delmas 
& Toffel, 2004), or institutional theory and resource-based views (Oliver, 1997; Clemens & 
Douglas, 2006), may predict how an organization may respond under two sets of forces.  In 
this regard, past theoretical studies examining how firms select a particular GI approach when 
dealing with environmental imperatives appear limited in reflecting the multi-dimensional 
nature of GI implementation. 
As Bansal and Gao (2006) and Hoffman and Sandelands (2005) put it, environmental issues 
have emotional, cognitive, value-based, technological, behavioural, economic and cultural 
elements embedded in them.  As such, the relations evolving around environmental issues are 
regarded as a web of multiple levels and multiple systems (Starik & Rands, 1995).  
Expectedly, solutions to environmental issues also have to be cross-disciplinary.  Theoretical 
domains employed to address the nature of environmental issues should, likewise, be multiple 
disciplinary (Bansal & Gao, 2007).   
Given that organizations are embedded in various institutional settings, have a nexus of 
contracts with different stakeholders, and employ resources rationally to maximise profits and 
other benefits, little is known about how different external and internal forces interact to 
affect a firm’s decision in selecting a GI approach.  While some studies found that 
organizations with a proactive attitude toward environmental issues tend to adopt pollution 
prevention technologies aimed at competitive advantage (Hart, 1995; Handfield et al., 1997), 
there is also little understanding of how these organizations went about achieving them.  A 
joint study of how four sets of forces - institutional pressures, stakeholders’ requirements, 
resource base and products’ environmental impacts along its life cycle – interact to influence 
a firm’s decision to embrace a specific approach for GI implementation will thus provide 
more comprehensive insights into the research questions posed. 
 
2.4.2 Theory of Planned Behaviour as an Integrative Platform 
This study uses the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1988; Ajzen, 1991), which predicts 
deliberate behaviour, as a platform for integrating the four theories to provide the conceptual 
base for the case study.  The theory planned behaviour model has been widely applied to 
study a diverse range of volitional behaviour in environmental management research.  They 
include examining recycling behaviours (Kurz et al., 2007; Boldero, 1995; Taylor & Todd, 
1995), green consumerism (Sparks & Shepherd, 1992), green marketing (Kalafatis et al., 
1999), farmers’ conservation behaviour (Beedell & Rehman, 2000), willingness to pay for 
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abatement of forest regeneration (Pouta & Rekola, 2001), and genetically modified food 
consumption behaviour (Cook et al, 2002).  Largely, this is the result of disappointment with 
attempts to find “strong and consistent links between environmental concern and pro-
environmental behaviour” (Kurz et al., 2007). 
The theory of planned behaviour is an extension of the well-researched theory of reasoned 
action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), which contends that intention is 
the immediate antecedent of behaviour.  Intention denotes a person's cognitive readiness to 
perform a given behaviour.  In the theory of reason action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1980), intention is posited as a function of two attributes:  a person’s attitude toward 
a specific behaviour, and his or her subjective norms. 
A person’s attitudes towards a particular behaviour measure the extent to which this 
individual has a favourable or unfavourable disposition toward the behaviour in question.  
Attitudes are made up of the beliefs that a person accumulates over time.  Some beliefs are 
formed from direct experience; some are from information; while others are inferred or self-
generated.  Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) contend that only a few of these beliefs contribute to 
influence attitudes.  Called salient beliefs, these are considered the "immediate determinants 
of a person's attitude" (Ajzen & Fishbein 1980, p63).  An attitude, in short, is a person's 
salient belief about whether the outcome of her or his action will be positive or negative. 
Subjective norm measures the influence of other people with respect to the behaviour 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).  They are beliefs about what others will think about the behaviour 
and how they will perceive the outcome of the behaviour (normative belief) and the degree to 
which this influences whether the behaviour is carried out (motivation to comply).  These two 
factors, in combination, give the subjective norm.   Opinions of persons considered to be 
significant, expectedly, will have a greater influence on the formation of an individual’s 
subjective norms than those who are less important. 
The difference between theory of reason action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and theory of 
planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1988, 1991; Ajzen & Madden, 1986) is the inclusion of a 
perceived behavioural control variable in the latter.  Theory of reason action does not take 
account of situations where a behaviour is not completely under an individual’s control, such 
as when people are not able to act because they lack appropriate opportunities or resources 
(e.g. time, money or skills).  The perceived behavioural control variable refers to a person’s 
perceptions of her or his ability (i.e., ease or difficulty) to perform a given behaviour.  Such a 
perception influences intentions.  This variable also reflects aspects of the person, such as her 
or his level of self-efficacy, and aspects of the behaviour, such as the necessity of obtaining 
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the cooperation of others to accomplish it.  According to the theory of planned behaviour, a 
person's intention to perform a behaviour increases as perceived behavioural control 
strengthens. 
In its original formation, theory of planned behaviour considered behavioural control to be 
mediated by intention (Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen & Madden, 1986).  In a second version, Ajzen 
(1988) noted that perceived behavioural control may accurately reflect actual control and 
went on to postulate a direct link between control and behaviour, which is not mediated by 
intention. 
Though not without criticism (see for example Sarver 1983; Lalljee et al., 1984), the basic 
theory of planned behaviour model has been refined, developed and tested over many years.  
For instance, the predictive power of the theory of planned behaviour model has been shown 
to improve with the addition of other factors.  As an illustration, in the context of beverage 
consumption, frequently-performed, low-involvement behaviour, such as eating and drinking, 
has been found to be influenced by habit or past behaviour in addition to attitudes and 
subjective norm (Bentler & Speckart, 1979; Ronis et al., 1989; Rutter & Bunce, 1989; Tourila 
& Pangborn, 1988).   
The structural linkages between attitudes, subjective norms, intentions, perceived behavioural 
control, and behaviour, as postulated by theory of planned behaviour, offer a framework upon 
which the behavioural implications suggested by institutional theory, stakeholder theory, 
resource-based theory, and life-cycle management theory could be integrated to examine how 
organizations respond to environmental imperatives.  According to the precepts of the theory 
of planned behaviour model, an organization’s behavioural response to an environmental 
issue arising from its operations would depend very much on its intention to adopt that 
response mode (e.g., end-of-pipe or pollution prevention).   The firm’s behavioural intention, 
in turn, would depend on three factors: its attitude towards a particular response mode, its 
subjective norm, and its perceived behavioural control. 
In adapting the model to the context of understanding a firm’s choice of the response mode to 
green implementation, the “intention” variable is termed as “natural environmental 
orientation” (NEO).  While Menguc and Ozanne (2005) also use the term NEO, this study 
does not view NEO as Menguc and Ozanne (2005) do.  This is because Menguc and Ozanne 
(2005) consider NEO as a proactive posture toward the environment and comprises three 
components, i.e., entrepreneurship, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and commitment to 
the natural environment, as three core resources “that will give rise to a NEO” (p. 431).  
Instead, this study draws on the concept of CSR expounded by Caroll (1979), Wartick and 
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Cochran (1985) and Clarkson (1988, 1991) to define NEO as a summary posture of an 
organization toward the natural environment and comprises four categories: resistive, 
reactive, accommodative and proactive.  The distinctions between the four categories, in 
terms of attitude toward external pressure, responsibility on natural environment, and taking 
actions toward environmental imperatives are outlined in Table 2.6. 
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TABLE 2.6: DIMENSIONS OF RESISTIVE, REACTIVE, ACCOMMODATIVE AND 
PROACTIVE NATURAL ENVIRONMENTAL ORIENTATION 
 
Natural 
Environmental 
Orientation 
Attitude toward external 
pressure 
Attitude toward 
responsibility on natural 
environment  
Attitude on taking actions 
toward environmental 
imperatives  
Resistive Resist external pressure Refuse to accept 
responsibility for impact of 
its activities on natural 
environmental  
Take action solely because 
non-action would result in 
litigation 
Reactive Do not resist external 
pressure but view them as 
performance-inhibiting 
Admit duty of care toward 
natural environment 
Take actions largely in 
accordance with legal 
requirements and social 
norms 
Accommodative Accept external pressure as 
progressive 
Accept full responsibility 
for impact of its activities 
on natural environment 
Embrace actions consistent 
with interests in protecting 
natural environment 
Proactive Support external pressure 
to extent of championing to 
increase their effectiveness 
Anticipate what its 
responsibilities toward 
natural environment might 
entail 
Take actions in anticipation 
of market trends, social 
norms or policy changes to 
regenerate environment 
quality 
 
Applying the theory of planned behaviour model to the context of the organization, the firm’s 
attitude towards the response mode is thus considered as shaped by its salient beliefs about 
the particular response mode, weighted by its assessment of the likelihood that adopting that 
response mode would result in a given outcome.  Given that attitudes are made up of beliefs 
that are accumulated over time, from either direct experience, information; or from inference 
(i.e., self-generated), they would be equivalent to the concept of cognitive forces, which is 
one of the three pillars underpinning institutional theory (Scott, 2004). 
Subjective norm, according to theory of reason action, is determined by normative beliefs, 
about what other relevant people (i.e., salient referents, such as primary stakeholders) would 
advise, demand or would hold, modified by the firm’s motivation to comply with the advice 
of those salient referents.  To the extent that stakeholders’ pressure, in particular primary 
stakeholders, have been found to have a significant effect on a firm’s response to 
environmental issue (Sharma & Henriques, 2005), the behavioural underpinnings of 
stakeholder theory fit into this part of the theory of planned behaviour model.   
Given that environmental stakeholders include all persons, organizations, and institutions that 
can affect or be affected by a firm’s environmental strategies (Freeman, 1984), regulators and 
community groups would thus fall within this definition (Banerjee et al., 2003).  In this sense, 
stakeholders’ pressures, as such, would encompass both coercive pressures (from regulators), 
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and normative pressures (from community groups).  Indirectly, institutional theory also 
augurs well into the subjective norm variable of the theory of planned behaviour model. 
In the case of perceived behavioural control, Azjen (1991) explains that it is “people’s 
perception of the ease or difficulty of performing the behaviour of interest” (p. 183).  The 
construct covers the resources and opportunities available to the person to carry out the 
behaviour.  In the context of corporate environmentalism, perceived behavioural control 
would equate to a firm’s resources and/or capabilities that may help, or hinder, the firm in 
adopting a particular response mode.  The role of resource based view in explaining the 
manner in which firms would be likely to respond to environmental imperatives would thus 
be most visible here – as an antecedent of intention (NEO) and response mode (to GI 
implementation). 
The theory of planned behaviour model is specifically designed to deal with behaviour 
involving choices freely made, where individuals consider the implications of their actions 
before deciding whether or not to act (Azjen, 1991).  By corollary, it would be inappropriate 
to use the theory to study involuntary behaviour.  In the context of corporate 
environmentalism, when an organization succumbs to strong coercive regulatory pressures to 
comply to seek legitimization, its response, in terms of selecting a particular GI 
implementation approach, may be regarded as involuntary.  However, this study argues that, 
even under such coercive circumstances, the firm still has the option to select a particular GI 
implementation approach, such as a pollution prevention, or an end-of-pipe, initiative, to do 
“the same job”.  The involuntary aspect is strictly confined to the part where the firm has little 
or no choice in terms of taking an appropriate action, such as reducing the toxicity of its 
effluent discharge.  The firm, arguably, does have a choice in terms of selecting what it 
considers is an “appropriate” course of action to reduce the toxicity of its effluents.  In this 
light, the framework provided by the theory of planned behavioiur model is considered 
relevant for the purpose of this study. 
According to Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), the link between intention and behaviour can be 
disrupted by the passage of time, unforeseen events or new information. In addition, low-
involvement behaviours are likely to be based on few, weakly-held, possibly unstable, views.  
Given these intervening events, this study argues that a firm’s GI implementation itself is an 
event.  As such, a firm’s response mode to GI implementation at one instance could have an 
effect on the link between intention and behaviour at subsequent instances.  Structurally, this 
simply means that behaviour (mode of response to GI implementation) could have a feedback 
effect on intention (NEO).  In turn, intention (NEO) would feedback on attitude (cognitive 
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pressure) and perceived behavioural control (organizational resources and capabilities).  
These feedback effects are added to the original theory of planned behaviour model, as 
depicted in Figure 2.2. 
Including these feedback effects onto the original theory of planned behaviour’s 
conceptualization thus enables the behavioural linkages between successive GI 
implementation be analysed.  Indirectly, the green capability building paths of organizations 
flowing from the implementation of successive GIs can be studied.  This is the conceptual 
base upon which this study will attempt to explore answer to its research questions. 
 
FIGURE 2.2: BEHAVIOURAL MODEL OF MODE OF RESPONSE TO GI 
IMPLEMENTATION BASED ON TPB THEORY 
 
Attitude toward Behaviour
(Cognitive Pressure) 
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Normative Pressures)
Perceived Behavioural Control 
(Organizational Resources 
and Capabilities
Intention
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the research methodology employed for the study based on the multiple-
case study approach. The chapter will commence by discussing the research design, centering 
on the rationale for the adoption of the multiple-case study methodology. This will be 
followed by the presentation of the research process, covering the identification and selection 
of appropriate cases for the study, the data collection process, and the manner in which the 
data were iteratively analysed to arrive at the results presented.   
 
3.1 Research design 
This study uses a nested, multiple-case design to examine how and why small and medium 
sized manufacturing enterprises (SMMEs) adopt a particular approach to implementing GIs 
under certain circumstances.  Given the equivocal findings surrounding the relationships 
between GIs and organizational performance and the lack of substantive insights into the GI 
selection and implementation process, a multiple-case design, arguably, offers a richer base 
for inducting reliable propositions and delineating more precise constructs and relationships 
for theory building than single case study (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Further, multiple-
case design permits cross case analysis, and a replication logic, to engender a more inclusive 
view of issues compared to other methods (Yin, 2003). 
While the nature of the relationships between GIs and organizational performance may yet be 
adequately explained, an array of theoretical insights has been offered (refer to Chapter 2).  
This research, as such, may be regarded more appropriately as “theory elaboration” (Lee, 
1999; Lee et al., 1999), rather than “theory building”. What it aims to unearth are the 
contextual issues underpinning GI implementation that have not been fully explored in 
previous studies: how the interactions of internal resource capabilities, environmental 
orientation, and external pressures influence the way GIs are implemented in organizations. 
These contextual factors, as discussed in Chapter 2, provide the conceptual base on which to 
extend existing explanations to “simplify, reconnect, and redirect theory” (Lee et al. 1999, p. 
166). 
The nested, comparative case study involves analyzing the way in which, and the 
circumstances under which, individual GIs were implemented in seven SMMEs.  The analysis 
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entails examining the implementation of GIs at the operational as well as the strategic level.  
At the operational level, each of the GIs implemented is a unit of analysis.  At the strategic 
level, the seven case study firms form the units of analysis.  Though complex, the embedded 
design offers a richer process of data review and a more insightful diagnosis of the dynamics 
surrounding the phenomena (i.e., selection and implementation of GIs) under study (Yin, 
1989; 1993). 
 
3.2 Research process 
Broadly, the research process comprises three main stages: sample selection, data collection, 
and data analysis (Figure 3.1). 
 
FIGURE 3.1: SCHEMATIC VIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
 
Sourcing and identification of target 
sample 
Screening of prospective case 
companies 
Invitation to participate in study 
On-site interview and tour of facilities 
Follow-up data verification 
checks 
Data coding, analysis, and 
interpretation 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
DATA COLLECTION 
DATA ANALYSIS 
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3.2.1 Sample selection 
In case study research, sample selection entails selecting cases most suited for purposes of 
illuminating the concerns of the study and providing explanations to the theory building 
process implicit in inductive research (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The number of cases to 
be selected, however, is difficult to determine in multiple case studies (Boiral, 2005). 
Likewise, selecting organizations that fit the theoretical sampling criteria could be equally 
challenging. Wilson and Vlosky (1997) suggest that cases should be chosen for their 
theoretical usefulness.  Boiral (2005) adds that case selection should focus on the quality and 
relevance of the information available, and case selection criteria should be developed based 
on their contributions to theory building rather than their generalizability to a population. 
Taking into consideration the practical issues of managing, analyzing, and interpreting data in 
multiple-case design, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests between four and ten cases as optimal. 
The seven SMMEs in this study were purposely selected to provide variance on types of GIs 
and the way GIs are integrated into business systems (also see Hendrickson & Tutle, 1997). 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, a number of studies  have argued that an organization’s 
environmental orientation exerts considerable bearing on its approach to implementing GIs.  
Taking an organization’s attitude toward environmental issues as a criterion, the theoretical 
sampling frame adopted in this study was constructed from a series of “bi-polar” items, 
anchoring on whether a firm’s attitudes toward environmental concerns was a “proactive” 
posture at one end, or “compliance” at the other.   
To ensure that the cases selected for the study could provide the varied empirical evidence 
needed for replication purposes expected of multiple-case studies (Yin, 1994), the sample 
selection process thus encompassed two specific tasks: sourcing and identification of target 
sample, and screening of prospective case companies. 
 
Sourcing and identification of target samples 
As indicated in Chapter 1, this study has targeted SMMEs as the context for analysis. In this 
regard, the target case companies were identified from three major sources: The 2002-03 
Business Review Weekly Small and Medium Enterprise (BRW SME) Fast 100 Database, 
Australian Manufacturing Association’s Membership List, and recommendations by RMIT 
Alumni. A preliminary background check of the list of companies from the three sources was 
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first conducted based on information provided on the websites of these companies (where 
available), followed by phone and email inquiries to ensure the target firms met the criterion 
of being an SMME. The identification process short-listed 50 prospective case companies, all 
privately owned SMMEs, as its target sample.  
 
Screening of prospective case companies 
The 50 short-listed case study candidates were further screened to obtain specific information 
on the GIs adopted. The screening was conducted via a number of means.  Companies 
identified from the 2002-2003 BRW SME Fast 100 Databases (23 in total) and the Australian 
Manufacturing Association’s Membership List (20 in total) were emailed a short exploratory 
questionnaire, which asked them to indicate their attitudes toward the environment, and the 
types of GI technology implemented in the last 10 years (see Exploratory Questionnaire for 
Screening in Appendix A).  For companies that did not respond after two weeks, a series of 
follow-up phone calls were made requesting them to complete the questionnaire. In about 
85% of the cases, the follow-up phone reminders essentially became a phone interview when 
a senior manager of the company was requested to provide the requisite information over the 
phone. In the case of companies identified by recommendations of RMIT alumni (7 in total), 
the screening was done entirely by phone interview without any prior email being sent.  
The results of the exploratory screening exercise were tabulated (see Table 3.1), from which 
20 were identified to ensure that the companies to be selected for the multiple-case study 
would be sufficiently spread across the “environmental concern” dimension. The 20 
companies were approached to participate in the study. Seven companies eventually agreed 
and completed the semi-structured interviews, which lasted between two and three hours on 
average. 
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TABLE 3.1: DISTRIBUTION OF 50 SHORT-LISTED CASE COMPANIES BY 
ENVIRONMENTAL ORIENTATION AND APPROACH TO GI 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Environmental Orientation  
GI Technology Adopted Compliant Supportive Proactive 
Pollution Control Only 5 7 0 
Pollution Prevention Only 2 2 10 
Pollution Control and Pollution 
Prevention 
3 14 7 
Total 10 23 17 
The seven case study companies that constituted the sample for the multiple-case study in this 
research fall into three modes of environmentalism: compliant, supportive (responsive), and 
proactive.  A brief profile of each of company is provided in Table 3.2. 
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TABLE 3.2: BRIEF PROFILE OF SEVEN CASE COMPANIES  
 
Case 
company 
Nature of 
business 
Year of 
establishment of 
manufacturing 
plant 
Work force 
(number of 
equivalent full-
time workers) 
Period during which 
production-related 
GIs were introduced 
GVCordial 
Cordial and 
Spring Water 
Production 
1996* 11 1996 - 2000 
BAPlastic Manufacturing of Plastic Packages 1996 65 2001 
EDevice 
Manufacturing of 
Power Converters 
for Cars 
1979 29 1998 - 2002 
CNW 
Wheels and 
Castors 
Manufacturing 
1920 107 1990 - 2004 
Car-Seat Car Seats Manufacturing 1997 300 1997 - 2004 
CAPigment 
Trading and 
Manufacturing of 
Colour Pigments 
1998 15 1998 - 2000 
TADairy Manufacturing of Dairy Products 1910 370 1978- 1998 
Note:  This refers to the year at which the present owner took over management of the company.  GVCordial 
was established in the 1920s. 
 
3.2.2 Data collection 
Answering “how” and “why” questions typically requires multiple sources of information be 
used to facilitate a diverse range of interpretations (Yin, 1994; Scholz and Tietje, 2002).  This 
research used semi-structured interviews, a structured questionnaire, and a range of secondary 
data sources, including company and product brochures, marketing and annual reports, 
environmental policy documents, performance charts, marketing and promotion slides, 
intranet news, and website of mother company, to gather multiple evidence to explore the 
phenomenon. 
On-site Semi-Structured interviews 
Informants for the formal semi-structured interviews were essentially confined to one key 
person who had sufficient knowledge of the company’s background and history in 
implementing production-related GIs.  Of the seven informants, two were CEO, two were 
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General Manager, one hold the title of Supply Chain Manager, one was a Plant Manager, and 
one, a Project Engineering Manager. 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted on-site the premise of the case company and 
were guided by an Interview Protocol (see Appendix C), which comprised a series of lead 
questions to prompt the interviewee to relate his or her knowledge of the circumstances 
surrounding and/or leading to the decision to implement a production-related GI.  
Interviewees were requested to describe those circumstances, as they understood them, 
focusing on the principal events leading to the implementation of the GIs: how each initiative 
was identified, assessed or reassessed over time, the factors that triggered the decision to 
adopt the initiative, and the subsequent impacts generated.  The interview followed a 
“courtroom” style interrogation, where interviewees were (gently) reminded to focus on facts 
and events rather than their personal interpretations (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Following the interview, which was taped recorded and typically lasted between two and 
three hours, a structured questionnaire (see Appendix yy) was left with the interviewee, 
asking him/her to fill it out at his/her convenience and to post it back to the researcher when 
completed.  The structured questionnaire consisted largely of closed-ended questions plus a 
few open-ended questions. The closed-ended questions were framed in the form of a series of 
provocative or suggestive statements where respondents were asked to rate their agreement or 
disagreement with the statement on a 7-point Likert scale.  The open-ended questions focused 
on the company’s environmental resource capability at the time of implementing each 
production-related GI. 
At the time of scheduling the appointment for the on-site interview, permission was also 
sought from the case company to enable the researcher to tour the site facility either before or 
after the semi-structured interview.  The site-tour took place in six of the seven case 
companies studied.  TADairy was the only one where such an opportunity was not considered 
convenient at the day of the interview.  The site-tour was extremely beneficial in aiding the 
researcher to understand the technical details associated with each of the GIs described. 
At the conclusion of the interviews, supplementary data, such as company reports, 
environmental policy statements, product catalogues, production process charts, and company 
promotion materials were sought.  Since the interview content remained fresh within the mind 
of the interviewees, it enabled the interviewees to identify relevant supplementary information 
sources for the study. 
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The recorded interviews were transcribed within two weeks of the interviews.  The interview 
transcripts were reviewed by cross-referencing them to the secondary sources collected.   
 
3.3.3 Data analysis 
The purpose of the data analysis is to understand the circumstances leading to or surrounding 
the implementation of production-related GIs in the case company.  With the overall objective 
of inducting (or extending) theory from the case study data, the data analysis process was 
iterative, with constant referral made between data sources, the literature and the multi-
theoretical framework (Miles & Huberman,  1994).  The process commenced with the review 
of the interview transcripts and the large array of secondary data collected, guided by 
procedures recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994) and Strauss and Corbin (1998).  
The first step involved the compilation of the case histories relating to the implementation of 
individual GIs for each of the seven companies.  In the process, all ambiguous events, unclear 
issues and questions, especially about specific processes or aspects appearing contradictory to 
information revealed by secondary data sources, were raised in a series of either follow-up 
interviews or clarification checks, depending on the availability of the interviewee for further 
face-to-face interviews.  The follow-up clarification checks were accomplished via either 
email correspondence or phone discussions.  Table 3.3 summarizes the face-to-face interview 
sessions and follow-up clarification checks for each of the seven case companies. 
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TABLE 3.3: SUMMARY OF FACE-TO-FACE INTERVIEWS AND FOLLOW-UP 
CLARIFICATION CHECKS 
Case 
company Interview record  Follow-up checks 
GVCordial 
- Number of Interview: 1 
- Position of Interviewee: 
General Manager 
- Number of Follow-up: 2  
- Supplementary information sources: company’s 
brochures and marketing and annual reports. 
BAPlastic 
- Number of Interview: 1 
- Position of Interviewee: 
CEO 
- Number of Follow-up: 3 
- Supplementary information sources: company’s 
reports and brochures, 2002-03 BRW SME Fast 
100 database. 
EDevice 
- Number of Interview: 2 
- Position of Interviewee: 
CEO 
- Number of Follow-up: 2 
- Supplementary information sources: company’s 
website, environmental policy documents, 2002-
03 BRW SME Fast 100 Database.  
CNW 
- Number of Interview: 2 
- Position of Interviewee: 
Supply Chain Manager 
- Number of Follow-up: 3 
- Supplementary information sources: company’s 
website, and environmental policy documents.   
Car-Seat 
- Number of Interview: 4 
- Position of Interviewee: 
Plant Manager 
- Number of Follow-up: 3 
- Supplementary information sources: 
performance charts, company’s marketing and 
promotion slides, intranet news, mother 
company’s website.  
CAPigment 
- Number of Interview: 1 
- Position of Interviewee: 
General Manager 
- Number of Follow-up: 2 
- Supplementary information sources: company’s 
product brochures, and mother company’s 
website 
TADairy 
- Number of Interview: 2 
- Position of Interviewee: 
Project Engineering 
Manager 
- Number of Follow-up: 2 
- Supplementary information sources: company’s 
websites, company’s annual reports, and 
brochures. 
 
Following the follow-up interviews and clarification checks, the case histories pertaining to 
the implementation of the GIs were revised.  From the individual case histories, a 
“relationship map” was constructed for each case company, indicating the linkages between 
factors affecting, and issues related to, business operations and the adoption of GIs.  An 
example of the “relationship map” constructed for CNW is depicted in Figure 3.2.  These 
“relationship maps”, together with the accompanying notes, were then independently 
reviewed by two research supervisors in consultation with the compiled case histories.  The 
revised “relationship maps” complete with accompanying notes were then sent to 
interviewees for their verification and confirmations of the relationships interpreted.  This 
process, which took close to 15 months to complete, helps improve understanding of the 
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environmental orientation of the case study companies as well as the perceptions of the 
interviewees with regard to the impacts of the GIs implemented. 
The case histories, “relationship maps” and the interpreted findings were used for two types 
of analysis: within case and cross-case (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  As with the tradition of 
inductive study, no a priori hypotheses were generated.  The within case analysis, documented 
in Chapter 4, focuses on describing the circumstances leading to and surrounding the 
implementation of each of the production-related GIs implemented by the case companies.  It 
also delves into the environmental orientation of the case company, together with the 
environmental resources and capabilities the firm possessed or planned to acquire during the 
implementation process.  The objective was to develop generalizable constructs, in terms of 
the interactions of the different forces or factors affecting the choice of an approach, and 
relationships between the different GIs implemented.  In the latter instance, attention was 
directed to exploring how the experience gained from the implementation of one GI led to, or 
influenced, the decision to adopt similar or different approaches when implementing 
subsequent GIs.  
  
 67 
F IGURE 3.2: ILLUSTRATIVE “RELATIONSHIP MAP” OF GIS AND BUSINESS OPERATIONS: CASE OF CNW 
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In the cross-case analysis, the focus was on identifying the presence or absence of similar 
constructs and relationships between the seven case companies.  The purpose was to identify 
comparable themes among the cases based on the constructs and relationships identified at the 
within-case analysis.  A large number of tables and charts were constructed to display the 
within-case constructs and relationships for comparisons and deliberations.  The iterative 
process lasted about nine months, where conceptual insights were debated, revised and 
reinterpreted, and repeatedly cross-referenced against extant literature to obtain a rich 
interpretation.  Though the interpreted relationships and patterns that emerged may not have 
fitted the data perfectly, the process has maximized the effect of the “replication logic” 
offered by case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin 1994; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
 
Issues of Validity, Reliability, and Generalizability of Findings 
Qualitative research is not expected to adhere to the standards of validity, reliability, and 
generalizability laid down for quantitative research.  Nonetheless, it is important to ensure the 
veracity of observations and the objectivity of the findings (Stewart, 1998).  To address these 
issues, the following strategies and precautions were taken during the process of data 
analysis: 
 
Construct validity  
To establish construct validity, defined as the incidence or repeatability of an observation, 
event or interpretation (Stake, 1994), the study employed multiple sources of evidences, also 
known as triangulation.  In addition, the interviewees were also requested to verify the 
transcript of their interviews as a form of validity check to clarify meanings and to ensure the 
different ways a phenomenon or event was being seen were captured (Stake, 1994).  The 
researcher’s interpretation was also compared and checked against the independent view of 
two research supervisors.  After being verified with supervisors’ analysis, drafts of the 
interpreted findings were also sent to the interviewees for review and comment.
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Internal validity 
To assure internal validity, this research employs the rival hypothesis testing tactic by 
deviating theoretical propositions from existing research before field research was conducted 
and data analysed.  The presence or absence of variations predicted by these propositions 
provides explanations for influences of variables on observed relationships. The iterative data 
collection and revision processes adopted facilitated pattern matching to generate explanatory 
propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Furthermore, the use of an embedded design increases 
degree of freedom, assisting observations in each case and across cases (Yin, 1994).  
 
External validity 
External validity is recognized as an inherent shortcoming of case study research.  The 
objective of this study is to develop in-depth knowledge at a particular GI integration setting, 
and from this base, develop a number of research propositions for testing across more 
representative samples. However, the degrees to which the contextual factors influence each 
GI adopted vary greatly (Shah & Ward, 2003).  This is a challenge in comparing GIs within 
and across firms. Yet, Yin (1989) argues that findings are generalizable to theory rather than 
populations.  Moreover, analytical generalization in case studies is accomplished through 
replication logic, which allows findings of a study to be applied to other situations. 
 
Reliability  
Reliability is enhanced by the development and use of an interview protocol, an establishment 
of a research database compiled from report data, interview records and transcription, and 
note taken during analysis.  A limitation resulting from “inferences” or “guesses” and 
interpreted views of interviewees on some events that happened, and/or decisions taken, 
before they occupied their current positions is unavoidable due to the long historical events 
that this study was after.  However, McCutcheon and Meredith (1993) have argued that 
multiple measures, using different data sources, can reduce this limitation by comparing notes 
made during interviews with annual reports, internal memos, financial records, sales figures 
and archival information.  This study had attempted to rectify this known weakness by 
repeatedly referencing these alternative sources. 
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The tactics used for addressing the validity and reliability issues are summarized in Table 3.4. 
 
TABLE 3.4 TACTICS FOR FOUR DESIGN TESTS 
Tests Tactics Phase of research in 
which tactic occurs 
Construct 
validity 
- Use multiple sources of 
evidence: companies’ 
websites, annual reports,  
- Have key informants review 
draft case study report 
- Data collection 
 
- Data collection and 
analysis 
Internal validity - Do pattern matching: rival 
hypothesis testing 
- Data analysis 
External 
validity 
- Use replication logic in 
multiple case design 
- Research design 
Reliability - Use case study protocol - Data collection 
Source: Yin (1994). 
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CHAPTER 4:  WITHIN CASE ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the within case analysis, which is accomplished at two levels.  The first 
level focuses on the individual GIs implemented by the case companies, examining the 
manner in which and the circumstances leading to and surrounding the implementation of 
each.  It includes a contextual analysis of the circumstances unearthed, covering the three 
institutional sets of pressures, i.e., coercive, normative, and cognitive, the environmental 
resource capability of the company at the time of implementation, as well as the 
environmental orientation at the time.  Because of the enormous amount of information 
involved, the analyses of the individual GIs are summarized in tabular form (Tables 4.1 to 
4.7). 
The second level of analysis is directed at the operational posture of the case company at the 
time of implementing each GI.  The focus is on the triggers that led to the implementation 
decision, the interplay between the various sets of driving forces that brew the situation to a 
head.  Emphasis is also placed on tracking the causal linkages, where visible, between the 
circumstances surrounding the implementation of each GI with the case company.  For each 
case company, an impact assessment of the GIs implemented concludes the analysis. 
 
4.1 Case Company 1: Environmental Blending at GVCordial 
 
Implementation of GIs 
GVCordial implemented three production-related GIs between 1996 and 2000: using recycled 
bottles and packaging for production and distribution (GI-1: 1996), adopting new bottling 
technology (GI-2: 2000), and recycling wash water (GI-3: 2000).  All three involved a change 
in the production process.  The use of recycled bottles and packaging for production and 
distribution (GI-1) required the creation of a reverse logistics chain to be integrated into the 
company’s existing distribution system, mandating a modification of GVCordial’s long-
established product distribution procedure.  The adoption of the new bottling technology (GI-
2) warranted the installation of new machineries and production lines, leading to a complete 
overhaul of the established production system.  Because the new bottling technology allowed 
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bottle rinsing and sterilizing, bottling, and capping to be performed sequentially, it became 
possible for GVCordial to consider using recycled wash water for bottle washing and 
equipment cleaning (GI-3) by piping water from the final rinse into a water tank from which 
water for the initial wash could be drawn.  No additional modification to the production 
operation process was needed other than the changes already made with the introduction of 
GI-2.  In this sense, all three GIs can be regarded as a pollution prevention approach aiming at 
attaining competitive advantage.  The circumstances leading to the implementation of the 
three GIs (Tables 4.1 (a) to 4.1 (c)) suggest that GVCordial was engaging in a process of 
environmental blending, embedding environmentally friendly practices into its production 
process to achieve operation efficiency.  
 
The implementation of the program to collect and recycle used glass and plastic bottles, and 
packaging containers (GI-1) was the first production-related GI that GVCordial implemented 
under its new owner and management.  It occurred at a time when the local community was 
becoming increasingly vocal of the many environmental issues linked to manufacturing 
activities in the region, and “has been heading to the media at the sight of the slightest 
environmental slip from any company” (General Manager, GVCordial).  While GVCordial’s 
primary motive to implement GI-1 was to achieve cost-efficiency, its new management 
cherished the support previous owners had been receiving from the local community because 
of the company’s historical roots as a key employer in a close-knitted region.  It regarded 
such support as “invaluable to its business”, and desired to retain as well as expand this 
historical link as a vital form of market support.  It wanted to be seen as conforming to public 
expectation.  As such, though the new management  was preoccupied with “getting its 
business on track” (General Manager, GVCordial) at that stage, GVCordial was “consciously 
scouting” for GIs that could simultaneously appease the local community to incorporate them 
into its production process to increase operation efficiency and cost-effectiveness.  The use of 
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recycled bottles and packaging in their production-dsitribution befitted the objective of killing 
two birds with one stone. 
 
The implementation of GI-2, and consequentially GI-3, was also the result of a conscious 
attempt by GVCordial to blend environmental-friendly practices into its production processes.  
GI-2 originated from the extreme dissatisfaction that GVCordial had with the bottling 
technology it inherited from the previous management.  The company identified the high 
incidence of breakages during capping of bottles already filled with finished products and an 
inability to include bottle rinsing and sterilizing during the production process, which had 
traditionally been outsourced, not only as two major cost burdens but also two 
environmentally adverse issues that need urgent attention.  Bottle breakage at the capping 
stage generated excessive wastes as well as increased the purchase of new bottles. The 
inability to rinse and sterilize bottles as part of the production process limited the opportunity 
to use recycled water for rewashing.  With its drive toward achieving manufacturing 
competency through environmental blending, GVCordial was not hesitant to adopt the new 
bottling technology when it was shown the impressive performance of an overseas plant that 
had embraced the said technology. 
 
Impacts of GIs 
All three GIs generated some significant benefits for GVCordial.  GVCordial’s General 
Manager estimated that the implementation of GI-1 resulted in a saving of 20%-25% 
packaging and distribution costs for GVCordial, its customers, and distributors in total, 
despite the initial investments on custom-made recyclable packaging containers. The 
participation of distributors and retailers in the recycling program also helped establish and 
consolidate GVCordial’s relationships with these stakeholders.  In the local market, 
GVCordial continued to retain its position as the major cordial supplier without any 
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competition.  In the national cordial market, GVCordial business had expanded almost two-
folds between 2001 and 2004, thanks to the distribution network of its supply chain partners.  
GI-2 also created some highly notable improvements in GVCordial’s production system.  It 
had significantly reduced the incidence of bottle damages during capping under the old 
bottling technology, which not only resulted in considerable product losses (hence wastes), 
but had also been a constant source of production stoppage, resulting in production backlog.    
As the new technology enabled the cleaning tasks – rinsing and sterilizing – to be integrated 
with bottling and capping, GVCordial achieved substantial cost savings by retracting the 
outsourcing contracts for rinsing and sterilizing.  GVCordial’s General Manager pointed out 
that the new bottling technology even reduced the odour of the ground water used for spring 
water and cordial productions.  The implementation of GI-2, in short, not only enhanced 
manufacturing productivity and reduced wastes, but also improved product as well as 
environmental quality.  GVCordial had been receiving favourable customer’s feedback about 
the improved product quality since adopting the new bottling technology.  
The use of recycled water for initial rinse (GI-3) made possible by GI-2 enabled GVCordial to 
reduce some 30% to 40% of the amount of clean water consumed previous to its introduction. 
The program also resulted in less waste water being discharged into the drainage system. The 
reduced consumption of clean water and the lower volume of wastewater discharge jointly 
contributed to approximately AUD $20,000 in annual cost savings for GVCordial.  While a 
relatively meagre amount in the scale of GVCordial’s operation, the benefits of the initiative 
on the environment had been visibly noted by the community. 
GVCordial’s relationships with the local community had grown from strength to strength in 
the last few years, as its General Manager mulled over the company’s achievements.  In his 
words, “it is not just financial gains we have benefited but also the recognition by the local 
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community as a socially and environmentally responsible manufacturer, who has its 
distributors and customers at heart”. 
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TABLE 4.1 (A) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT GVCORDIAL, 1996 - 2000 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-1 
Using recycled 
bottles and 
packaging for 
production and 
distribution 
(1996)  
- GVCordial imposed 
a reimbursable fee 
on bottles and 
containers sent to its 
distributors, who, in 
turn, levied a 
reimbursable fee on 
retailers 
- Retailers, likewise, 
imposed a 
reimbursable charge 
on bottles when 
selling drinks to 
consumers.  
- Distributors were 
fully briefed on how 
the reimbursable 
bottle levy system 
worked and its 
associated cost-
saving benefits 
- Classified as 
pollution prevention 
aimed at 
compliance, and 
frequency-based GI. 
- GVCordial changed ownership and management 
in 1996. The new owners cum managers decided 
to outsource 2 functions – rinsing and sterilizing 
bottles - to keep operation costs down. 
- Costs of new bottles and packages were 
increasing rapidly. 
- Local community was becoming increasingly 
aware of the many environmental issues 
generated by manufacturing activities in the 
region, including excessive use of water resources 
and power, let alone pollution. 
- Bottle recycling had already been a common 
practice among local and regional communities. 
- Distributors and retailers were keen to project an 
environmentally friendly image and willing to 
participate in schemes, such as recycling bottles, 
to garner community support. 
-  
- To achieve 
cost-
effectiveness 
- To be seen as 
environmental
ly ‘compliant’ 
with 
community’s 
expectations 
- Institutional Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (There was no regulatory 
requirement for GVCordial to recycle used 
bottles and packaging for production.) 
o Normative: Strong (Recycling bottles had already 
been a common practice among local and 
regional communities. “Local community have  
been heading to the media at the sight of the 
slightest environmental slips” – GM, 
GVCordial) 
o Cognitive: Weak (GVCordial did not consider 
recycling as one of its operational priorities.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Weak 
(GVCordial management was new to the cordial 
production business. Though it was keen to appease 
the community with regard to environmental issues, 
it had little knowledge about environmental 
management.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: 
Accommodative (While GVCordial management 
was preoccupied with getting its business running, 
it was keen to appease community’s expectations, 
and paid attention to understanding the impacts its 
operation might have on the environment. 
- “The most important thing at that stage is for us to 
get our business on track. We also want to ensure 
that our actions coincide with community 
expectations as far as environmental issues are 
concerned” - GM, GVCordial.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.1 (B) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT GVCORDIAL, 1996 - 2000 
 
GIs 
Implemented* Manner of Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-2 
Adopting new 
bottling 
technology 
(2000) 
- GVCordial removed old 
bottling machines, and 
installed a new and 
custom-made bottling 
technology. 
- The new bottling 
technology allowed four 
tasks - rinsing, 
sterilizing, bottling and 
capping - to be 
performed sequentially. 
Its adoption required a 
complete overhaul to its 
production process. 
- Classified as pollution 
prevention aimed at 
competitive advantage, 
and trait-based GI. 
- The former bottling technology had two major 
problems: high incidence of breakages during capping 
of bottles already filled with finished products; and 
inability to perform bottle rinsing and sterilizing as 
part of the production process, which had to be 
outsourced 
- GVCordial was making considerable efforts to 
improve its manufacturing competency. 
- A recent draught in the Murray Darling region, where 
GVCordial’s cordial bottling plant was located, 
pushed the company to “do everything to conserve 
water resources”. (such as cutting down water 
consumption (see GI-3) changing all its lightings to 
energy efficient bulbs) 
- After putting its production operation in place, 
GVCordial had begun actively seeking ways to reduce 
production wastes and losses while improving product 
quality. 
- GVCordial scoped the cordial and beverage industry 
to investigate available technologies that could assist 
the company to address the problem of high bottle 
breakages.  Its new custom-made bottling technology 
was modelled after one of the successful cordial 
production plants overseas. 
-  
- To reduce 
production 
cost by 
minimizing 
production 
losses 
- To improve 
production 
efficiency 
- Institutional Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (There was no regulatory 
requirement for GVCordial to adopt a particular 
type of bottling technology in its production 
operation.) 
o Normative: Strong (Local community had 
become highly vocal and critical on a range of 
environmental issues affecting the region directly, 
especially after the occurrence of a recent draught. 
“Local community have  been heading to the 
media at the sight of the slightest environmental 
slips” – GM, GVCordial) 
o Cognitive: Strong (GVCordial had been placing 
strong emphasis on improving its manufacturing 
competency as one of its operational priorities.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Strong 
(GVCordial had been actively pursuing strategies to 
reduce production wastes and losses as part of its 
product quality improvement program and had acquired 
the needed technical knowledge to deal with many of the 
issues.  The adoption of the new bottling technology was 
an outcome of the new capability.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Proactive (As 
GVCordial’s new management got its house in order, 
the company had been taking a proactive approach to 
dealing with not just environmental issues emerging 
from its operations but also those concerning the local 
community. Its launch of an energy reduction program – 
changing all its lightings to energy efficient light bulbs 
in the manufacturing plant to cut power consumption – 
signalled a change from an accommodative to proactive 
attitude toward environmental issues.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.1 (C) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT GVCORDIAL, 1996 - 2000 
 
GIs 
Implemented* Manner of Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-3 
Recycling wash 
water (2000)  
- GVCordial utilized 
recycled water for part 
of its bottle washing and 
equipment cleaning 
process 
- GVCordial piped water 
discharged from the final 
rinse into a water tank, 
from which water was 
drawn for the initial 
wash.  It also replaced 
all nozzles with a water-
saving type. 
- Classified as pollution 
prevention aimed at 
compliance and cost 
reduction, and 
frequency-based GI. 
- Due to a severe and prolonged drought, there was a 
strong movement among the local community to curb 
water usage. 
- The State Government had also introduced a water 
restriction program to suppress the liberal use of water 
for discretionary purposes. 
- It had become a common practice for many firms in 
the region, beside GVCordial, to use recycled water as 
far as possible. 
- As one of the main commercial entities in the region 
that consumed the largest volume of water, GVCordial 
led the charge in promoting water conservation 
programs and exploring alternatives to reduce water 
usage. 
-  
 
- To reduce 
water usage 
- Institutional Pressure:  
o Coercive: Strong (Though no regulatory 
requirement was sanctioned for manufacturing 
firms to recycle water, the State Government had 
introduced a water restriction program to suppress 
the liberal use of water for discretionary purposes.) 
o Normative: Strong (Local community had 
become highly vocal and critical on a range of 
environmental issues affecting the region directly, 
especially after the occurrence of a recent draught. 
“Local community have  been heading to the 
media at the sight of the slightest environmental 
slips” – GM, GVCordial) 
o Cognitive: Strong (GVCordial led the charge in 
promoting water conservation programs and 
exploring alternatives to reduce water usage.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Strong (Other 
than pursuing strategies to reduce product wastes and 
losses as part of its product quality improvement 
program, GVCordial had actively engaged businesses in 
the community to explore win-win solutions to conserve 
water.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Proactive (As 
soon as  GVCordial’s new management got its house in 
order, the company took a proactive approach in dealing 
with not just environmental issues emerging from its 
operations but also those concerning the local 
community. It launched an energy reduction program, 
changing all its factory lightings to energy efficient light 
bulbs to cut power consumption and actively promoted a 
water conservation program in the region, exploring 
alternatives to reduce water usage.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation.
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4.2 Case Study 2: BAPlastic’s move from Visionary Adaptation to 
Revolutionary Production  
 
Implementation of GIs 
Upon its establishment in 1996, BAPlastic actively pursued membership of the National 
Packaging Covenant (NPC), a voluntary agreement founded on the principles of shared 
responsibility among companies of the packaging supply chain and governments at all 
levels, i.e., National, State, Territory and Local, to address the environmental impacts of 
consumer packaging in Australia.  BAPlastic was cognizant that having an NPC 
membership would help the company to better satisfy customers’ requirements, acquire 
sound knowledge of state-of-the-art technologies, and keep the company abreast of the 
plastic packaging market.  In line with NPC’s principles, BAPlastic started a plastic 
collection and recycling program that same year to reduce “the plastic impact” within its 
factory premise.  Though the quantity involved was small compared to normal production 
volumes, this modest initiative reduced on-site solid wastes considerably. 
During late 1990s and early 2000s, most of small plastic manufacturing companies in 
Australia faced tough competition from VISY, the biggest player in collecting industrial 
and kerbside plastic products, and plastics remanufacturing in Australia.  Like other small 
plastic manufacturers, BAPlastic realised that it could be difficult and cost inefficient to 
implement manufacturing using recycled material, because of small volumes of recycled 
plastics available. However, realizing that VISY only had facilities for recovering 
materials like glass, rubber and paper, but not plastics, BAPlastic moved to build its own 
plastic recovery plant as part of its bigger program to tackle “the plastic impact”.  
Though modest, BAPlastic’s plastic collection and recycling program soon created an 
unprecedented awareness among BAPlastic’s stakeholders as well as packaging covenant 
signatories regarding the economic value of recycled plastics as raw materials for plastic 
manufacturing.  To support its plastic recovery plant, BAPlastic expanded its plastic 
collection and recycling program to include industrial plastics, collecting from landfills 
and recycling tips, to launch the manufacture of recycled plastic end-products in 2001.  
The use of recycled plastic waste as raw materials for plastic manufacturing led to the 
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creation of a second production line, which was devoted exclusively for the manufacture 
of used plastic end-products (GI-4). 
The launch of GI-4 encountered several major problems, many of which were attributable 
to the intensive use of labor in sorting, cleaning, and reprocessing before plastic polymer 
could be recovered as inputs for manufacturing.  In addition, the recycled plastic end-
products were found to possess inferior properties, such as low density and low material 
shrinkage tolerance.  Despite the challenges, BAPlastic persisted, firmly believing that the 
future of plastic manufacturing lied in the use of recycled plastics as raw materials. 
In the same year, BAPlastic also replaced the method of self-stick labelling with in-mould 
technology (GI-5) not only to increase production efficiency and improve product quality 
but more so to reduce the use of printed labels.  Similar to the case of GI-4, GI-5 was not 
trouble-free either.  Plastic end-products with in-print labels produced by in-mould 
technology became problematic during recycling: the colour imprints were difficult to 
strip off in the thermoplastic process. In 2002, fronted with the mounting problems of 
inferior material properties and of colour removal with the use of recycled plastics, 
BAPlastic commissioned an external research institution to investigate how recycled 
plastic materials could be strengthened to match that of virgin materials, not only to 
improve the quality of its products, but also to give recycled plastics a longer recyclable 
life-span, i.e., enable recycled plastics materials to be re-used multiple times.  In a more 
specific technical sense, the research team was directed to explore ways to improve the 
properties of recycled plastics to withstand the polymer melting process.  At the time of 
reporting, the research project was still continuing. 
BAPlastic regarded itself as environmentally proactive.  In addition to its induction 
program to brief new staff about health, safety, and environmental issues, special 
information sessions were routinely organized to update all staff on the impacts of its 
production activities on the environment.  The company was constantly in search of 
options to reduce “the plastic impact”, as it called it.  It regarded itself as holding a second 
place in the industry in terms of the volume of plastics recycled.  The company held the 
view that it had always been in compliance with all legislative requirements, to the extent 
that it prided itself as directing “more-than-the-required” efforts to explore ways to 
mitigate the environmental impacts generated by its products. 
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BAPlastic’s management board was highly sensitive to pressures from its external 
stakeholders - competitors, buyers (as firms), consumer organisations, general consumers, 
retail companies, trade associations, and the press - on issues relating to environmental 
compliance.  The company adopted the attitude of “let’s try and do something before 
we’re told to do it”, in the words of its CEO.  The company further claimed that it “made 
it a point” to benchmark its environmental record against industry’s best practices relating 
to recycling. 
BAPlastic recognised that any GIs introduced would not likely to bolster its return on 
investment or cash flows in the short term. Yet, it firmly believed that any actions taken to 
green their production processes could help enhance the image of the company and its 
products.  The company was also less concerned with cost savings when it came to issues 
relating to mitigating the effects of its operations on the environment. Neither was 
boosting productivity its primary objective.  Its aim was, according to its CEO, how best 
to reduce the impact of its operations on the environment through product and process 
quality improvement. 
Many BAPlastic’s external stakeholders had a keen interest on the company’s 
environmental practices, especially its research on the “recyclability of recycled plastics”.  
Several went to the extent of offering financial support in return for a stake in the 
outcomes.  BAPlastic had rejected all such expressions of interests from external 
investors.  It was not because BAPlastic did not need financial support, but that “it doesn’t 
want the objective of the project be derailed,” as its CEO put it.  The company regarded 
this opportunity as “the opening of a new era for the plastic recycling market”.  The CEO 
iterated that this project would be, like its business, “100% family control”.  It would only 
accept financial support from family members. 
Both GIs (GI-4 and GI-5) implemented by BAPlastic involved not only a relatively 
significant process change, but a product modification.  BAPlastic modified its production 
process to accommodate specific batch runs for recycled materials (compared Figure 4.1 
with Figure 4.2).  The process was further transformed when the company adopted the in-
mould labelling technology to replace the self-stick system (see Figure 4.3).   
Apart from having technological changes during the labelling stage, plastic manufacture 
using recycled materials (remanufacturing phase) also required logistical support to link 
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the collection and recycling of plastic products to the melting process where recycled 
polymer resin was prepared for input materials. Logistical assistance was also needed 
between the manual gathering of used plastic products around the plant, and washing the 
used products, before returning them to points where input materials were lined up for 
melting. Therefore, while the in-mould labelling technology initiative was integrated only 
into the production process, that of using recycled material for manufacturing was 
integrated into both the logistical as well as the process life-cycles, as suggested in Asiedu 
and Gu (1998).  
FIGURE 4.1: BAPLASTIC’S PRODUCTION PROCESS PRIOR TO 1999 
 
 
FIGURE 4.2: BAPLASTIC’S PRODUCTION PROCESS BETWEEN 1999 AND 
2001 
 
 
FIGURE 4.3:  BAPLASTIC’S PRODUCTION PROCESS POST 2001 
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FIGURE 4.4: BAPLASTIC’S VISION OF ITS FUTURE PRODUCTION PROCESS 
 
 
The change in input material, from virgin to recycled, created a difference in the qualities 
of the end-products: the shrinkage of virgin material was much less than that of recycled 
resin. While BAPlastic was working with its external research team to lessen the 
shrinkage and improve the recyclability of recycled plastics, the easy-to-shrink problem 
still prevailed in stages post manufacturing, such as packaging, storage, transportation and 
distribution. The company had to employ temporary solutions to deal with the easy-to-
shrink plastic products, including modifying product shapes to fit more products into a 
container and to protect product quality during transportation and distribution. From the 
product life cycle perspective, this change in manufacturing raw material, i.e., eliminating 
use of virgin material, required adjustments in multiple stages of the product life cycles. 
Despite all the hassles and challenges, BAPlastic was convinced that the future of 
sustainable plastic manufacturing lies in the exclusive use of recycled plastic for 
manufacturing (see Figure 4.4). BAPlastic’s journey to the exclusive use of recycled 
plastic for plastic manufacturing could be regarded as a move from visionary adaptation to 
revolutionary production.  
 
Impacts of GIs 
The use of recycled plastics as another source of raw materials had broadened BAPlastic‘s 
product range.  As a result, its sales volume and market share increased considerably. 
BAPlastic was convinced that the two GIs introduced (GI-4 and GI-5) had made its 
production processes more efficient and expanded its product range.  The changes made to 
the production processes also contributed to a reduction in labour, material, and energy 
costs (in terms of per unit production).  More importantly, the GIs introduced had led to a 
noticeable reduction in the amount of virgin materials procured as well as in the volume of 
solid wastes produced. 
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The ability to shift between using virgin polymer resin and recycled polymer resin to 
produce a range of plastic products in response to raw material availability had increased 
BAPlastic’s production flexibility. The flexibility allowed BAPlastic to select input 
material to match customers’ cost requirements. Together with the progressive research 
findings coming from the external research institution, BAPlastic was able to improve its 
plastic product’s quality while keeping the cost down for customers who selected to use 
recycled polymer resin. As a result of this enhanced flexibility, BAPlastic’s customer base 
had broadened considerably.   
When the self-stick labelling system was in use, manual labour was required to attach 
paper labels onto the recycled plastics end-products as they rolled out the production line.  
In addition to saving substantial labour costs, the introduction of in-mould technology had 
enabled BAPlastic to remove the need of printing self-stick labels, which resulted in 
significant savings in paper and ink usage.   
While BAPlastic savoured its first mover advantage in using recycled plastics for 
remanufacturing. It was driven by a sense of “being the best” in the packaging industry, 
when it comes to the issue of reducing “the plastic impact”. The company was not the only 
one that realised the major challenge facing recycled plastic manufacturers: low 
recyclability of recycled plastics. However, it was the first company that sought ways to 
improve the inferior properties of recycled materials. In this regard, BAPlastic has created 
a new pathway for the plastic manufacturing industry. As the research results unfolded, 
the company expected to become a leader in the plastic packaging industry, using its state-
of-the-art knowledge to make its products more recyclable. To a significant extent, it may 
even be deemed as an “impact minimization” approach. 
While it is not possible to link the introduction of BAPlastic’s GIs to its financial 
performance, it was noted that BAPlastic’s cash-flow position and profitability were 
significantly improved between 2000 and 2003, in comparison with its earlier years’ 
performance.
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TABLE 4.2 (A) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT BAPLASTIC, 2001 
 
GIs 
Implemented* Manner of Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-4 
Using recycled 
plastic resins for 
package 
manufacturing 
(2001) 
- From a trial program of 
collecting industrial 
plastics to expand the 
manufacturing of recycled 
plastics end-products, 
BAPlastic embarked upon 
a plastic waste recovery 
scheme, including 
building a plastic recovery 
facility, to bolster input to 
the manufacturing 
process. 
- Classified as a value 
seeking, and innovative GI 
(not sourced from existing 
GIs). 
 
- BAPlastic‘s general manager (GM) believed that the 
plastic wastes found within the compound of the 
manufacturing plant could be a resource. The company 
could sell to other companies or reuse these wastes 
after being recovered. 
- The GM sought professional advice and participated in 
workshops. Through these exposures, the GM realised 
that there was an increasing demand for plastic 
products manufactured from recycled plastic wastes 
from customers that were already members of the 
Australian National Packaging Covenant. 
- The GM also found that its biggest competitor had not 
yet developed any recovery facility for plastic, though 
this competitor had recovery facilities for other 
materials. 
- The GM believed that the company could differentiate 
its products from those of its competitors and brand its 
image as manufacturing environmentally-friendly 
products. 
-  
- To enhance 
company’s 
image 
through 
environment
al product 
differentiati
on 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (There was no legislation  
requiring BAPlastic to use recycled plastics for 
manufacturing) 
o Normative: Strong (customers that belonged to 
the National Packaging Covenant preferred 
BAPlastic to explore the use of recycled plastic 
resins for their products) 
o Cognitive: Strong (BAPlastic was extremely keen 
and firmly committed to use recycled plastic resins 
for package manufacturing, to the extent of 
seeking professional advice and participated in 
workshops to explore feasible options.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Strong 
(BAPlastic built its capability in utilizing recycled 
plastics for manufacturing through a trial program.  
Through professional advice and participation in 
education workshops, BAPlastic refined this capability 
into a core competence) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Proactive 
(BAPlastic had been actively seeking professional 
advice on issues related to using recycled plastic in 
manufacturing.  The company had also commissioned a 
local research institute to investigate the tolerance limits 
for re-manufacturing of recycled plastics.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.2 (B) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT BAPLASTIC, 2001 
 
GIs 
Implemented* Manner of Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-5 
Replacing self-
stick labelling 
method with in-
mould labelling 
technology 
(2001) 
- BAPlastic replaced the 
method of self-stick 
labelling machines with 
in-mould equipment. 
- Classified as pollution 
prevention aimed at 
competitive advantage, 
and trait-based GI. 
- BAPlastic noted a disproportionate surge in labour 
input using the self-stick labelling system when the 
company had to increase its production volumes, as a 
result of an order increase from its European 
customers 
- BAPlastic had long wanted to change its products’ 
aesthetic appearance to attract more customers. 
- The in-mould labelling was a contemporary 
technology used by many leading plastics 
manufacturers overseas.  
- BAPlastic reviewed the suitability of the technology 
for its operation and decided it was worthwhile to 
adopt the technology to the extent of reconfiguring its 
production process. 
-  
- To reduce 
labour post 
- To improve 
product 
appearance 
by imparting 
a quality 
image 
- To increase 
production 
efficiency 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (There was no regulatory 
requirement stipulating the use of a particular type 
of labelling technology for plastic manufacturing.) 
o Normative: Weak (customers that belonged to the 
National Packaging Covenant preferred BAPlastic 
to explore the use of recycled plastic resins for 
their products) 
o Cognitive: Strong (BAPlastic was concerned with 
the disproportionate surge in labour input using the 
self-stick labelling system despite its production 
volume increase.  It had wanted to change the 
labelling technology used not only to cut cost but 
also to increase production efficiency.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Strong 
(BAPlastic had been building up its knowledge base in 
plastic manufacturing, not merely in the use of recycled 
plastics for manufacturing but also on the chemical 
properties of the recycled plastics) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Proactive 
(BAPlastic was driven by a vision: “the best in 
providing environmentally-friendly, quality products 
and satisfying customers”) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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4.3 Case Company 3: Lean Production and Clean Products at EDevice 
 
Implementation of GIs 
Founded in 1979, EDevice manufactured electronic voltage converters, inverters, power 
supplies, battery chargers, electric brake products and associated automotive products for 
the transportation industry.  Conscious of the impacts of its production operations on the 
environment, the company introduced four GIs between 1998 and 2002: recycling metal 
wastes (GI-6: 1998); reducing material wastes via Lean Manufacturing (GI-7: 2000); 
replacing leaded soda with lead-free soda in soldering process (GI-8: 2000); and 
progressively introducing lead-free, weather-resistant car power converters (GI-9: 2002). 
 
The first initiative, recycling metal wastes (GI-6), implemented in 1998, was very much 
an attempt by EDevice to conform to what many other manufacturing plants in the 
electronic and metal industries in Australia had been practising.  EDevice, however, was 
not contented with simply collecting the large quantity of metal wastes, in particular 
aluminium that had been accumulating in its factory compound, and selling the metal 
scraps to recycling companies.  The company knew it could do more by using its influence 
to encourage its suppliers and contractors to join the initiative.  EDevice contrived a metal 
collection and return system to encourage their business associates to send their metal 
scraps and package wastes to designated recycling companies, from which EDevice would 
rank them on a scoring system that measured their contribution to reducing the metal 
impact. In addition to gauging the performance of their business associates against a pre-
agreed set of targets, EDevice would determine whether it would continue or discontinue 
its business relationships with these contractors based on their contribution to reducing the 
metal impact. 
 
The second initiative, reducing material wastes via lean manufacturing (GI-7: 2000), 
comprised two programs: water conservation and waste reduction.  In the water 
conservation program, EDevice recirculated the waste water from subsequent rinses and 
installed flow restrictors to taps to minimize unnecessary water wastage.  In its production 
process, EDevice used to consume large amount of water for cleaning its board surfaces 
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before drilling and etching. A series of subsequent rinses were then performed to 
terminate chemical reactions to protect the board from contamination. As part of its Lean 
Manufacturing initiative, EDevice recirculated the rinse water for other uses.   
 
To further the effectiveness of its water conservation program, the company implemented 
“a water-wise policy’, which demanded that all employees follow a set of simple 
guidelines for water usage.  These included allowing boards to drain well after rinsing and 
shutting down nozzles when not in use.  Supporting its water-wise policy, EDevice 
installed flow restrictors to taps to reduce the amount of water used during rinsing. 
 
The Lean Manufacturing program (GI-7) at EDevice was also underscored by efforts to 
reduce wastes in all stages of the production process, commencing from raw material 
procurement through to packaging and distribution. Packaging wastes from procurement 
and packaging operations were recycled and reused, wherever possible.  As part of the 
Lean Manufacturing program, EDevice introduced a policy to use only cardboard boxes to 
pack its products.  Once products were unpacked, the cardboard boxes would be folded for 
recycling or reuse.  EDevice further displayed a “nothing is going to waste” slogan in a 
number of places in its factory premise to demonstrate that the company was serious about 
recycling.  In the words of EDevice General Manager: “all packages, regardless of their 
sources, could be reused or recycled.” 
 
The waste minimization initiative (GI-7) was, in a sense, a sequel of the recycling metal 
wastes initiative (GI-6) introduced in 1998.  As aluminium recycling proved to be a 
success, EDevice extended the practice to include other materials, such as plastics and 
paper.  In fact, efforts to reduce wastes under the company’s lean manufacturing program 
went further than waste recycling and reuse.  EDevice extended the idea to the use of 
energy as well.  Other than making it a point to use energy efficient machinery and 
equipment whenever a replacement for a device was due, EDevice changed all its lightings 
in the factory premise to energy efficient bulbs. 
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EDevice had, for a while, been exploring how the concept of lean manufacturing might be 
adapted to operations outside of manufacturing production, including studying how some 
of the big companies in the electronics industry had embraced them to cut costs.  Since the 
region in which EDevice’s manufacturing plant was located had been experiencing a 
prolonged draught, the company’s water-wise policy to reduce water consumption in its 
manufacturing plant was, in a sense, implemented in support of the State Government’s 
water restriction program that suppressed the liberal use of water for discretionary 
purposes.  While implementing its water-wise policy, EDevice received strong supports 
from the local council’s Industry Sustainable Program (ISP). With the assistance of the 
local council, EDevice extended its water saving effort to reduce use of other input 
materials as part of its lean manufacturing initiative. 
 
Through its local council’s ISP, EDevice further learnt that some of big companies in 
Australia already run lead-free trial program with positive results.  Coincidentally, before 
2000, EDevice’s General Manager (GM) went to an overseas conference and learnt about 
the Japanese electronic industry’s lead-free movement.  Without much hesitation, EDevice 
quickly initiated a pilot lead-free soldering process for three months in 2000, which also 
generated favourable outcomes.  Boosted by the results of the trial program, EDevice 
projected that the soldered connections would improve with lead-free soldering, which 
would enhance the quality of its electronic converters.  At the conclusion of its pilot lead-
free soldering scheme, EDevice replaced leaded soda with lead-free soda in soldering (GI-
8). 
 
EDevice was determined to become an innovator, not an imitator in electronic product 
manufacturing. When the lead-free soldering trial program further discovered that some 
electronic components, such as ceramic capacitors, still required lead inside the 
components for contacting purposes, EDevice decided it should be aiming at phasing out 
the use of lead in its entire product range. EDevice set up a research team to further 
investigate the application of lead-free soda in other processes as well as to explore the 
possibility of eliminating the use of lead in its final products.  Again, EDevice invited its 
suppliers to participate in its lead-free campaign, encouraging them to explore the use of 
lead substitute, wherever possible, with a view to making all components of its Printed 
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Circuit Boards (PCBs) lead-free.  While the search for lead-free products went on, the 
company commenced introducing its lead-free, weather-resistant car power converters 
(GI-9) in 2002. This was the start of what EDevice’s General Manager called an 
“incremental progression” toward introducing lead substitutes to all its production lines. 
 
EDevice held a “responsible citizen” attitude toward the environment. The company was a 
strong supporter of the local council’s ISP. One of its staff served on the ISP steering 
committee, which gave EDevice prompt access to information and professional advice 
whenever the firm wished to seek advice on GI implementation.  
 
To support the implementation of its lead-free program and other GIs, EDevice 
established an environmental policy in 1999. The prospective policy was geared toward 
enhancing work environment safety, assisting EDevice to comply with regulatory 
requirements while facilitating the development and implementation of a more 
environmentally friendly substitute for lead-based solvent. Under the policy, EDevice 
would arrange biannual health safety training workshops for employees. New employees 
were always provided an induction. 
 
It did not regard profitability as its uttermost business objective. While making profits was 
important to the company, the company stressed that its business goals and environmental 
policy should be achieved jointly, as reflected in this statement of EDevice’s CEO: “that 
purpose should not be achieved at the cost of the environment”.  
 
EDevice greatly valued its relationships with employees and its interactions with local 
industries. It carried out annual surveys of key stakeholders to assess its overall 
performance. The company placed employees’ satisfaction, and sound work environment 
as amongst the most important performance indicators. Apart from that, its interactions 
with local industries were emphasized, as EDevice regarded peer pressures as amongst the 
driving force of their innovation. Together with EDevice’s relationships with employees 
and connections with local industries, GIs were perceived as among the most important 
part of EDevice’s value system.  
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EDevice always took stock of its resources well before launching its important initiatives. 
For instance, knowing that lead-free soda was a future trend in the electronics industry, 
EDevice sought ways to develop and implement lead-free substitutes. Its first activity was 
to source information from the (Australia) Electronic Industry Alliance (EIA), of which 
EDevice as an active member. The company then participated in a series of conferences 
focusing on methodologies to improve some inferior properties of lead-free substitutes 
such as low heat resistance or low yield of electrical interconnection. On the strength of 
this new knowledge, EDevice then experimented in a number of potential substitutes, to 
identify the best substitute candidate for the currently used solvent (leaded). 
 
At the time of this case study, EDevice was building its own premise in Australia. The 
newly built facility would be fitted with the state-of-the-art technologies, aimed at 
reducing noise, minimizing waste, and enhancing productivity simultaneously.  
 
Impacts of GIs 
Consequent to its initiative of recycling metal, plastic, and paper wastes (GI-6 and GI-7), 
EDevice estimated that its production cost had been reduced by no less than 15%.  The use 
and reuse of cardboard trays and boxes during product transfers and distributions also 
helped reduce packaging waste by about 30%. As a result, EDevice reckoned that its solid 
and waste disposal expenditures decreased by 12% between 2000 and 2003.  Apart from 
the tangible benefits of cost and expenditure reduction, the recycling of aluminium also 
lessened the transfer of aluminium wastes between different parts of the production line, 
lowering the exposure level of employees to an accumulated concentration of aluminium 
during production. 
 
EDevice was proud to mention that its employee turnover rate was less than 5% since 
being founded.  Thanks to the energy saving light bulbs, EDevice’s electricity 
consumption was down by 10% between 2000 and 2003.  
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The use of lead-free soda in soldering (GI-8) drastically reduced the level of toxic liquid 
waste discharged to the storm water system, though EDevice’s level of toxic waste 
discharge had always been below the permitted level.  According to EDevice’s General 
Manager, the company saved an estimated $25,000 per annum from treating toxic liquid 
waste after the introduction of GI-8.  Though a very much a front-runner in lead-free 
products, EDevice continued to search for lead substitutes for its PBC components.   
However, the implementation of GI-8, had not been problem free. Lead-free soldering 
process required PBC materials to withstand a temperature of 2600 degrees Celsius during 
assembly.  Therefore, while creating a positive image on its product, the lead-free 
initiative (GI-8) presented a significant cost implication to the company.  The expenditures 
involved in researching the selection of suitable lead substitutes for soldering, and the 
development of lead-free PCB components “had been exorbitant”, which EDevice’s 
General Manager refused to provide an estimate. However, this cost implication had not 
dampen EDevice’s faith in investing in a lead-free future for electronics products.  In the 
words of EDevice’s General Manager, “this initiative would attract the attention of the 
electronics community and potential customers, those who would like to have no lead 
content in their final products and in landfills.”  Expecting to have its products totally free 
from lead in the near future, EDevice was poised to take a lead role in this new direction.
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TABLE 4.3 (A) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT EDEVICE, 1998 - 2002 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation Circumstances leading to or surrounding Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-6 
Recycling metal 
wastes 
(1998) 
- Aluminium 
scraps were 
collected from 
soldering and 
insulating 
processes, and 
sold to 
recycling 
companies. 
- Classified as an 
end-of-pipe, 
and frequency-
based GI. 
- In line with what many other manufacturing plants in 
the electronic and metal industries in Australia had been 
practising, EDevice joined the bandwagon by recycling 
metal wastes. 
- “While conforming to industry norm was our aim then, 
we also realised that we could recover some of the 
material cost by selling the large quantity of aluminium 
scraps to recycling companies” – GM, EDevice. 
-  - To conform 
to industry 
norm 
- To recover 
material cost 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (There was no legislation requiring metal 
wastes to be recycled.) 
o Normative: Strong (Though there was no specific 
regulation on the disposal of metal wastes and neither was 
the local community making much noise about the wastes 
accumulating in E Device compound, many other 
manufacturing plants in Australia had been practising metal 
recycling. EDevice felt the pressure to comply.) 
o Cognitive: Strong ((EDevice was conscious of the 
unsightly accumulation of aluminium wastes piling up in its 
factory compound and had wanted to find a way to recycle 
them.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Strong (EDevice 
developed its own environmental policy, and established an 
environmental officer position to oversee the company’s 
environmental management activities.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Reactive (While EDevice 
had wanted to find a way to recycle the aluminium wastes piling 
up in its factory compound, it had not taken an active course of 
action to make it happen for a while.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.3 (B) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT EDEVICE, 1998 - 2002 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation Circumstances leading to or surrounding Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-7 
Reducing 
material wastes 
via Lean 
Manufacturing 
(2000) 
- The initiative 
comprised two 
programs: 
o conserving 
water by 
recirculating 
waste water 
for 
subsequent  
rinses, and 
installing flow 
restrictors to 
taps 
o reducing 
wastes by 
reusing and 
recycling 
packages 
- Classified as 
pollution 
prevention aimed at 
competitive 
advantage, and 
outcome-based GI. 
 
- The region in which EDevice’s manufacturing plant was 
located had been experiencing a prolonged draught. 
- The State Government had also introduced a water 
restriction program to suppress the liberal use of water 
for discretionary purposes. 
- In response, EDevice developed and implemented a 
water-wise policy to reduce water consumption in its 
manufacturing plant 
- While implementing water-wise policy, E Device 
received strong supports from the local council’s 
Industry Sustainable Program (ISP). With the assistance 
of ISP, E Device extended its water saving effort to 
reducing use of other input materials by introducing 
Lean Manufacturing.  
- EDevice had, for a while, been exploring how the 
concept of Lean Manufacturing might be adapted to its 
operations, including studying how some of the big 
companies in the electronic industry had embraced them 
to cut costs.  
-  
- To reduce 
manufacturi
ng cost 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Strong (Though no legislation was put in place 
for manufacturing firms to conserve water, the State 
Government had introduced a water restriction program to 
suppress the liberal use of water for discretionary purposes 
with the prolonged draught.) 
o Normative: Strong (The region was in a “water 
conserving” mode, pushing EDevice to conform.) 
o Cognitive: Strong (EDevice was a staunch supporter of the 
government’s “water conservation” movement and a 
volunteer organization in its local council’s ISP.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Strong (EDevice 
developed its own water-wise policy, and participated in the local 
council’s ISP. It had also been gearing its operations up to 
embrace the principles of lean manufacturing) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Proactive (EDevice was a 
staunch supporter of the government’s “water conservation” 
movement and a volunteer organization in its local council’s ISP) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.3 (C) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT EDEVICE, 1998 - 2002 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation Circumstances leading to or surrounding Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-8 
Replacing 
leaded soda with 
lead-free soda in 
soldering 
process 
(2000) 
- Using lead-free 
soda to replace 
leaded soda in 
soldering 
- Classified as 
pollution 
prevention 
aimed at 
competitive 
advantage, and 
outcome-based 
GI approach. 
- Before 2000, EDevice’s general manager (GM) went to 
an overseas conference and learnt about the Japanese 
electronic industry’s lead-free movement. 
- Through its local council’s ISP, E Device realised that 
some of big companies in Australia already run lead-
free trial program with positive results.  
- EDevice quickly initiated its pilot lead-free soldering 
process for 3 months, which also generated favourable 
outcomes. 
- Following the success of its pilot lead-free soldering 
scheme, EDevice replaced leaded soda with lead-free 
soda for soldering. 
-  
- To enhance 
company’s 
image 
through 
reduction of 
lead content 
in products 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (There was no legislation in place for 
manufacturing firms to use lead-free soda for soldering.) 
o Normative: Strong (The local area was running ISP, which 
significantly increased local residents’ general 
environmental awareness. Many businesses in the local 
areas also published their own environmental actions 
quarterly.) 
o Cognitive: Strong (Since its GM learnt about the lead-free 
movement in Japanese electronic industry, EDevice had 
wanted very much to remove lead from its products.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Strong (E Device 
recruited its own research team for the lead-free soda soldering 
project to improve the properties of lead-substitute material 
during soldering) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Proactive (E Device was 
a staunch supporter of the government’s “water conservation” 
movement and a volunteer organization in its local council’s ISP.  
It was championing a move to use non-toxic materials for 
manufacturing electronic components. ) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.3 (D) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT EDEVICE, 1998 - 2002 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation Circumstances leading to or surrounding Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-9 
Progressively 
introducing 
lead-free, 
weather-
resistant car 
power 
converters  
(2002) 
- E Device ran a 
series of trials 
to find the 
“best” lead-
substitutes for 
components 
(i.e., ceramic 
capacitors) that 
still required 
lead for 
contacting.  
- The company 
progressively 
applied a range 
of lead 
substitutes to 
all its 
production 
lines. 
- Classified as a 
value seeking 
and innovative 
stance (not 
sourced from 
existing GIs) 
- Encouraged by the success of its lead-free soldering 
program, E Device conducted a series of trials to find 
the “best” lead-substitute for components (i.e., ceramic 
capacitors) that still required lead for contacting.  
- E Device invited its suppliers to participate in its lead-
free campaign, encouraging them to make all 
components of Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) lead-free.  
-  
- To enhance 
company’s 
image by 
progressivel
y phased out 
lead-based 
products 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (There was no legislation in place requiring 
electronic firms to use lead-free components.) 
o Normative: Strong (The local area was running ISP, which 
significantly increased local residents’ awareness of general 
environmental issues, including exposure to lead or lead-
latent products.  Many businesses in the local areas also 
published their own environmental actions quarterly, some 
of which had discussed issues relating to lead poisoning.) 
o Cognitive: Strong (Since its GM learnt about the lead-free 
movement in Japanese electronic industry, EDevice had 
wanted very much to remove lead from its products.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Strong (E Device had 
invested significantly to build up its environmental resource 
capability through research and innovation since the initiation of 
the lead-free soldering program in 2000) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Proactive (E Device was 
a staunch supporter of the government’s “water conservation” 
movement and a volunteer organization in its local council’s ISP. 
E Device extended the research program, from lead-free soldering to 
lead-free production. It also sent its researchers to international 
conferences to present their finding.  
“If lead-free program was successful with one manufacturing stage, it 
should be possible for other stages to be lead-free” – GM, EDevice.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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4.4 Case Company 4: Discriminatory Environmentalism at CNW 
 
Implementation of GIs 
Between 1990 and 2004, CNW introduced four production-related GIs: package efficiency 
(PE) program (GI-10: 1990); reusing cooled recycled hot wastewater for casting process 
(GI -11: 1994); extending PE program: reducing packaging use, recycling packages, and 
employing permanent packages (GI -12: 2001); introducing an environmentally-friendly 
corrosion protection system for a new range of green products (GI -13: 2004). 
CNW had a long history of supporting its regional communities in different ways, from 
being a sponsor of school sporting events to charity functions.  Founded as a family-
owned wheel manufacturer in early 1920s, the company had cultivated a very strong 
rapport with the adjacent business as well as the more distant residential communities.  
With a long history in the region, CNW had gained a responsible business reputation 
amongst its customers, suppliers, distributors, insurance companies, environmental 
watchdog, and the local government. 
Realizing that recycling plastic packaging and metal wastes had become a common 
practice in the castor and wheel industry, CNW did likewise by putting in place its 
package efficiency (PE) program (GI-10) in 1990.  Rather than limiting the practice to 
itself, CNW distinguished its practice by extending it to its entire supply chain by inviting 
its suppliers and distributors to join its PE program.  As participation in its PE program 
required that its suppliers and distributors made adjustment to their former mode of 
operations, CNW was unsure whether such a move would succeed because of the slight 
inconvenience placed upon its business associates.  It implemented the PE Program first as 
a trial program, involving only a handful of suppliers and distributors.  CNW gave itself 
three months to review the outcomes before officially launching it by enlisting the 
participation of all supply chain members. 
The result of 3-month recycling trial was a resounding success: all parties involved 
estimated a saving of 25-30% packaging costs.  With this positive outcome, CNW was 
able to win over all suppliers and distributors to join in the program.  Consequentially, 
CNW created a positive image of “doing well by doing good” and among its stakeholders. 
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CNW considered itself strategic in the implementation of its GIs.  It prided itself as 
implementing business initiatives (GIs included) “only if the perceived benefits could be 
realized in the short term.”  By taking the implementation of its PE program (GI-11) in 
incremental steps, the company ensured that its benefits were visibly perceived by its 
business associates as a means to garner their support in other ways.   
Because of the cautionary principle it imposed on its business practice, CNW did not 
launched its second GI - reusing cooled recycled hot wastewater for casting process (GI -
11) until some four years later.  Though not considered a common practice, cooling heated 
water from casting operation for reuse had been practised in some of competitor plants.  
While CNW reckoned that this initiative would help boost its image as a company 
committed to building a sustainable environment, it, nonetheless, carried out a simple 
cost-benefit analysis. 
CNW used to discharge the cooled water from casting directly to the drainage system.  
There had never been problems with regard to discharging the cooled water directly to the 
drainage system and neither was there an issue with the amount of water used by 
industries in an Industrial Zone.  Implementing such an initiative, on the other hand, 
would involve piping the hot (heated) water flowing from the casting operation to a 
cooling tower.  A return pipe had to be built to feed the cooled water from the cooling 
tower back to the casting machine.  CNW decided to go ahead with the idea only after the 
results of the cost-benefit study showed a potential savings resulting from the use of 
recycled water in relation to a one-off investment in extra piping.  
Despite the success of its PE Program (GI-10), CNW continued to experience cost 
increases in material and logistic costs as its business expanded.  Through an internal 
investigation, CNW discovered that substantial amount of “package wastes” sent for 
recycling could be reduced through reuse.  CNW extended the scope of its original PE 
Program to include reduction and reuse as their additional features (GI-12) in 2001. 
With its experience in the PE program, CNW fully recognized that the success of the 
extended PE Program (GI-12) hinged very much on the participation and cooperation of 
its suppliers and distributors, who also, coincidentally, expressed their concerns about the 
increasing volumes of packaging wastes and wanted to do something about them.  CNW 
held several meetings with its supply chain partners to develop its well-known durable 
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“tobacco boxes” to support goods movements between suppliers, CNW and distributors 
under the 3R operations - recycle, reuse and reduce – of the extended PE program.  To 
ensure that the “tobacco boxes” could be used multiple times as well as to minimize 
product damage during transit, CNW invested a substantial sum to customize the design of 
the boxes using a light but higher quality material. 
The “tobacco box” was used to store inbound goods which can be sent back to suppliers 
and distributors for reuse. Finished goods were boxed in these containers and delivered 
from suppliers to CNW, from where they were dispatched to distributors.  To entice all 
suppliers and distributors to participate in its extended PE program, CNW introduced a 
range of incentives to encourage the use of tobacco boxes to guarantee the quality of 
products during transit.  
At the time when GI-12 was introduced at CNW, the manufacturing community at large 
had been practising reduce, reuse, and recycle under the Local Council’s Green 
Environment Initiative.  CNW wanted to play a lead role in this initiative.  Extending the 
scope of its PE Program was thus perceived as “making the right move at the right time” - 
CNW’s General Manager. 
With the heightened publicity given to such phenomena as global warming and climate 
change, CNW envisaged that the environmental era for the manufacturing industry was an 
imminent future.  The Local Council had aimed to develop and maintain several 
environmentally sustainable industry zones within the council area and had called on the 
support of local industrialists.  Though the company was not one of those in the high 
environmental impact sector, it wanted to be ahead of its time in addressing environmental 
issues with its products.  CNW ran a pilot study on consumer demand for green products.  
It found that some of its regular clients were willing to pay higher prices for “greener” 
product.  Some even expressed interests in wanting specific supportive environmental 
features in CNW’s new product range. 
CNW proceeded to investigate and developed an environmentally-friendly corrosion 
protection system for their zinc-plated castor ranges.  Throughout the R&D process, CNW 
held quarterly meetings with the Local Council to report the progress of its green project.  
The successful testing of its environmentally-friendly corrosion protection system for their 
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zinc-plated castor ranges (GI-13) led to the launch of a new range of green products 
complete with a huge array of finish options and colors to suit almost every application.  
In the process of extending its PE program (GI-11) in 2001, CNW also introduced a plan 
to moderate energy use during daytime. The company realised that its power consumption 
and the power price was at peak during daytime.  CNW was determined to modify its 
production schedule to moderate energy consumption during day time by transferring 
some of the repetitive tasks to off-peak hours, to cut down on energy consumption during 
peak time.  CNW was aware of the labor cost increase by shifting some of the production 
from day to night hours due to the application of penalty rates during off-hours as well as 
the trainings required for nightshift operators, many of whom were seasonal or semi-
permanent employees.  However, it saw the energy savings as more important, though the 
company might run the risk of incurring higher operational cost in the end.  The change in 
attitudes signalled a crucial turning point in CNW’ attitude toward the introduction of GIs, 
moving from one where all business (including green) initiatives had to demonstrate 
visible benefits in the short term to one in which beneficial GIs should be explored.  This 
change in attitude, according to CNW’s General Manager was instrumental in the 
company’s move toward the production of green products, with the launch of GI-13. 
Of the four production-related GIs introduced by CNW, one, GI-10, was an end-of-pipe 
approach; two, GI-11 and GI-12, could be classified as pollution prevention strategies 
aiming at competitive advantage; and one, GI-13, could be regarded as a value seeking 
scheme.  In all instances, there were no coercive pressures imposed on the company, 
though in the case of GI-10, GI-12, and GI-13, there were normative as well as cognitive 
pressures, as Tables 4.4(a) to 4.4(d) illustrate. 
Prior to 2001, “being green at CNW also means financially viable and legislatively 
accommodating.”  Though it held a responsible citizen ethic, CNW saw the main function 
of GIs as to assist VNW in complying with regulations.  In the words of its General 
Manager, the company would decline to adopt environmental projects at the expense of its 
financial health.  The General Manager added that if those projects only served to comply 
with legislative requirements, the company would find the cheapest ways to fulfil the 
requirements.  Before committing to an environmental initiative, a comprehensive cost 
benefit analysis would need to be carried out to determine the associated costs and 
benefits.  This analysis provided the management with a picture of what and how long 
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benefits could be recouped from GI adoption. After that, a series of GI forecasts would be 
compared and bidded, to provide a basis for decision making. As a small operation, CNW 
had a tendency to focus on a limited range of projects at any one time.  This process 
helped “ensure that GIs adopted were financially viable and measurable within a certain 
time frame”.  CNW admitted that some environmental projects was never developed and 
implemented as their financial forecast showed them to be “non-commercially viable”.  In 
this regard, CNW was holding very much a reactive, though responsive, stance with 
regards to GI introduction, despite its general proactive views towards environmental 
issues.   The GIs that it implemented may be regarded as “discriminatory 
environmentalism.”  
The development of an environmental policy in 2000, followed by the recruitment of a 
dedicated person to take responsibilities on environmental, health and safety issues within 
the company exemplifies this responsible posture.  In this policy, the company clearly 
stated that it should maintain its growth on condition that it occurred within a context of 
employee safety and environmental safeguards.  
 
Impacts of GIs 
As indicated earlier, CNW, as well as its suppliers and distributors, achieved a savings of 
25-30% in packaging costs with the introduction of the PE program (GI-10).  In the case 
of the wastewater recycling initiative (GI-11), CNW saved almost 50% of the volume of 
clean water consumed for cooling purposes.  Further, the use of returned water for cooling 
also resulted in less wastewater being discharged into the drainage system.  Together, 
CNW achieved some AUD $20,000 to $30,000 annually since introducing GI-12.  CNW 
prided itself on going beyond legislative requirements in wastewater discharges.  The 
company was awarded a Certificate of Achievement by the Victoria State’s EPA and 
became a role model of recycling wastewater for the local companies. 
CNW claimed that energy moderation was a right decision. Prior to the practice of 
moderating production volumes, CNW found its electricity bills skyrocketing to 
accommodate big volume orders, with much of production taking place during daytime. 
By shifting workloads to off peak hours, the company saved at least 25% of its electricity 
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costs by adjusting production volumes between day and night shifts.  While labor cost had 
increased quite considerably, CNW reckoned that “it was better to pass the cost increase to 
benefit its employees rather than to hurt the environment”.  The change in schedule, 
indirectly, had also contributed to an increase in work-efficiency due to the need to 
minimize on unnecessary over-time and to meet urgent deadlines with a lower production 
volume during day-light hours. 
The extended PE program (GI-12) cut down solid wastes that could have been sent to 
landfills. CNW reported a 15% reduction of its solid waste disposal costs compared to pre 
2001 operations, though production volume had increased.  This initiative further helped 
reuse some 5%-7% of steel scraps as inputs to production.  While this reduction was very 
modest in scale, it indicates an improvement in resource utilization. CNW estimated the 
combined effects of reduced solid waste disposal and enhanced resource utilization 
contributed to about AUD $9,000 annual cost savings between 2000 and 2003. 
In addition to cost saving, GI-12 also helped CNW to achieve an operational 
improvement.  The use of the corporate tobacco boxes lifted the presentation (and hence 
corporate image of CNW) and maintained product quality during transportation.  The 
participation of distributors and suppliers in extended PE program further strengthened 
CNW’s relationships with them.  Because of the cost saving advantage other stakeholders 
were able to enjoy by participating in the PE (GI-10) and extended PE (GI-12) programs, 
CNW also gained a reputation as a supply chain leader who looked after the interests of its 
chain members. 
CNW saw the introduction of an environmentally-friendly corrosion protection system for 
a new range of green products (GI -13) as its face for the future.  In the words of its 
General Manager, “CNW wants to be ahead of its time and other competitors in going 
green.  This initiative is our competitive weapon for the years ahead.”  
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TABLE 4.4 (A) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT CNW, 1990 - 2004 
 
GIs Implemented* Manner of Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-10 
Package Efficiency 
(PE) Program: 
recycling plastic 
packaging and 
metal wastes 
(1990) 
- The PE Program 
was preceded by a 
trial program that 
lasted three months, 
involving a handful 
of suppliers and 
distributors. 
- Under its PE 
program, CNW 
collected and 
recycled metal 
scraps and plastic 
residues. 
- Wherever possible, 
the solid wastes 
would be reused in 
the manufacturing 
process.  Otherwise, 
they would be sold 
to recycling 
companies. 
- Classified as an 
end-of-pipe and 
frequency based GI. 
- Established in the 1920s, CNW had a long 
history of supporting its regional communities in 
different ways, from being a sponsor of school 
sporting events to charity functions. It had 
cultivated a very strong rapport with the 
adjacent business as well as the more distant 
residential communities. 
- When CNW wanted to launch its PE Program, it 
took the implementation in steps to ensure that 
its benefits were visibly perceived by the 
surrounding communities as a means to garner 
their support.  It commenced by staging a 3-
month trial run with the cooperation of a few of 
its suppliers and distributors. 
- The result of the 3-month trial run was a 
resounding success: all participating parties 
recorded a saving ranging between 20% and 
30% of packaging cost. 
- CNW acknowledged that recycling plastic 
packaging and metal wastes was already in 
practice in the castor and wheel industry.  
However, it distinguished its PE Program by 
extending the practice to the entire supply chain. 
-  
- To reduce 
packaging 
and metal 
wastes 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (Though recycling plastic packaging and 
metal wastes was already in practice in the industry, there 
was no regulatory requirement for CNW to recycle 
packaging and metal wastes.) 
o Normative: Strong (Recycling plastic packaging and metal 
wastes was already in practice in the industry. CNW did not 
want to be seen as a non-conformer.) 
o Cognitive: Weak (CNW also did not see launching the PE 
Program as succumbing to community pressure to conform. 
The 3-month trial run and the inclusion of supply chain 
partners into the program reflected CNW”s cautious attitude 
and suspicions of the beneficial effects of the program) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Weak (CNW did not 
devote much resource to environmental practices. It did not have 
a dedicated person to deal with environmental issues then.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Reactive (Though it 
distinguished its PE Program by extending the practice to the 
entire supply chain, CNW’s attitude toward environment issues 
was one of compliance.  “Being green means meeting financial 
viability and legislatively accommodating criteria.” – CNW’s 
Supply Chain Manager.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.4 (B) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT CNW, 1990 - 2004 
 
GIs Implemented* Manner of Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-11 
Reusing cooled 
recycled hot 
wastewater for 
casting process. 
(1994) 
- Water was piped 
through casting 
machines on a non-
contact base to 
remove excess heat 
and to keep 
operating 
temperature for 
casting constant. 
- The hot (heated) 
water flowing from 
the casting 
operation was piped 
to a cooling tower. 
- A return pipe fed 
cooled water from 
the cooling tower 
back to the casting 
machine.  
- Classified as 
pollution prevention 
aimed at compliance 
and simple cost 
reduction, and 
frequency-based GI. 
- Though not considered a common practice, 
cooling heated water from casting operation for 
reuse had been practised in some of competitor 
plants. 
- CNW used to discharge the cooled water 
directly to the drainage system. 
- There was no issue with respect to the amount 
of water used by industries in the Industrial 
Zone. 
- The initiative was the result of a simple cost-
benefit analysis, which demonstrated the 
potential savings involved by using less recycled 
water in relation to a one-off investment in extra 
piping.  
- CNW also reckoned that this would help boost 
their image as committed to building a 
sustainable environment. 
-  
- To increase  
water 
utilization 
efficiency 
- To reduce 
operation 
cost 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (There was no regulatory requirement for 
CNW to use recycled cooled water.) 
o Normative: Strong (Using cooled recycled water had been 
a common practice adopted by competitors) 
o Cognitive: Weak (CNW did not see the cost-saving 
advantage of using recycled cooled water until after the 
result of its cost-benefit analysis.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Weak (CNW did not 
devote much resource to environmental practices. It did see the 
need to have a dedicated person to deal with environmental issues 
then.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Accommodative (With 
no dedicated person responsible for environmental management, 
CNW made little attempt to investigate plausible options to 
reduce, reuse and recycle at that stage.  The initiative was an 
accidental outcome of an exercise to reduce production cost. 
- “Being able to capitalize on this initiative to project our socially 
responsible image was a bonus.  Our real motive was to reduce 
operation cost” – CNW’s Supply Chain Manager.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.4 (C) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT CNW, 1990 - 2004 
 
GIs Implemented* Manner of Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-12 
Extending PE 
Program: reducing 
packaging use, 
recycling packages, 
and employing 
permanent 
packages. 
(2001) 
- CNW extended its 
PE Program to 
include reduce 
packaging use by 
employing 
“permanent” 
packages in addition 
to its original 
recycling packages 
initiative.  
- The company 
invited all its 
distributors and 
suppliers to 
participate in the 
enlarged PE 
Program which 
emphasised not just 
recycle, but also 
reuse and reduce. 
- Goods moved 
between suppliers, 
CNW and 
distributors were 
packed in the same 
“tobacco boxes”.  
When the goods 
were finally 
removed from the 
“tobacco boxes”, 
they were returned 
to the upstream 
supply chain where 
it resumed its 
productive life-
cycle. 
- Classified as an 
end-of-pipe, and 
outcome-based GI. 
- Despite its PE Program, CNW continued to 
experience cost increases in material and logistic 
costs. It discovered that substantial amount of 
“package wastes” sent for recycling could be 
reduced through reuse.  
- CNW extended the scope of its original PE 
Program to include reduce and reuse as their 
additional features. 
- CNW fully recognized that the success of the 
extended PE Program hinged very much on the 
participation and cooperation of its suppliers 
and distributors, who also, coincidentally, 
expressed their concerns about the increasing 
volumes of packaging wastes and wanted to do 
something about them. 
- CNW had several meetings with its supply chain 
partners to ensure the smooth implementation of 
the extended PE Program. 
- To ensure that the “tobacco boxes” could be 
used multiple times as well as to minimize 
product damage during transit, CNW invested a 
substantial sum by requesting the box 
manufacturers to customize them using a higher 
quality material. 
- The community at large had been practising 
reduce, reuse, and recycle under the Local 
Council’s Green Environment Initiative.  CNW 
wanted to play a lead role in this initiative. 
- Extending the scope of its PE Program was thus 
perceived as “making the right move at the right 
time” - CNW’s General Manager. 
-  
 
- To increase 
logistics 
efficiency 
- To reduce 
material cost 
- To minimize 
product 
damage 
during 
transit 
- To play a 
lead role in 
Local 
Council’s 
Green 
Environmen
t Initiative 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (There was no regulatory requirement for 
CNW to introduce “reduce and reuse” in addition to its 
recycling program.) 
o Normative: Strong (Though there was no expectation that 
all manufacturing plants should be practising “reduce, reuse, 
and recycle”, the community at large had been engaged in 
such a practising under the Local Council’s Green 
Environment Initiative.)   
o Cognitive: Strong (CNW wanted to play a lead role in the 
Local Council’s Green Environment Initiative.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Strong (Since 2000, 
CNW hired a dedicated person to take responsibilities on 
environmental, health and safety issues within the company.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Accommodative (CNW’s 
intention was to play a lead role in this initiative, though its 
original motive was efficiency and cost focussed.  While 
environmental alignment  happened to be a fortunate by-product, 
the company viewed any action consistent with interests in 
protecting the natural environment as “a move in the right 
direction”  
- “ … making the right move at the right time” - CNW’s Supply 
Chain Manager. 
- “Being green means meeting financial viability and legislatively 
accommodating criteria.” – CNW’s Supply Chain Manager.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.4 (D) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT CNW, 1990 - 2004 
 
GIs Implemented* Manner of Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-13 
Introducing an 
environmentally-
friendly corrosion 
protection system 
for a new range of 
greener products 
(2004) 
- CNW investigated 
and developed an 
environmentally-
friendly corrosion 
protection system 
for their zinc-plated 
castor ranges. 
- Following the 
successful testing of 
the corrosion 
protection system, 
the company created 
a huge range of 
finish options and 
colors to suit almost 
every application.  
- Classified as a value 
seeking and 
innovative GI (not 
sourced from 
existing GIs) 
- The Local Council had aimed to develop and 
maintain several sustainable industry zones 
within the council area and had called on the 
support of local industrialists. 
- CNW envisaged that the environmental era was 
an imminent future for companies in the big- 
and medium-sized environmental impact sector. 
- The company wanted to be ahead of its time in 
addressing environmental issues with its 
products. 
- CNW ran a survey and a pilot program on 
greening its product. It found that some 
customers were willing to pay higher prices for 
“greener” product. Some customers further 
expressed interests in wanting specific 
supportive environmental features in CNW’s 
new product range. 
- CNW proceeded to investigate and developed 
an environmentally-friendly corrosion 
protection system for their zinc-plated castor 
ranges. 
- Throughout the R&D process, CNW held 
quarterly meetings with the Local Council to 
report the progress of its green project. 
- The successful testing of its environmentally-
friendly corrosion protection system for their 
zinc-plated castor ranges led to the launch of a 
new range of green products. 
-  
 
- To improve 
product 
quality 
through 
greener 
products 
- To expand 
market share 
- To enhance 
company’s 
green image 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (Though the Local Council had aimed to 
develop and maintain several sustainable industry zones 
within the council area, there was no regulatory requirement 
for CNW to “green” its products.) 
o Normative: Strong (The Local Council’s plan to develop 
and maintain several sustainable industry zones within the 
council area signalled CNW that the direction for the future 
was “green” products.) 
o Cognitive: Strong (CNW had been attuning itself to the 
production of greener products.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Strong (Since 2000, 
CNW hired a dedicated person to take responsibilities on 
environmental, health and safety issues within the company. 
CNW also invested considerable resources in developing the 
corrosion protection coating, which took more than a year.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Proactive (CNW 
consulted its main stakeholder - the customers - in this project. 
- CNW had been participating in the local Tree Planting Day and 
was a key sponsor of the local Environment Day Appeal for the 
last few years. 
- “CNW wants to be ahead of its time and other competitors in 
going green.” – CNW’s Supply Chain Manager.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation.
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4.5 Case Company 5: Car Seat’s Journey from Proactive Compliance to 
Progressive Innovation 
 
Implementation of GIs 
Since its establishment in 1997, Car Seat implemented a total of six GIs: installing an in-
built air filtering system (GI-14: 1997); recycling and reusing supply packaging (GI-15: 
1997); redesigning Kanban containers for internal material movements (GI-16: 2000); 
reengineered the production process (GI-17: 2000); introducing a new foam formulae (GI-
18: 2004); and changing from “mig” to laser welding (GI-19, 2006). 
Being in the medium to heavy environmental impact sector, the newly established Car 
Seat’s manufacturing plant was regularly visited by local environmental regulators in its 
initial year of operation.  Car Seat’s mother company was conscious of the close scrutiny 
that environmental regulators had on Car Seat.  It introduced Car Seat to an in-built air-
filtering system that had proven to be effective in its other branches.  The system could be 
fitted directly onto its production line to minimize the amount of fine dusts emitting from 
its production operation.  Car Seat moved quickly to install the in-built air filtering system 
(GI-14) to demonstrate to the local authority its “proactive” stance toward environmental 
issues. This is a typical end-of-pipe strategy, since the initiative only dealt with air 
exhausts created by the production process. 
Being new, Car Seat was also under pressure from its mother company to minimize 
operation costs, wherever possible.  In sourcing seat components from suppliers, Car Seat 
received high volumes of boxes as packages.  Experience from its sister branches 
elsewhere informed Car Seat that it could reuse and recycle those boxes for material 
storage, both for handling work-in-progress as well as for transporting finished products to 
customers.  Car Seat saw this as yet another opportunity to demonstrate to the local 
authority its “proactive” stance toward environmental issues and also to its mother 
company its efforts to minimize operation cost.  Within months after the implementation 
of GI-14, Car Seat launched its recycling and reusing supply packaging (GI-15) program, 
utilizing suppliers’ packaging to send goods to customers, as well as reusing and recycling 
packaging within its manufacturing plant. When a package containing components could 
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be recycled, it reduced the volume of package wastes generated during production. This 
initiative, integrated into the production cycle, as such, is considered as pollution 
prevention approach.  
While the use of recycled packages had significantly reduced the purchase of new 
packages, it had also created handling issues due to the high incidence of package damage.  
In its continuous efforts to explore ways for waste minimization, Car Seat supplemented 
the use of recycled packages within its manufacturing plant with a durable model.  With 
technical advice from its mother company and drawing from what had been used in other 
sister branches, Car Seat designed a range of durable Kanban containers (GI-16) to reduce 
the incidence of package damage during internal material transfers.  
 With its business picking up after some initial teething problems, Car Seat began to direct 
some of its attention to modernise its production operations.  With technical advice and 
financial support from its mother company, Car Seat spent 6 months to redesign and 
change its production lines.  The design process entailed studying various types of 
production and assembling technologies used by other plants under the mother company.  
The final design was a hybrid of several existing designs with a distinct focus on waste 
minimization.  In 2000, Car Seat reengineered its production process by installing an 
internally designed, fully automated state-of-the-art assembly system to increase the speed 
of assembling as well as to reduce “production wastes” (GI-17). 
Many of Car Seat’s customers were European-based, where environmental awareness was 
reaching an all-time high in early 2000.  Car Seat aimed to assert a dominant presence in 
this “green” market.  Meanwhile, several prospective overseas clients had insisted on 
visiting Car Seat’s factory (to determine its environmental credentials) prior to appointing 
Car Seat as a supplier.  Some existing clients had also taken similar measures prior to 
renewing Car Seat’s contract.  In its efforts to support of this growing market segment, 
Car Seat invested significantly in R&D.  In 2004, its R&D efforts paid off.  Car Seat’s 
R&D team invented a new, environmentally friendly foam formulae to reduce its product 
end-of-life disposal impact on the environment (Design for the Environment) (GI-18).  
The new formula was an innovative outcome of Car Seat’s internal R&D efforts.  None of 
the other plants of the mother company had used such a formulation before. To support a 
faster assembly needed for the new foam design (Design for Manufacturing), Car Seat 
also changed its conveyor belt system.   .   
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Continuing with its efforts to improve productivity, Car Seat focused on exploring a range 
of options for many of its production activities.  Experimenting with the use of laser 
welding to replace the conventional “mig” welding technology was one of many R&D 
activities the company had been exploring.  Results from a series of pilot runs showed that 
laser welding not only increased welding speed but also gave an aesthetically smoother 
finish.  In 2006, Car Seat changed its conventional “mig” welding system to laser welding 
(GI-19).  Recognized by the manufacturing industry as a cleaner production technology 
than “mig” welding, the use of laser welding had propelled Car Seat into a league of its 
own as not many competitors were capable of using laser technology for welding purposes 
then. 
As a branch of a multi-national corporation, Car Seat had, from the outset, every intention 
to comply with local legislative requirements.  Despite the monthly inspection by local 
council officials at Car Seat’s business and manufacturing premise during the initial years 
of business, Car Seat was not at all worried about not having complied with environmental 
legislations in whatever aspects of its production. However, there was the annoyance 
among staff that they were under constant surveillance. Even though not many local 
customers and authorities were aware of the GIs adopted and practised at Car Seat, the 
company maintained its effort in keeping up with local legislation changes, to safeguard 
its compliance status.  
As a daughter company, it was not surprise that Car Seat strictly adhered to the intent of 
the environmental policies laid down by its mother company.  In line with the practice in 
other sister branches, the company also launched an energy conservation program to lower 
its energy consumption soon after its operations commenced.  Though this was not 
directly a production-related GI, Car Seat also changed is roofing system, replacing the 
tile roofs with clear and semi-transparent perspects to allow for natural light to shine into 
the plant during the day to further reduce energy consumption and improve aesthetic 
appearance of the production buildings. Other programs that Car Seat also introduced 
included Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), 6-Sigma, and Car Seat Controls 
Manufacturing System (JCMS).  Other than contributing to productivity increase, these 
programs also contributed to reducing the impacts of Car Seat’s operations on the 
environment. For instance, the use of ERP also enhanced resource consumption across the 
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company while JCMS and 6-Sigma could be used to measure defects and to improve 
process and product qualities. 
Apart from major influences of the mother company, Car Seat was also under increasing 
pressures from overseas, especially European, customers to embrace GIs.  These 
customers demanded that Car Seat’s products met international standards about 
environmental impacts (i.e., ISO 14001) and quality management (i.e, ISO 9001).  With 
half of Car Seat’s customers being foreign companies, Car Seat was quick to realise the 
importance of acquiring these international recognitions.  
Being ISO 14001 certifed helped bring together the GIs which were previously practised 
in isolation - recycling and reusing packages, reducing energy, or filtering air pollutants. 
In addition, Car Seat also achieved a list of national standards: QS9000/ISO 9001 and 
VDA 6.1 quality system certificates in 2000, ISO/TS 16949 (quality management), and 
OHSAS 18000 (health and safety control) in 2003. 
Foam material was subject to disfigurement and damage during transportation from foam 
manufacturing to seat assembly. The new foam formula invented by Car Seat’s R&D team 
helped maintain the quality of seat foam during transport and manufacturing.  At the same 
time, the new formula also reduced product wastes resulting from damaged products 
during transportation. The use of the new foam formulation was also facilitated by the 
durable Kanban containers which gave the foam materials a added protection during the 
inter-departmental transfer. With an increase in hardness, the new foam materials are 
easier to cut and shape into product frames. More importantly, the new foam are bio-
degradable.  
The plan to replace gas by laser in mig welding improved welding quality and reduced 
production wastes at the same time. 
 
Impacts of GIs  
The new assembly technology introduced as part of the re-engineered processes (GI-17) 
enabled Car Seat to assemble all kinds of car seats (front, rear, driver, and passenger) in 
one assembly line. It removed the need for using separate assembly lines for different 
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kinds of seats. Further, automating the assembly system reduced the assembling of car 
seats from 75 seconds to 60 seconds per seat, which translates into an annual saving of 
USD $500,000 for Car Seat. 
The recycling and reusing supply package initiative (GI-15) helped reduce the amount of 
package materials used and the volume of packaging wastes. Together, the volume of 
wastes for landfill disposal was cut by approximately 30% between 2000 and 2002. While 
it cost Car Seat to buy containers for storage and material transferral between departments, 
the company could prevent material loss and product defects. Car Seat reported an average 
saving of USD $35,000 annually from foam recovery and less product defects. Jointly, 
Car Seat saved almost USD $60,000 from enhanced material utilization (package material 
and foam material) and reduced solid waste disposal.    
The company’s effort to minimise resource consumption was demonstrated in the switch 
to more energy efficient light bulbs. The production area used T12 fixtures, each 
contained two 60W lamps. Car Seat replaced T12 fixtures with T8 fixtures that contained 
six-lamp high-bay fluorescent bulbs.  High-bay fluorescent bulbs consumed less energy, 
and emitted more light.  Car Seat was able to save 50,000 kWh or USD $4,000 annually.  
Car Seat’s ability to switch between different types of foam materials broadened its 
product ranges. This was welcome by many Car Seat’s customers, who typically had 
different material and cost constraints. The introduction of GI-18 helped Car Seat increase 
its market share by approximately 10% since while a wider range of products were offered 
with the introduction of the new foam formula, the production process remained 
unchanged. As such, Car Seat was able to offer the extended product range to its 
customers without any added cost, allowing its customers to choose different foam types 
to suit their budgets.  
Having major changes in its production processes (renovated assembly technology, laser 
welding tool, GI-19), Car Seat achieved a substantial growth in production volumes and 
product quality enhancement during 2002-2004, despite the initial investment costs, Car 
Seat was recognised as a fast and well growing company in relation to its peers. Its sales 
revenue registered a 72% increase from 2002 to 2003, and a 15% growth during the 2003-
2004 period. These are some of the tangible benefits emanating from the implementation 
of its GIs that Car Seat’s Technical manager recounted. 
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TABLE 4.5 (A) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT CAR SEAT, 1997 - 2006 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-14 
Installing an in-
built filtering 
system 
(1997) 
- Car Seat 
installed an in-
built air 
filtering system 
to its 
production line 
to filter-off 
production 
dusts. 
- Classified as an 
end-of-pipe and 
outcome-based 
GI. 
- Being in the medium to large environmental impact 
sector, the newly established Car Seat’s manufacturing 
plant was regularly visited by local environmental 
regulators. 
- Car Seat’s mother company was conscious of the close 
scrutiny that environmental regulators had on Car 
Seat.  It introduced Car Seat to an in-built air-filtering 
system that had proven to be effective in its other 
branches.  The system could be fitted directly onto its 
production line to minimize the amount of fine dusts 
emitting from its production operation. 
- Car Seat moved quickly to install the in-built air 
filtering system to demonstrate to the local authority a 
“proactive” stance toward environmental issues. 
-  
- To minimize 
emission of 
fine dust in 
production 
operations 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Strong (Being new and in the medium-to-large 
environmental impact sector, the company was under the 
scrutiny of environmental regulators.) 
o Normative: Weak (Dust level emitted from car seat 
manufacturing had not been an issue, either with the 
automotive industry or its other stakeholders.) 
o Cognitive: Weak (Though Car Seat was quick to install the 
in-built air filtering system,  the company did not possess a 
strong internal drive to take all plausible action to move 
beyond environmental compliance.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Weak (Car Seat’s 
manufacturing plant was newly established in 1997. The 
company’s energy was directed almost exclusively to routinize its 
production operations. “We had little time and resources to 
devote to exploring ways to reduce wastes” – Plant Manager, Car 
Seat.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Reactive (This GI was 
Car Seat’s spontaneous response to its mother company’s 
suggestion. “We just did what was most convenient for us to 
please our mother company and the environmental regulators” – 
Plant Manager, Car Seat.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.5 (B) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT CAR SEAT, 1997 - 2006 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-15 
Recycling and 
reusing supply 
packaging 
(1997) 
- Car Seat 
utilised 
suppliers’ 
packaging to 
send goods to 
customers, as 
well as reused 
and recycled 
packaging 
within its 
manufacturing 
plant. 
- Classified as an 
end-of-pipe and 
frequency-
based GI. 
- Being in the medium to large environmental impact 
sector, the newly established Car Seat’s manufacturing 
plant was closely watched by local environmental 
regulators. 
- Car Seat was also under pressure by its mother 
company to minimize operation costs, whenever 
possible. 
- Car Seat received high volumes of boxes containing 
seat components from suppliers. Experience from its 
sister branches elsewhere informed Car Seat that it 
could reuse and recycle those boxes for material 
storage, both for handling work-in-progress as well as 
for transporting finished products to customers.  
- Car Seat saw this as an opportunity to demonstrate to 
the local authority its “proactive” stance toward 
environmental issues and also to its mother company 
its efforts to minimize operation cost, while being 
environmentally responsible at the same time. 
-  
- To reduce 
packaging 
cost 
- To 
demonstrate 
its 
commitment 
to deal with 
environmental 
issues 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Strong (Being new and in the medium-to-large 
environmental impact sector, the company was under the 
scrutiny of environmental regulators.) 
o Normative: Weak (There was no expectation from the local 
community or the automotive industry that manufacturing 
plants reused and recycled their supply packaging.) 
o Cognitive: Weak (Though Car Seat’s mother company 
placed significant emphasis on Car Seat to control its 
operations cost, there was no pressure for Car Seat to be 
environmentally proactive.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Weak (Car Seat’s 
manufacturing plant was newly established in 1997. The 
company’s energy was directed almost exclusively to routinize its 
production operations. “We had little time and resources to 
devote to exploring ways to reduce wastes” – Plant Manager, Car 
Seat.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Reactive (This GI was 
merely a superficial portrayal of Car Seat commitment to 
environmental issues. “We just did what was most convenient for 
us to please our mother company and the environmental 
regulators” – Plant Manager, Car Seat.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.5 (C) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT CAR SEAT, 1997 - 2006 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-16 
Redesigning 
Kanban 
containers for 
internal material 
movements  
(2000) 
- Car Seat 
supplemented 
the use of 
recycled 
packages 
within its 
manufacturing 
plant with a 
durable design 
- Classified as 
pollution 
prevention 
aimed at cost 
reduction 
advantage, and 
outcome-based 
GI. 
- Car Seat had continuously been devoting efforts to 
explore ways for waste minimization. 
- While the use of recycled packages had significantly 
reduced the purchase of new packages, it had also 
created handling issues due to frequent breakages. 
- With technical advice from its mother company and 
drawing from what had been used in other sister 
branches, Car Seat designed a range of durable 
Kanban containers to facilitate internal material 
movements.  
-  
- To reduce 
cost for 
packaging 
purchase 
- To enhance 
productivity 
- To minimize 
packaging 
wastes 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (With no violation records during its initial 
years of operations, the company was no longer under the 
close scrutiny of local environmental regulators) 
o Normative: Weak (There was no stipulation on the type(s) 
of containers used for material movements within 
automotive manufacturing plants.) 
o Cognitive: Weak (Car Seat’s mother company put no 
pressure on Car Seat to be environmentally proactive) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Strong (Car Seat had 
been taking steps to acquire ISO 14001 status by 2001. The 
company had been devoting considerable resources, including 
sending key personnel to training and organizing environmental 
education programs and seminars for its workers, to build up its 
environmental capability) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Accommodative (Car 
Seat wanted to have not just the most modern facility, but one that 
would be considered environmentally friendly. The company 
believed that environmental solutions could also benefit business 
processes. It modified its factory lighting system to accommodate 
the installation of energy-efficient bulbs to lessen power 
consumption in 2000. 
- “When redesigning our production lines, we took the opportunity 
to see how some of the production wastes could be eliminated” – 
Plant Manager, Car Seat.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.5 (D) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT CAR SEAT, 1997 - 2006 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-17 
Reengineered 
production 
process 
(2000) 
- Car Seat 
installed an 
internally 
designed, state-
of-the-art 
assembly 
system to fully 
automate and 
increase the 
speed of 
assembling as 
well as to 
reduce 
“production 
wastes” 
- Classified as 
pollution 
prevention 
aimed at 
competitive 
advantage, and 
innovative GI 
(not sourced 
from existing 
GIs). 
- With its business picking up after some initial teething 
problems, Car Seat also directed its attention to 
modernise its production operations. 
- With technical advice and financial support from its 
mother company, Car Seat spent 6 months to redesign 
and change its production lines.  
- The design process entailed studying various types of 
production and assembling technologies used by other 
plants under the mother company.  The final design 
was a hybrid of several existing designs with a distinct 
focus on waste minimization. 
-  
- To enhance 
productivity 
- To minimize 
“production 
wastes” 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (With no violation records during its initial 
years of operations, the company was no longer under the 
close scrutiny of local environmental regulators) 
o Normative: Weak (This was purely an internally motivated 
operation-oriented initiative.) 
o Cognitive: Strong (Car Seat’s firmly believed that 
environmental solution could be an integral part of business 
imperatives) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Strong (Car Seat had 
been taking steps to acquire ISO 14001 status by 2001. The 
company had been devoting considerable resources, including 
sending key personnel to training and organizing environmental 
education programs and seminars for its workers, to build up its 
environmental capability) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Proactive (Car Seat 
wanted to have not just the most modern facility, but one that 
would be considered environmentally friendly. The company 
modified its factory lighting system to accommodate the 
installation of energy-efficient bulbs to lessen power consumption 
in 2000. 
- “When redesigning our production lines, we took the opportunity 
to see how some of the production wastes could be eliminated” – 
Plant Manager, Car Seat.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.5 (E) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT CAR SEAT, 1997 - 2006 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-18 
Introducing a 
new foam 
formulae 
(2004) 
- Car Seat 
invented a new, 
environmentall
y friendly foam 
formulae to 
reduce its 
product end-of-
life disposal 
impact on the 
environment 
(Design for the 
Environment) 
- It also changed 
its conveyor 
belt system to 
support a faster 
assembly under 
the new foam 
design (Design 
for 
Manufacturing)
. 
- Classified as a 
value seeking 
and innovative 
GI (not sourced 
from existing 
GIs) 
- Many of Car Seat’s customers were European-based, 
where environmental awareness was reaching an all-
time high. Car Seat aimed to assert a dominant 
presence in this “green” market. 
- Several prospective overseas clients had insisted on 
visiting Car Seat’s factory (to determine its 
environmental credentials) prior to appointing Car 
Seat as a supplier.  Some existing clients had also 
taken similar measures prior to renewing Car Seat’s 
contract. 
- The new formula was an innovative outcome of Car 
Seat’s internal R&D efforts.  None of the other plants 
of the mother company had used such a formulation 
before.  The design focused on minimizing the 
product’s end-of-life disposal impact. 
-  
- To improve 
product 
quality 
- To assert a 
green market 
image 
- To 
differentiate 
its product 
offerings with 
a green focus 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (With no violation records, Car Seat was no 
longer under the close scrutiny of local environmental 
regulators) 
o Normative: Weak (This was purely an internally motivated 
operation-oriented initiative.) 
o Cognitive: Strong (Car Seat’s firmly believed that 
environmental solution could be an integral part of business 
imperatives) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Strong (Car Seat had 
been expanding resources on exploring and implementing 
environmentally friendly programs.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Proactive (Car Seat 
acquired ISO14001 status in 2001 and had been taking proactive 
actions to reduce its carbon footprints on all fronts, which 
included: modifying its factory lighting system to accommodate 
the change to energy-efficient bulbs to lessen power consumption 
(2000); and changing its factory roofing to a tough transparent 
Perspex to reduce electricity consumption (2003).)  
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.5 (F) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT CAR SEAT, 1997 - 2006 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-19 
Changing from 
“mig” to laser 
welding 
(2006) 
- Car Seat 
changed its 
conventional 
“mig” welding 
system to laser 
welding 
- Classified as a 
pollution 
prevention, 
aimed at 
competitive 
advantage, and 
innovative GI 
(not sourced 
from existing 
GIs). 
- In its continuous efforts to improve productivity, Car 
Seat had been exploring a range of options  for many 
of its production activities. Experimenting with the use 
of laser welding to replace the conventional “mig” 
welding technology was one of many R&I activities 
the company had been looking into. 
- Results from a series of pilot runs showed that laser 
welding not only increased welding speed but also 
gave an aesthetically smoother finish.  
- Laser welding had also been recognized by the 
manufacturing industry as a cleaner production 
technology than “mig” welding. 
-  
- To increase 
productivity 
- To move 
toward 
cleaner 
production 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (With no violation records, Car Seat was no 
longer under the close scrutiny of local environmental 
regulators) 
o Normative: Weak (There was no technical requirement 
relating to the choice of welding technology used in the 
automotive industry.) 
o Cognitive: Strong (Car Seat’s firmly believed that 
environmental solution could be an integral part of business 
imperatives) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Strong (Car Seat had 
been expanding resources on exploring and implementing 
environmentally friendly programs.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Proactive (Car Seat 
acquired ISO14001 status in 2001 and had been taking proactive 
actions to reduce its carbon footprints on all fronts, which 
included: modifying its factory lighting system to accommodate 
the change to energy-efficient bulbs to lessen power consumption 
(2000); and changing its factory roofing to a tough transparent 
Perspex to reduce electricity consumption (2003).  
- “We believe in being environmentally responsible not just in 
image, but also in substance.  Cleaner production is one such 
dimension” – Plant Manager, Car Seat.)  
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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4.6 Case Company 6: Accidental Environmentalism at CAPigment 
 
Implementation of GIs 
Since its establishment in 1997, CAPigment implemented three main GIs: dust collection 
scheme (GI-20: 1998); customized packaging efficiency program (GI-21: 2000); and 
pigment recycling and palette reuse or “PR-Square” program (GI-22: 2000).  Of the three 
GIs implemented by CAPigment, both the “customized packaging efficiency program” 
(GI-21) and the “PR-Square” program (GI-22) could be considered as pollution prevention 
measures aiming at gaining competitive advantages.  The dust collection scheme (GI-20) 
was a typical end-of-pipe scheme.  However, the circumstances leading to the 
implementation of the three initiatives (see Tables 4.6(a) to 4.6(c)), in particular those 
surrounding GI-21 and GI-22, suggest that these GIs were essentially by-products of 
business-oriented objectives.  CAPigment had not taken a proactive approach to deal with 
environmental issues. 
Implemented in 1998, the dust collection scheme (GI-20) was not an externally enforced 
program.  Though a permitted threshold for dust concentration regulating the pigment 
industry existed, this requirement had not been strongly enforced by the authority.  As a 
daughter company of a multinational outfit, CAPigment, however, was well aware of 
possible health issues among employees exposed to pigment dust, and the consequences 
such an outfall carried, if it did not contain dust concentration to a level considered as the 
norm in the color pigment industry.  As a newly established company, CAPigment was 
extremely sensitive to any adverse publicity that could disrupt its business growth 
strategies.  As its General Manager emphasised, “we do not wish to invite any unwanted 
publicity that could undermine our growth forecast.” 
Despite an internally initiated scheme, CAPigment did not select options targeted at 
reducing pigment dust at source (i.e., during production stage).  As its General Manager 
explained, “color pigment manufacturing is a non-polluting industry.  Our main 
ingredient, iron oxides, is not toxic, non-fading, chemically inert, weather resistant, and 
light fast.”  The company did not consider the need “to invest unnecessarily”.  
Consequentially, it chose the cheapest, easiest, and most straight forward option by fitting 
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air filters and supplying masks to employees. As part of its dust collection scheme (GI-
20), CAPigment also developed a very detailed accident recovery procedure, outlining the 
processes to be followed in the event of an accidental pigment spillage occurring in the 
factory. 
Located in an industrial zone, the company was never the subject of residents’ complaints 
regarding the noise, dust and wastes that it generated.  The only form of external pressure 
the company was subject to was that of cost control, an implicit directive coming from its 
mother company which constantly reminded CAPigment of the cost cutting measures 
adopted by its other sister plants in other countries.  To demonstrate its capability to match 
its sister branches in this aspect, CAPigment’s shifted its strategic business focus from 
achieving growth to attaining production effectiveness three years after establishment. 
As small businesses made up almost 95% of its customers, whose orders were highly 
variable, i.e., non-standard, CAPigment launched a “customized packaging efficiency 
program” (GI-21) in 2000 with the aim of varying its product package options to suit the 
wide range of product requirements in its move to meet the idiosyncratic needs of this 
increasing customer segment.  Working hand in hand with its packaging suppliers, 
CAPigment would perform an pigment order analysis each time an order was received to 
determine most cost-effective packaging types to suit the customer’s budget requirements.  
Based on experience of its sister branches, CAPigment believed that offering its customers 
a wide range of packaging options designed to meet the specific packaging needs of 
different products (such as from low grade to high quality products) could cut material 
costs and reduce packaging wastes.  The company publicized this program not only as a 
customized service but also promoted it as a GI to boost its corporate social responsibility 
image. 
In its continual attempt to explore cost-cutting measures, CAPigment realized, from 
practices adopted in its sister branches, that it could clean the used palettes for reuse to 
reduce the rising cost of new palette purchase.  It also recognized that it could sell 
“damaged” pigments, i.e., pigments spoilt when incorrect colors were used in the mixing, 
as a lower grade product to cut input (material) cost.  Shortly after the implementation of 
the packaging efficiency scheme, in late 2000, CAPigment embarked on another cost-
cutting program: “pigment recycling and palette reuse program” or “PR-Square” Program 
(GI-22).  Because “pigment recycling and palette reuse program” helped bring down the 
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amount of raw materials used for pigment production, and the number of new palettes 
purchased, CAPigment also publicized its “PR-Square” program (GI-22) as a GI to boost 
its environmental image. 
Despite having implemented pollution prevention measures, CAPigment did not really 
portray a proactive environmental posture.  Investing in environmental resources remained 
a low priority at the company.  Perhaps, this was because both GI-21 and GI-22 were not 
initiated with the explicit objective of dealing with specific environmental issues arising 
from the company’s production operations.  They were both “accidental environmental 
by-products” spilling from the company’s drive toward cost-savings. 
More obviously, perhaps, was that CAPigment was never subject to any serious 
regulatory, community or stakeholders’ pressures requiring it to comply with any 
particular environmental legislations or community expectations.  Indirectly, this also 
gave the company the impression that their operations had been environmentally 
compliant.  There was never the occasion when CAPigment was required to respond to an 
environmental directive from the authority or deal with adverse publicity launched against 
it by the public, let alone the need to be proactive.  As these words from CAPigment’s 
General Manager indicate: “We believe that as long as we comply with regulations, our 
environmental record would be clean.”  
 
Impacts of GIs 
The dust collection program (GI-20), initiated as soon as the operation was underway in 
1998, evidently had an effect in reducing air-borne dusts emitted from pigment 
production, since no incident relating to employees developing breathing difficulties and 
diseases related to exposures to air-borne dusts had been reported.  It had, indirectly, 
minimised any litigation costs related to occupational health and safety that the company 
could potentially be facing if no preventive measures had been taken. 
The customized packaging efficiency scheme (GI-21) proved to be a commercial success.  
According to CAPigment’s General Manager, much of the company’s growth could be 
attributable to the launch of this scheme, which met customers’ budget and product quality 
requirements, thus enhancing customers’ satisfaction. As a consequence, CAPigment was 
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able to enjoy an image linked to its ability “to provide a high quality service to meet the 
unique needs of small and medium enterprises”.  CAPigment’s General Manager was 
convinced that the scheme had enabled the company to reduce its packaging wastes, 
generated from splitting packaging bags to fit small pigment volume orders previous to the 
launch of GI-21. On one account, the customized packaging efficiency program had 
created a competitive position for CAPigment. On another, the program also cut down 
costs related to packaging waste disposals. 
Besides customizing packaging options to suit customers’ requirements, GI-21 also helped 
CAPigment to broaden its service line. Before the launch of GI-21, pigment products were 
packed on standard packaging bag sizes, such as 10kgs or 20kgs. These default sizes 
created difficulties when customers put in orders for unconventional volumes, such as 
22kgs or 37kgs.  Because CAPigment’s customers ranged from micro and small 
businesses to big corporations, the ability to meet such a highly variable order range, from 
ten to a few hundred kilograms, boosted CAPigment’s sale volumes and market share, 
particularly among small businesses.  
On the downside, the implementation of the customized packaging efficiency program 
(GI-21) required employees to have unassailable marketing skills and sound pigment 
product knowledge to make it work.  As a result, the launch of GI-21 called for increased 
expenditures on employee development and training, which raised operation costs.  
Between 2000 and 2003, CAPigment admitted that it encountered a significant reduction 
in profitability, though its sales volume and market share were substantially improved. 
According to an independent audit report carried out by a consultant at the invitation of 
CAPigment, the customized packaging efficiency scheme (GI-21) had more than its fair 
share of the problems.  Customization essentially created more operational tasks, in 
addition to higher skill requirements.  These included additional transport services to be 
organized, uneconomical packaging (due to the use of non-standard packaging sizes), and 
increased handling. 
The third GI, “PR-Square” program (GI-22), which focused on reusing and recycling used 
pigments and palettes, did cut down the volume of material used for pigment production, 
and the quantities of new colour palettes purchased. It certainly had helped CAPigment to 
achieve its cost-saving objective. In an indirect way, the program also created an image of 
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a waste-free plant for CAPigment, which greatly improved CAPigment’s management and 
employees’ self-satisfactions. However, CAPigment also acknowledged that the 
implementation of this initiative had increased labour costs (due to the washing of 
palettes, as well as monitoring and intense scrutiny carried out to ensure the quality of 
recycled pigments).  In terms of material and energy used per unit of production, operation 
cost, according to an audit done subsequent to the implementation of GI-22, had 
increased.  The same audit report also revealed that CAPigment’s total product costs went 
up after the launch of GI-22.  More significantly, the greater use of resources, water for 
washing especially, did not augur well with what the company’s claim as having 
established more environmentally friendly measures in the process. 
In sum, the three initiatives implemented by CAPigment did help to assert CAPigment’s 
competitive position, boosting its image both in terms of providing customized quality 
services as well as its corporate image as an environmentally responsible organization.  In 
a more stringent sense, however, the two pollution prevention initiatives introduced (GI-
21 and GI-22) were more environmentally-damaging than they were environmentally 
ameliorating. 
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TABLE 4.6 (A) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT CAPIGMENT, 1998 - 2000 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-20 
Dust reduction 
and collection 
scheme (1998) 
- CAPigment fitted 
air filters to reduce 
dust emissions and 
installed fans to 
ventilate air 
throughout the 
production building 
- The company also 
supplied masks and 
breathing devices to 
employees exposed 
to pigments. 
- A very detailed 
accident recovery 
procedure was also 
prepared, outlining 
the process to be 
followed in the 
event of an 
accidental pigment 
spillage occurring in 
the building. 
- Classified as an 
end-of-pipe, 
frequency-based GI. 
- There was a permitted threshold for dust 
concentration. However, this requirement had 
not been strongly enforced by the authority.  
- Despite a weak legislation, CAPigment was 
aware of possible health issues among 
employees exposed to pigment dust, if it did not 
contain dust concentration to a legally 
acceptable level. 
- While there were options available to reduce 
pigment dust at source (i.e., during production 
stage), CAPigment chose the easiest and most 
straight forward option (fitting air filters and 
supplying masks to employees) used in the 
industry.  
-  
- To comply 
with 
legislative 
requirements 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (The weakly regulated emission threshold 
did not give CAPigment a strong sense that it must comply or 
faced litigation. Located in an industrial zone, the company 
was not subject to residents’ complaints about noise, dust and 
waste pollution) 
o Normative: Strong (The pigment industry in general did not 
view colour pigment manufacturing as highly polluting, as 
iron oxides, the main ingredients, are not toxic, non-fading, 
chemically inert, weather resistant, and light fast. Despite 
that, CAPigment was conscious that it was being watched by 
the Union and other special interest groups, including the 
media. “We can not afford any adverse publicity” – 
CAPigment’s General Manager) 
o Cognitive: Weak (CAPigment understood the importance of 
being environmentally compliant. It did not, however, see the 
need to do anything extra. “So long as we are 
environmentally compliant, we could go on our business as 
usual”- CAPigment’s General Manager) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Weak (Being new, 
(established in 1997), CAPigment’s main concern was business 
growth. It did not see the urgency of investing in environmental 
resources with a weak legislation enforcing body, and little 
community and stakeholders’ pressures) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Reactive (“Our primary 
concern is business growth and complying with regulations” 
General Manager, CAPigment.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
  
 124 
TABLE 4.6 (B) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT CAPIGMENT, 1998 - 2000 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-21 
Customized 
Packaging 
Efficiency 
program 
(2000) 
- CAPigment worked 
with its packaging 
suppliers to offer 
customers a wide 
range of packaging 
options designed to 
meet the specific 
packaging needs of 
different products 
(from low grade to 
high quality 
products). 
- CAPigment also 
performed pigment 
order analysis to 
determine the types 
of pigments and 
most cost-effective 
packages to suit 
customers’ budget 
requirements.  
- Classified as 
pollution prevention 
aimed at compliance 
and cost reduction, 
and trait-based GI. 
- A branch of a multinational corporation in the 
color industry, CAPigment was under intense 
pressure from its mother firm to explore ways to 
lower total production cost. 
- A large proportion of CAPigment’s orders were 
non-standard. To maintain this increasing 
segment of customers, the company launched a 
“customized packaging efficiency program” to 
vary its product package options to suit a wide 
range of product requirements.  
- Based on experience of other branches, 
CAPigment believed that the “customized 
packaging efficiency program” could cut 
material costs and reduce packaging wastes.  
The company publicized this program not only 
as a customized service but also a GI to boost its 
corporate social responsibility image. 
-  
- To cut 
production 
cost 
- To better 
meet 
customer 
needs 
- To boost 
corporate 
social 
responsibility 
image 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (Located in an industrial zone, the company 
was not subject to residents’ complaints about noise, dust and 
waste pollution.) 
o Normative: Strong (The pigment industry in general did not 
view colour pigment manufacturing as highly polluting, as 
iron oxides, the main ingredients, are not toxic, non-fading, 
chemically inert, weather resistant, and light fast. Despite 
that, CAPigment was conscious that it was being watched by 
the Union and other special interest groups, including the 
media. “We can not afford any adverse publicity” – 
CAPigment’s General Manager) 
o Cognitive: Weak (Though CAPigment’s mother firm 
pressured it to reduce production cost, the direct was not 
environmentally motivated. The company might welcome 
any business opportunities that happened to be 
environmentally friendly. It did not push for anything extra) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Weak (CAPigment’s main 
concern had shifted from achieving business growth to attaining 
production effectiveness. Investing in environmental resources 
remained a low priority with little regulatory, community and 
stakeholders’ pressures.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Reactive (Though 
CAPigment had capitalized on the effects of the “customized 
packaging efficiency program” to boost its corporate social 
responsibility image, there was little evidence to suggest that the 
company was environmentally proactive. “We believe that as long 
as we comply with regulations, our environmental record would be 
clean” - General Manager, CAPigment.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.6 (C) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT CAPIGMENT, 1998 - 2000 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-22 
Pigment 
Recycling and 
Palette Reuse 
(PR-Square) 
program (2000) 
- CAPigment washed 
the used palettes, for 
reuse to reduce cost 
of new palette 
purchase. 
- CAPigment sold 
“damaged” 
pigments, i.e., 
pigments spoilt 
when the incorrect 
colors were used in 
the mixing, as a 
lower grade product 
to cut input 
(material) cost.  
- Classified as 
pollution prevention 
aimed at 
compliance, and 
frequency-based GI. 
- In response to the call of its mother firm to 
lower total production cost, CAPigment 
continued to explore areas for cost reduction. 
- The rising cost of new palettes and the large 
amount of pigment materials discarded due to 
accidental mixing of incorrect colors prompted 
CAPigment to embark on another cost-cutting 
program: “pigment recycling and palette reuse 
program” or PR-Square Program, which had 
also been practised in other branches. 
- Similar to the case of the “customized 
packaging efficiency program”, CAPigment also 
publicized this program as a GI to boost its 
corporate social responsibility image. 
-  
- To cut 
production 
cost 
- To boost 
corporate 
social 
responsibility 
image 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (Located in an industrial zone, the company 
was not subject to residents’ complaints about noise, dust and 
waste pollution.) 
o Normative: Strong (The pigment industry in general did not 
view colour pigment manufacturing as highly polluting, as 
iron oxides, the main ingredients, are not toxic, non-fading, 
chemically inert, weather resistant, and light fast. Despite 
that, CAPigment was conscious that it was being watched by 
the Union and other special interest groups, including the 
media. “We can not afford any adverse publicity” – 
CAPigment’s General Manager) 
o Cognitive: Weak (Though CAPigment’s mother firm 
pressured it to reduce production cost, the direct was not 
environmentally motivated. The company might welcome 
any business opportunities that happened to be 
environmentally friendly. It did not push for anything extra) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Weak (CAPigment’s main 
concern had shifted from achieving business growth to attaining 
production effectiveness. Investing in environmental resources 
remained a low priority with little regulatory, community and 
stakeholders’ pressures.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Reactive (Though 
CAPigment had capitalized on the effects of the PR-Square 
Program to boost its corporate social responsibility image, there is 
little evidence to suggest that the company is environmentally 
proactive. “We believe that as long as we comply with regulations, 
our environmental record would be clean” - General Manager, 
CAPigment.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation 
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4.7 Case Company 7: Resistant Adoption at TADairy 
 
Implementation of GIs 
Since its establishment as a dairy co-operative in North Eastern Victoria in early 1900s, 
TADairy recalled that it only implemented five production-related GIs (Tables 4.7(a) to 
4.7(e)).  The first of these was that of replacing its old dryers with a new model widely 
acknowledged as capable of containing emissions to a legally acceptable level (GI-23: 
1978).   The implementation of GI-23 in 1978, in a sense, was forced onto TADairy due to 
a law suit filed against the company by local residents, complaining about the milk dusts 
emitted by its expanding production operations.  The local council watchdogs and Victoria 
State’s Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) investigated the incident.  TADairy 
was found accountable for emitting milk dusts above the permissible limit, causing a 
nuisance and posing a health risk to the local community. 
In an unrelated matter, TADairy was also encountering increasing pressures from local 
farmers, its main stockholder, to reduce production costs in that same year.  To enable the 
company to concentrate its energy on dealing with mounting pressures from local farmers, 
TADairy reacted to EPA’s demand by replacing its existing dryers with a Niro CDI 315 
Drying plant, the most commonly used model widely acknowledged as capable of 
curtaining emissions to a legally acceptable level then. 
When the dispute was resolved, EPA further tightened its emission control on TADairy, 
requiring TADairy to lower its emission thresholds below the then permitted level, if it 
intended to continue its expansion spate.  As no other milk manufacturing plants in the 
State had been confronted with such high level of adverse publicity, TADiary quickly 
complied by renovating its drying technology.  The company also hired a wet mix 
blending plant that did not generate milk dust to enable it to expand its range of baby food 
products.  
While TADairy’s Board of Directors (BOD) was concerned with the imminent lawsuit the 
company could be slapped with at that time, if no quick action was taken to address the 
unacceptably high dust emission level, it made little attempt to examine the root causes of 
the problem.  No one questioned whether the production process or technology should be 
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investigated.  The company’s focus, instead, was on renovating drying technology.  The 
hiring, rather than purchasing, of the wet mix blending plant was a case in point.  The 
main reason, as TADairy’s Operations Manager reflected on the deliberation at its board 
meeting then, was that “the company did not see how investing in a technology that could 
remove milk dust would help improve its business operations.” 
In the ensuing years, TADairy’s orientation toward the environment remained reactive, as 
reflected in this statement of the company’s Operations Manager: “EPA is monitoring our 
environmental fallouts all the time. If we are not told of any infringement, it means that we 
are all right.  We will, of course, take actions when we are asked to.” 
In its drive to explore new product ideas to grow its business, TADairy’s range of milk 
products continued to expand.  To cope with production increase, TADairy appointed an 
external consultant in early 1984 to review its production process and organizational 
structures.  The operational review showed that TADiary had not fully optimized the 
economic value of its input materials by capturing the values of the by-products. The 
consultant pointed out that it was common practice in the milk product industry to recover 
fat contents.  Convinced of the additional revenues the company could generate from milk 
fat recovery, TADiary initiated a fat recovery program (GI-24: 1984) by building settling 
tanks to remove cheese solids from rinse water in 1984.  The solids obtained were reused 
in the cheese making process.  Other fat by-products recovered were sold to soap 
manufacturers to recoup production cost, or used for making anhydrous milk fats, adding 
another product line to its range of milk products.  
Though TADiary had not been notified by EPA or the local council about the contents of 
its rinse water discharge, the company did consider its fat recovery program (GI-24) as a 
GI, relieving a significant load of fat from its wastewater discharge.  Unfortunately, 
TADiary’s management remained adamant of its conviction that investing in 
environmental capabilities would not benefit its business operations.  The company made 
little attempt to explore other revenue-generating opportunities that could, at the same 
time, reduce its operational impact on the environment.  It did not see investing in 
activities that would reduce its operational impact on the environment would enhance its 
business operations.  The two, in the words of the Operation’s Manager, “are not 
complementary.” 
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In 1992, TADairy, once again, found itself stumbling onto a lawsuit with neighbouring 
residents about its wastewater leaking into the storm water system.  Borrowing the voice 
of an environmental lobby group, neighbouring residents claimed that wastewater 
discharged from TADairy manufacturing plant had high contents of contaminants.  
Without treatment, according to a report by the environmental lobby group, these effluents 
“had contaminated the receiving water, thus affecting the local water”.  At that time, there 
were regulations regarding wastewater discharges.  Those regulations, were, however, not 
strictly enforced.  Therefore, while EPA and local council had earlier demanded that 
TADairy should pre-treat its wastewater before discharging to drainage system, TA Dairy 
had not taken the warning seriously, until neighbouring residents took legal actions.  The 
lawsuit stretched several years without a resolution.  After months of negotiations with 
increasing adverse publicity, TADairy finally agreed to build a dam to store and treat its 
wastewater prior to discharging into the local storm water. 
The construction of wastewater storage dam (GI-25: 1998) started in 1998 and was 
finished in 2001.  The treatment facility had a storage capacity of 20ML wastewater and 
could process approximately 250,000 litres of wastewater per day.   In addition to 
wastewater storage, the dam also stopped wastewater from leaking into the groundwater. 
In 1998, TADairy also implemented two other GIs: reducing salt content in wastewater 
(GI-26: 1998) and recycling hot water (GI-27: 1998).   Again, the implementation of GI-
26 was a result of a directive from Victoria EPA.  At the height of the legal dispute 
between TADairy and the local residents regarding the high levels of contaminants in 
TADairy’s wastewater discharge, Victorian EPA and the local environmental watchdogs 
also noted a close link between increased salinity in the locality and the wastewater 
discharged from TADairy’s plant in mid 1990s.  Supported by its monitoring records, 
EPA directed TADairy to reduce the salt content and remove other solid wastes from its 
wastewater. 
TADairy insisted that the increase in salinity and other contaminants in its wastewater was 
not the results of its “dirty” operation, attributing the rise in salt content and solid wastes 
in its wastewater to its steady increase in production volumes since the late 70s’.  To avert 
further unwanted publicity, TADairy complied with EPA’s directive.  The company 
adopted, without much exploration, one of the most common and least-cost practices 
adopted in the diary industry then: use of settling tanks.  TADairy ran its wastewater 
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through settling tanks to enable salt and other solid wastes (i.e., fats or recyclable 
products) to settle. The precipitated salt and solids settling at the bottom of tanks were 
subsequently harvested by an external company that sold these solid wastes to other 
manufacturers to make fertilizers.  
In the case of CI-27, its implementation was economically motivated.  TADairy had 
always wanted to reduce its manufacturing costs, wherever possible.  Realizing that many 
of its competitors had been saving production costs by recycling hot water used for 
pasteurization to clean its equipment, TADairy went on to install the needed piping to feed 
the hot water into the boilers for anhydrous milk fat making or pasteurization.  During 
pasteurization, the heat of the hot water was captured to heat the medium receiving the 
incoming cold milk.  By exchanging heat between hot water and cold milk, the energy for 
pasteurization was saved. The recycled hot water was then utilized for cleaning to reduce 
energy consumption. 
Despite of its long history in milk manufacturing, TADairy’s shareholders maintained a 
belief that they did not need to do much with regards to environmental impacts.  As its 
Operation Manager explained, “TADairy was working along with nature”.  Though the 
Operation Manager admitted that the company had been struggling to cope with legal 
suits, appease local residents, EPA and local environmental watchdog, the company made 
no attempt to create a department or hired a personnel dedicated to deal with 
environmental issues. 
From 2001 to 2003, TADairy upgraded its factory building and fortified its structures to 
reduce noise.  During this renovation, noise proof material was installed to reinforce the 
area where dryers were located.   The company also installed more fans to reduce milk 
dust concentrations inside the buildings.  At no time, however, did the company consider 
reorganizing its production processes to reduce the noise of its production machinery or 
the emission of milk dust at source.  
With the exception of GI-27 (Recycling hot water used for pasturization), the other four 
GIs adopted by TADairy could be regarded as end-of-pipe measures.  The posture taken 
by TADairy is a typical minimalist: to meet legislative requirements and appease the 
public when problems or incidents occurred.  TADairy’s case is characteristic of what 
Walley and Whitehead (1994) portray as "resistant adaptation" (p. 48), the mode in which 
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businesses typically responded to environmental regulation from 1970 to 1985.  In its 
description, Handfield et al. (1997) point out that, in this response mode, businesses 
typically find “the cheapest way to minimally comply with environmental legislation” (p. 
295). Resistant adaptation companies, like what TADairy has illustrated, see 
environmental issues “a regulatory nuisance, … noncompliance would result in severe 
financial penalties” (Handfield et al., p. 295).  Because they do not “internalize 
environmental issues nor develop business strategies to deal with environmental 
questions” (Handfield et al., p. 295), these organizations do not see the benefits that could 
be accrued from taking environmentally responsible actions to deal with the impacts of 
their operations.  Neither are they able to learn from the experiences in implementing GIs 
as such, a point which will be taken up later in the next chapter during the cross-case 
analysis. 
 
Impacts of GIs 
In recounting the costs and benefits associated with the implementation of the five 
production-related initiatives, TADairy’s Production Manager reasoned that they added 
more costs than benefits to the company.  The implementation of GI-23 (replacing dryers) 
might have resulted in significant reduction in milk dust emission onto the surrounding 
residential areas.  TADairy, however, considered the initiative a cost burden, as it added 
no tangible benefit to its production process.  As the Production Manager recalled, the 
change only appeased local residents and the EPA, but did nothing to help increase 
TADairy’s production or operations efficiency.  “We did not even get a pat on the back, 
though the management considered that the firm had done the “right-thing” by fixing up 
problems it caused before the situation deteriorated further”.  Likewise, TADairy also did 
not feel that it had profited from the construction of a wastewater treatment dam (GI-25) 
other than bringing to a close an unwieldy prolonged, expensive lawsuit, saving possibly 
additional legal fees and continuous unwanted publicity.  The same may be said of the salt 
reduction initiative (GI-26) set up primarily to meet regulatory requirement.  TADairy did 
not benefit directly from this investment.  On the contrary, the initiative led to additional 
on-going cost of monitoring and testing, as the production Manager rationalized, 
“treatments taken to reduce salt concentration entailed extended costs for examining and 
monitoring”.  
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The fat recovery program (GI-24), by contrast, provided more benefits than costs, in the 
words of TADairy’s Production Manager.  Other than opening up more business 
opportunities for TADairy, the initiative reduced the fat content in its wastewater, cutting 
down on waste discharge cost.  
The hot water recycling project (GI-27) carried both cost and benefit. The indispensable 
cost of installing pipes for returning water was recouped from energy savings incurred in 
boiling and evaporating non-recurring water. The project also reduced the amount of hot 
water sent to a cooling tower. TADairy estimated that the hot water recycling program 
saved more than 20% of the company’s annual energy costs due to the need to generate 
steam previously. 
While it is difficult to establish a direct causal link between GIs implementation and 
organizational performance, the context of TADairy showed conformance between 
periods when these GIs were implemented with financial outcomes recorded during such 
times.  In most periods between late 1970s and early 2000s, the company’s financial 
performance was not significantly impressive.  The exception was in the mid 1980s when 
the fat-recovery program was introduced.  TADairy’s financial performance rose rather 
dramatically for three consecutive years after 1984. 
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TABLE 4.7 (A) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT TADAIRY, 1978 - 1998 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-23 - 
Replacing 
dryers to reduce 
milk dust 
emissions 
(1978) 
- TADairy replaced 
the old dryers with 
a new model 
widely 
acknowledged as 
capable of 
containing 
emissions to a 
legally acceptable 
level. 
- Classified as an 
end-of-pipe, and 
frequency-based 
GI. 
- Neighbouring residents had been filing a number 
of complaints about milk dust emissions from 
TADiary plant. 
- Victoria Environmental Protection Authority 
(EPA) investigated the incident and demanded 
that TADairy took immediate actions to rectify 
problem or to face court action. 
- In an unrelated matter, TADairy was also 
confronted with increasing pressures from local 
farmers, its main stockholder, to reduce 
production costs at the same time. 
- To enable the company to concentrate its energy 
on dealing with mounting pressures from local 
farmers, TADairy reacted to EPA’s demand by 
adopting the most commonly used option – 
replacing existing dryers with a new model 
widely acknowledged as capable of containing 
emissions to a legally acceptable level.  
-  
- To meet 
legislative 
requirements 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Strong (TADiary was required to address the high 
milk dust emission level or face court action.) 
o Normative: Strong (Other milk manufacturing plants in the 
State had never been confronted with such high level of 
adverse publicity as TADiary was experiencing.) 
o Cognitive: Weak (Though TADiary’s Board of Directors 
(BOD) was concerned with the imminent lawsuit it could be 
slapped with if no quick action was taken to address the 
unacceptably high dust emission level. It did not believe that 
investing in environmental capabilities would help improve its 
business operations.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Weak (TADiary’s 
management had not invested much to understand the environmental 
implications of their operations. The company’s primary concern 
was production efficiency.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Resistive (“EPA is 
monitoring our environmental fallouts all the time. If we are not told 
of any infringement, it means that we are all right.  We will, of 
course, take actions when we are asked to” – Operations Manager, 
TADiary.)  
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.7 (B) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT TADAIRY, 1978 - 1998 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-24 
Introducing fat 
recovery 
program 
(1984) 
- TADairy built 
settling tanks to 
remove cheese 
solids from the 
rinse water. The 
solids harvested 
were used for 
cheese making.  
- The fat recovered 
as part of the 
process was sold 
to soap 
manufacturers, or 
used for making 
anhydrous milk 
fats in house via a 
separate 
production line at 
TADairy’s plant. 
- Classified as 
pollution 
prevention aimed 
at cost reduction 
advantage, and 
frequency-based 
GI. 
- TADiary used to discharge its rinse water to the 
sewerage system. 
- An operational review conducted by an appointed 
external consultant in early 1984 reviewed that 
TADiary had not fully optimized the economic 
value of its input materials by capturing the 
values of the by-products. The consultant pointed 
out that it was common practice in the milk 
product industry to recover fat contents.  
- Convinced of the additional revenues the 
company could generate from milk fat recovery, 
TADiary proceeded to invest in building settling 
tanks and a second production line for making 
anhydrous milk fats. 
-  
- To minimize 
material loss 
- To develop 
another 
revenue-
generating  
product line 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (TADiary had not been notified about 
problems relating to its rinse water discharge.) 
o Normative: Strong (Other milk manufacturing plants in the 
State had been running their milk-fat recovery schemes.) 
o Cognitive: Weak (While TADiary’s BOD wanted its senior 
management to explore new business ideas, there was no 
emphasis on adopting environmentally responsible options.  It 
did not see investing in environmental capabilities as 
complementing business operations.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Weak (Despite the previous 
ordeal with the milk dust, TADiary’s management made little 
attempt to better understand the environmental implications of their 
operations. Production efficiency remained the primary concern of 
the company.  The BOD remained convinced that investing in 
environmental capabilities would not benefit its business operations.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Reactive (“EPA has been 
monitoring our environmental fallouts all the time. If we are not told 
of any infringement, it means that we are all right.  We will, of 
course, take actions when we are asked to” – Operations Manager, 
TADiary.)  
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.7 (C) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT TADAIRY, 1978 - 1998 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-25 
Establishing a 
wastewater 
collection 
system 
(commenced in 
1998, completed 
in 2001) 
- TADairy 
constructed a dam 
and ancillary 
piping system to 
collect wastewater 
for treatment prior 
to discharge. 
- Classified as an 
end-of-pipe and 
frequency-based 
GI. 
- During the early 1990s, TADiary was caught up 
in a dispute with neighbouring residents about 
wastewater from its plant leaking into the storm 
water system.  The dispute came to a head in 
1992, when local residents, with support from the 
Local Council and EPA, filed a law suit against 
TADiary. 
- While the Local Council had specific regulations 
regarding wastewater discharge at that stage, they 
were not strictly enforced.  In 1997, a new (and 
strongly enforced) piece of legislation was 
introduced in the State, requiring all dairy 
manufacturing plants to build and operate a waste 
treatment facility on site.  
- There had been precedent that construction of the 
dam for wastewater storage and treatment had 
been accepted by the EPA as a first step toward 
building a complete treatment facility. 
- Dairy understood that it could incur further (and 
very significant) legal costs, if it was seen not 
having taken action toward building the on site 
waste treatment facility.  
-  
- To meet 
legislative 
requirement
s 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Strong (The newly enforced legislation gave 
TADiary little choice but to commence building a wastewater 
collection system as a first step toward the installation of an on-
site waste treatment facility.) 
o Normative: Weak (Being a new piece of legislation, not many 
milk manufacturing plants in the State had in place an on- site 
waste treatment facility.) 
o Cognitive: Weak (TADiary’s BOD left it to its senior 
management to take the needed steps to comply with the new 
legislation.  It continued to consider investing in environmental 
capabilities as wasting valuable resources. “Investing in 
environmental capabilities could be a drain to our valuable 
resources” – Operations Manager, TADiary.)  
- Environmental Resource Capability: Weak (TADiary’s 
environmental resources remained fragmentary. Despite a long 
history in milk manufacturing (since the early 1900s), there was no 
department or dedicated personnel to review or audit the 
environmental implications of its operations. “We will cross the 
bridge when we come to it” – Operations Manager, TADiary.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Resistive (TADiary 
continued to hold a reactive attitude toward environment issues. “We 
work with nature. We do what is needed by law” – Operations 
Manager, TADiary.)  
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.7 (D) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT TADAIRY, 1978 - 1998 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-26 
Piping 
wastewater into 
settling tanks for 
subsequent salt 
removal 
(1998) 
- TADairy ran 
wastewater 
through installed 
settling tanks to 
allow salt and 
other solid wastes 
(i.e., fats or 
recyclable 
products) to 
precipitate prior to 
discharging them 
into the 
wastewater dam. 
- The salt and solids 
deposited at the 
bottom of tanks 
were removed. 
- Classified as an 
end-of-pipe and 
frequency-based 
GI. 
- Victoria EPA and local environmental watchdogs 
had noted a close link between increased salinity 
in the locality and the wastewater discharged from 
TADairy’s plant in early 1990s. 
- Supported by its monitoring records, EPA 
directed TADairy to reduce the salt content of its 
wastewater and remove other solid wastes from 
its wastewater.  
- TADairy attributed the rise in salt content and 
solid wastes in its wastewater to the steady 
increase in production volumes since the late 70s’ 
(due to expanded local market shares and 
extension to overseas market). 
- To comply with EPA’s directive, TADiary 
adopted, without much exploration, one of the 
most common and least-cost practices adopted in 
the diary industry then: use of settling tanks. 
-  
- To meet 
legislative 
requirement
s 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Strong (EPA and local residents were well aware of 
the high salinity and the increased wastewater volumes 
discharged by TADairy. TADiary had no choice but to 
comply.) 
o Normative: Weak (No visible pressure.) 
o Cognitive: Weak (TADiary’s BOD directed its senior 
management to take the needed measures to comply.  It did not 
believe in investing more than what was needed to comply.  
“Investing in environmental capabilities could be a drain to 
our valuable resources” – Operations Manager, TADiary.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Weak (TADiary’s 
environmental resources remained fragmentary. Despite a long 
history in milk manufacturing (since the early 1900s), there was no 
department or dedicated personnel to review or audit the 
environmental implications of its operations. “We will cross the 
bridge when we come to it” – Operations Manager, TADiary.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Reactive (TADairy did not 
explore other plausible options to meet EPA’s requirements. “We 
needed to act fast, to avoid possible fines. We just wanted to rid them 
(EPA) off our back” – Operations Manager, TADiary.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation. 
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TABLE 4.7 (E) – GI IMPLEMENTATION AT TADAIRY, 1978 - 1998 
 
GIs 
Implemented* 
Manner of 
Implementation 
Circumstances leading to or surrounding 
Implementation 
Implementation 
Objective(s) Contextual Analysis 
GI-27 
Recycling hot 
water used for 
pasteurization 
(1998) 
- TADairy utilized 
hot water from 
pasteurization for 
cleaning its 
manufacturing 
equipment 
- Classified as 
pollution 
prevention aimed 
at cost reduction, 
and frequency-
based GI. 
- TADairy had always wanted to reduce its 
manufacturing costs where possible. 
- Realizing that many of its competitors had been 
saving production costs by recycling hot water 
used for pasteurization to clean its equipment, 
TADairy went on to install the needed piping for 
the purpose.  
-  
 
- To reduce 
production 
cost 
- To reduce 
water 
consumption 
- External Pressure:  
o Coercive: Weak (TADairy was not under any external directive 
to recycle and reuse the hot water.) 
o Normative: Weak (This was an internally motivated operation 
initiative.) 
o Cognitive: Weak (TADiary’s BOD was keen to adopt any 
measures that can save the company money but was not 
convinced that measures directed to mitigating the 
environmental impact of its operations could also be 
operationally beneficial. “Investing in environmental 
capabilities could be a drain to our valuable resources” – 
Operations Manager, TADiary.) 
- Environmental Resource Capability: Weak (TADiary’s 
environmental resources remained fragmentary. Despite a long 
history in milk manufacturing (since the early 1900s), there was no 
department or dedicated personnel to review or audit the 
environmental implications of its operations. “We will cross the 
bridge when we come to it” – Operations Manager, TADiary.) 
- Natural Environmental Orientation: Reactive (The initiative was 
not motivated by the need to reduce water usage.  Rather, it was 
financially motivated. “We always think of ways to cut costs and will 
implement any measures that could save us money … we will leave it 
to the EPA to assess the environmental implications of these 
measures … and comply when instructed” – Operations Manager, 
TADiary.) 
Note: * Figures in parentheses refer to year of implementation.
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CHAPTER 5: CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the cross-case analysis of 7 case companies. It starts highlighting major 
perceptible trends in the data by comparing the GI approaches, institutional pressures, natural 
environmental orientation, and the level of GI impacts recorded at all case companies. The 
chapter then introduces the concept of Green Wall Syndrome, which was a common feature in 
GI implemented adopted by the two case companies – TADairy and CAPigment. Focusing on 
the abilities of accumulating firms’ learning experiences, this section also highlights the 
contexts in which five firms – EDevice, CNW, Car Seat, GVCordial and BAPlastic – created 
knowledge connection between GI implementation. Among these five companies, only three 
of them: EDevice, Car Seat, and BAPlastic were able to go beyond their experiential learning 
to redefine their markets. The GIs that helped these three companies in redefining 
competitions are discussed in the last section.    
 
5.1 Some perceptible trends 
Though imperfect, a comparison of the results of the within case analysis suggests that there 
is a correlation between approach to GI implementation and extent of impact on a firm’s 
environmental performance (see Tables 5.1 (a), (b), (c), and (d)).  The EOP technology 
essentially has very limited impact on the implementing firm’s environmental outcome, 
typically confined to the production process.  Of the nine GIs identified as implemented based 
on EOP technology, only one (GI-12: Extending PE Program by CNW in 2001) had its 
effects extended beyond the manufacturing process (Table 5.1 (a)).  The impact of the 
pollution prevention approach aiming at compliance is equally limited.  Similar to the case of 
the EOP approach, only one (GI-21: Customized Packaging Efficiency program by 
CAPigment in 2000) of the five GIs under this category reported to carry benefits outside of 
the manufacturing process (Table 5.1 (b)).   
When the posture of the pollution prevention approach changes from compliance to 
competitive advantage, the effects of the GIs on the case company tended to extend beyond 
manufacturing onto other business functions.  In this case, only one (GI-3: Recycling wash 
water implemented by GVCordial in 2000) (Table 5.1 (c)) of the seven GIs implemented 
under this approach had its impact limited to the manufacturing process.  
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The value seeking approach, in sharp contrast, has the most profound effect on the 
implementing firm’s environmental performance, with four of the six GIs belonging to this 
group having impacts propagating onto the business functions of its supply chain partners (see 
Table 5.1 (d)).  These observations confirm findings from the mainstream literature that GIs 
implemented beyond compliance tends to generate more benefits than those implemented 
under a compliance attitude.   
The results of the within case analysis also reveal another discernible association: that 
between natural environmental orientation (NEO) and approach to GI implementation. As 
Table 5.2 shows, a resistive attitude is essentially tied to the EOP approach.  A reactive mind-
set is also predominantly linked to the EOP approach, though they are anomalies.  A closer 
scrutiny of the four non-EOP GIs adopted under the reactive NEO (i.e, GI-21 and GI-22 by 
CAPigment and GI-24 and GI-27 by TADairy), however, reveals that they are essentially 
pseudo-GIs, i.e., they did not originate as GIs, but business initiatives aimed at generating 
greater revenue.  This suggests that a reactive NEO may still be linked to the EOP approach.  
An accommodative NEO position seems to be less related to any one GI implementation 
approach, suggesting that this is very much an undecided mind-set susceptible to change, 
depending on external influences.  Lastly, the proactive NEO posture tends to gravitate 
toward the adoption of either the pollution prevention approach aimed at competitive 
advantage or the value-seeking approach. 
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TABLE 5.1 (A) - SUMMARY OF GI IMPACT AT DIFFERENT LEVELS  
 
Level  of Impacts 
Internal-to-firm External-to-firm GI 
Approach GIs Adopted 
On Manufacturing 
(Level 1) 
On other Business 
Functions 
(Level 2) 
On Overall 
Development 
(Level 3) 
On Other 
Stakeholders 
(Level 4) 
Issues arising from 
implementation 
GI 6- Recycling metal wastes (1998) Lowered metal waste disposal    Increased handling costs 
GI 10- Package Efficiency (PE) 
Program: recycling plastic packaging 
and metal wastes (1990) 
Slashed the amount of solid waste 
disposed, recovered metal loss during 
production , Improved material 
utilization and reduced material costs 
   Increased handling costs 
GI 12- Extending PE Program: 
reducing packaging use, recycling 
packages, and employing permanent 
packages (2001) 
Reduced packaging waste disposal 
and related costs. 
Improved relationships 
with distributors and 
retailers 
 Saved packaging costs 
for distributors 
 
GI 14- Installing an in-built filtering 
system (1997) 
Reduced air pollutant concentration     
GI 15- Recycling and reusing supply 
packaging (1997) 
Reduced new packages used, lowered 
packaging wastes disposed 
   Increased package handling 
costs 
GI 20- Dust reduction and collection 
scheme (1998) 
Reduced dust emission     
GI 23- Replacing dryers to reduce milk 
dust emissions (1978) 
Improved drying process: less dust 
generated and noise emitted 
   Higher operation and 
machinery maintenance 
costs 
GI 25- Establishing a wastewater 
collection system (1998) 
Reduced risks of wastewater seeping 
into groundwater system or into 
neighbouring natural water bodies 
    
End-of-pipe 
GI 26- Piping wastewater into settling 
tanks for subsequent salt removal 
(1998)  
Lowered the risk of salinity to 
neighbouring land 
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TABLE 5.1 (B) - SUMMARY OF GI IMPACT AT DIFFERENT LEVELS  
 
Level  of Impacts 
Internal-to-firm External-to-firm 
GI Approach GIs Adopted 
On Manufacturing 
(Level 1) 
On other Business Functions 
(Level 2) 
On Overall 
Development 
(Level 3) 
On Other 
Stakeholders 
(Level 4) 
Issues arising from implementation 
GI 11- Reusing 
cooled recycled hot 
wastewater for 
casting process. 
(1994) 
Cut down wastewater discharge, 
lowered the amount of clean water used 
for cooling process 
    
GI 21- Customized 
Packaging Efficiency 
program (2000) 
Reduced the volumes of packages used Enhanced handling efficiency and 
reduced product damages 
  Increased overall product costs. 
GI 22- Pigment 
Recycling and 
Palette Reuse (PR-
Square) program 
(2000) 
Reduced the amount of colour palettes 
used 
   Increased water consumption and created 
wastewater during washing palettes. 
GI 24- Introducing 
fat recovery program 
(1984) 
Lowered fat content in wastewater, 
recovered fat loss during production.  
    
Pollution 
Prevention 
aimed at 
Compliance 
GI 27- Recycling hot 
water used for 
pasteurization (1998) 
Reduced clean water used for steaming 
process, and cut down on wastewater 
discharges 
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TABLE 5.1 (C) - SUMMARY OF GI IMPACT AT DIFFERENT LEVELS 
Level  of Impacts 
Internal-to-firm External-to-firm 
GI Approach GIs Adopted 
On Manufacturing 
(Level 1) 
On other Business Functions 
(Level 2) 
On Overall 
Development 
(Level 3) 
On Other Stakeholders 
(Level 4) 
Issues arising from 
implementation 
GI 1 - Using recycled 
bottles and packaging for 
production (1996)  
Reduced solid wastes from packaging 
and bottles 
Improved relationships with 
suppliers: Saved 20-25% 
packaging and distribution costs  
Widened distribution 
network, improved 
market shares. 
Saved packaging costs for distributors 
and retailers 
Increased handling costs 
in the first year of 
operation, but benefits 
recouped from the 
second year onwards. 
GI 2- Adopting new 
bottling technology 
(2000) 
 
Lowered product damages of caps and 
bottles, combined four independent 
processes (cleansing, rinsing, filling, 
and washing ), thus lowered operation 
costs 
Improved Health and Safety for 
operators by lowering the risks of 
exposure to processes (which were 
self-contained) 
Developed a capability 
to in-house 
manufacture complete 
products  
  
GI 3- Recycling wash 
water (2000) 
 
Reduced fresh water consumption by 
30%-40%, and wastewater discharge by 
40% 
    
GI 5- Replacing self-stick 
labelling method with in-
mould labelling 
technology (2001) 
Reduced manual labour requirement, 
cut down on paper and ink needed for 
printing self stick labels 
Improved products’ marketing (i.e., 
improved product quality and 
aesthetic appearance).  
Increased sales 
volumes 
  
GI 7- Reducing material 
wastes via Lean 
Manufacturing (2000) 
Cut down on both liquid and solid 
wastes (water, energy and packaging) 
Created a culture of corporate 
social responsibility, projected an 
image about an environmentally-
friendly production process 
   
GI 8- Replacing leaded 
soda with lead-free soda 
in soldering process 
(2000) 
Reduced lead content in wastewater and 
in the final products 
Helped create a new image for 
products 
Created a new market 
for lead-free products 
- Reduced the risks of exposing to 
lead for end users and other 
manufacturers while using 
products 
- Reduced the work of separating 
lead from other contents during 
recovery or remanufacturing 
stage. 
 
Pollution 
Prevention 
aimed at 
Competitive 
Advantage 
GI 16- Redesigning 
Kanban containers for 
internal material 
movements  (2000) 
Reduced the product components’ 
damage and labour handling during 
inter-departmental transportation 
Cut down the product losses and 
labour costs due to damages during 
transportation 
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TABLE 5.1 (D)- SUMMARY OF GI IMPACT AT DIFFERENT LEVELS  
 
Level  of Impacts 
Internal-to-firm External-to-firm 
GI approach GIs Adopted 
On Manufacturing 
(Level 1) 
On other Business 
Functions 
(Level 2) 
On Overall 
Development 
(Level 3) 
On Other Stakeholders 
(Level 4) 
Issues arising 
from 
implementation 
GI 4- Using recycled plastic 
resins for package 
manufacturing (2001) 
Cut down amount of virgin plastic 
material 
Expanded product 
ranges 
Broadened market share.  Reduced virgin plastic extraction work for 
upstream manufacturers  
 
GI 9- Progressively 
introducing lead-free, 
weather-resistant car power 
converters (2002). 
Phased out lead content in wastewater 
and the final products 
Helped create a new 
image for products 
Created a new market for 
lead-free products 
- Minimised  the risks of exposing to 
lead for end users and other 
manufacturers while using products 
- Removed the work of separating lead 
from other contents during recovery or 
remanufacturing stage. 
 
GI 13- Introducing an 
environmentally-friendly 
corrosion protection system 
for a new range of greener 
products (2004) 
No information about impacts on process 
Castors (end-products) got additional 
protection from corrosion. 
The protection layer, when removed, was 
environmentally friendly. 
Improved product 
aesthetic appearance, 
and marketing 
Created a new market for 
its product 
Reduced end-of-lie environmental impacts 
of castors. 
Reduced effort during product recovery 
stage. 
 
GI 17- Reengineered 
production process (2000) 
Removed different assembly lines for 
different types of seats (front, back and 
rear seats), lowered energy consumption 
with energy saving features, enhanced 
assembly speed, and cut down on energy 
consumption  
Facilitated quality 
checking and 
inspection 
Speeded up productivity, 
assisted the production to 
cope with increased 
product volumes  
  
GI 18- Introducing a new 
foam formulae (2004) 
Made products more biodegradable, 
lowered material cost 
Expanded product 
ranges 
Increased market share Reduced the time that foams degraded 
during post-consumption stage (more 
environmentally friendly). Reduced effort in 
product recovery stage. 
 
Value 
Seeking 
Approach 
GI 19- Changing from 
“mig” to laser welding 
(2006) 
Speeded up welding process Improved products’ 
marketing (i.e., 
enhanced quality and 
aesthetic appearance) 
Assisted the production to 
cope with increased 
product volume 
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TABLE 5.2 – RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NEO AND APPROACH TO GI 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
  Approach to GI Implementation 
Natural 
Environmental 
Orientation 
(NEO) 
End-of-Pipe Pollution 
Prevention aimed 
at Compliance 
Pollution Prevention 
aimed at 
Competitive 
Advantage 
Value Seeking 
Resistive GI-23; GI-25 - - - 
Reactive GI-6; GI-10; GI-14; 
GI-15; GI-20; GI-26 
GI-22 GI-21; GI-24; GI-27 - 
Accommodative GI-12 GI-1; GI-11 GI-16 GI-13 
Proactive - GI-3 GI-2; GI-5; GI-7; GI-
8; GI-17; GI-19 
GI-4; GI-9; GI-18 
 
 
There is yet a third perceptible link emerging from the results of the within-case analysis.  
This link is that between institutional pressures and NEO (Table 5.3).  The presence of strong 
coercive pressures appears to push firms toward adopting either a resistive or reactive NEO.  
The only exception seems to be when strong normative and cognitive pressures were also 
present.  Under the influence of three strong institutional pressures, firms tended to adopt a 
proactive NEO. 
The case findings also show that firms facing strong normative pressure would typically adopt 
a reactive-accommodative NEO, except in the joint presence of strong cognitive pressures 
when the NEO would move toward a proactive stance.  In fact, from the experience of the 
seven case companies, it appears that firms facing strong cognitive pressure toward the 
environment would have a higher predisposition toward engaging a proactive stance 
compared with others.  When none of the three institutional pressures are dominant, firms 
tended to be either reactive or accommodative in their NEO. 
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TABLE 5.3 – RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURE AND 
NEO 
 
 Natural Environmental Orientation (NEO) 
Strong external 
pressure from: 
Resistive  Reactive Accommodative Proactive 
Coercive GI-25 GI-14; GI-15; GI-26 - - 
Normative - GI-20; GI-21; GI-22; GI-24 GI-1; GI-11 - 
Cognitive - - - GI-5; GI-17; GI-18; GI-19 
Coercive and 
Normative GI-23 - - - 
Coercive and 
Cognitive - - - - 
Normative and 
Cognitive - GI-6; GI-10 GI-12; 
GI-2; GI-4; GI-8; 
GI-9; GI-13 
Coercive, Normative, 
and Cognitive - - - GI-3; GI-7 
None - GI-27 GI-16 - 
 
 
Given the links between presence of external institutional pressures and NEO as well as 
between NEO and GI implementation approach, it would suggest that there would also be an 
association between presence of institutional pressures and GI implementation approach.  
Table 5.4 shows how, and to what extent, the latter two are related. 
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TABLE 5.4 – RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PRESENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL 
PRESSURE AND APPROACH TO GI IMPLEMENTATION 
 
  Approach to GI Implementation 
Strong external 
pressure from: 
End-of-Pipe Pollution 
Prevention 
aimed at 
Compliance 
Pollution 
Prevention aimed 
at Competitive 
Advantage 
Value 
Seeking 
Coercive GI-15; GI-25; GI-
26 - - - 
Normative GI-20 GI-1; GI-11;GI-21 GI-22; GI-24 - 
Cognitive - - GI-5; GI-17; GI-19  GI-18 
Coercive and 
Normative GI-23 - - - 
Coercive and 
Cognitive GI-14 - - - 
Normative and 
Cognitive 
GI-6; GI-10; 
GI-12 
- GI-2; GI-8 GI-4;GI-9; GI-13 
Coercive, Normative, 
and Cognitive - GI-3 GI-7 - 
None - - GI-16; GI-27 - 
 
 
As expected, when firms were subjected to strong coercive pressures, even in the presence of 
either strong normative or cognitive pressures, they exhibited a high tendency toward 
adopting EOP approach.  Only when both strong normative and cognitive pressures were 
jointly present with coercive pressures, GI implementation approach would move away from 
EOP.  Under strong normative pressures, the common reaction appears to centre around the 
adoption of a pollution prevention approach.  In the joint presence of strong normative and 
cognitive pressures, GI adoption pattern, however, seems to be polarized either toward the 
EOP or the value seeking approach.  However, it would not take long to realize that the three 
EOP GIs were implemented with either a reactive or accommodative NEO, while the value 
seeking GIs were implemented under a proactive NEO.  This lends support to the notion that 
NEO is the critical determinant of GI implementation, as suggested by the theory of planned 
behaviour.  Lastly, when firms were not subjected to any of the three sets of institutional 
pressures, the pollution prevention approach aimed at gaining competitive advantage seems to 
be a likely target for GI implementation. 
 
These qualitative observations lead to the interpretation that the adoption of GI 
implementation approach does follow the precepts of the theory of behaviour discussed in 
Chapter 2.  The presence of institutional pressures would influence an organization’s NEO, 
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leading to the choice of a particular GI implementation approach.  Observations on the 
circumstances under which each of 27 the initiatives was being implemented and the 
subsequent change in NEO exhibited by each of the seven case companies following each GI 
implementation (see Figures 5.1 (a) to 5.1 (g)) suggest the presence of some inertial, as well 
as some motivating, forces at work.  The inertial forces inhibit companies from learning from 
their GI implementation experience, to the extent that they somehow cloud their 
understanding of the advantages associated with a proactive NEO.  By contrast, the 
motivating forces help push the companies over a “cognitive hump”, enabling them to move 
along the NEO continuum toward a proactive posture.   
 
The experiences of companies facing the inertial forces, exhibited by the manner in which 
TADairy [Figure 5.2(g)] and CAPigment [Figure 5.2(f)] implemented their GIs over time, are 
interpreted as exhibiting a “green wall syndrome”.  Those able to cross the cognitive hump, as 
depicted by the environmental resource building paths of the other five case companies 
[Figure 5.2 (a)] to [Figure 5.2 (e)]) are portraying a capability to engage in “experiential 
learning”.  Among these five companies, three – BAPlastic, EDevice, and Car Seat – went 
further to treat their environmental resource building as an integral part of strategic business 
operations with a view to redefining their competition.  These three firms are viewed as 
displaying characteristics similar to what Hart (1995) describes as “sustainable development” 
in his natural resource-based view model.  
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Figure 5.1(c): EDevice's GI Implementation Path by NEO 
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Figure 5.1(d): CNW's GI Implementation Path 
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Figure 5.1(e): Car Seat's GI Implementation Path by NEO and 
Institutioanl Pressure
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Figure 5.1(f): CAPigment's GI Implementation Path by 
NEO and Institutioanl Pressure
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Figure 5.1(g): TADairy's GI Implementation Path by NEO and 
Institutioanl Pressure
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fb = frequency-based EOP = End-of-pipe
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FIGURE 5.2(A): GVCORDIAL’S GI IMPLEMENTATION PATH FROM PERSPECTIVES OF INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURE, NEO, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE INVESTMENT 
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FIGURE 5.2(B): BAPLASTIC’S GI IMPLEMENTATION PATH FROM PERSPECTIVES OF INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURE, NEO, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE INVESTMENT  
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FIGURE 5.2(C): EDEVICE’S GI IMPLEMENTATION PATH FROM PERSPECTIVES OF INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURE, NEO, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE INVESTMENT 
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FIGURE 5.2(D): CNW’S GI IMPLEMENTATION PATH FROM PERSPECTIVES OF INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURE, NEO, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE INVESTMENT 
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FIGURE 5.2(E): CAR SEAT’S GI IMPLEMENTATION PATH FROM PERSPECTIVES OF INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURE, NEO, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE INVESTMENT 
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FIGURE 5.2(F): CAPIGMENT’S GI IMPLEMENTATION PATH FROM PERSPECTIVES OF INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURE, NEO, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE INVESTMENT 
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FIGURE 5.2(G): TADAIRY’S GI IMPLEMENTATION PATH FROM PERSPECTIVES OF INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURE, NEO, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE INVESTMENT 
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5.2 Green Wall Syndrome 
The experience of TADairy, which encountered strong coercive and normative pressures to 
take actions to curb their milk dust emissions in 1978, suggests that strong institutional 
pressures create not only an urgency to comply (for fear of facing lawsuit and unwanted 
publicity) but also strong resentment from senior management.  The result is that companies 
would tend to look at GI implementation as a “project”, something that needs to be done with 
a deadline target.  The natural reaction, it appears, as evidenced from TADairy’s response, 
would be to find some quick-fix, market solutions acceptable to the pressure groups.  As 
TADiary’s Operations Manager explained, “we needed to act fast, to avoid possible fines. We 
just wanted to rid them (EPA) off our back”.  Under such circumstances, there would be little 
incentive to experiment new techniques or to explore new ideas for innovation.   
The resentment generated also tends to result in a heightened level of negativity toward 
environmental imperatives, which consequentially leads to an attitude that “GI is nothing but 
a necessary evil”.  As summed up in this statement from TADairy’s Operation Manager: 
“There is nothing we can learn from implementing such programs (i.e., GIs).”  Such an NEO, 
obviously, would not be predisposed toward acquiring environmental resources to build 
capability, gravitating to what may be termed “resource inertia”. 
A detailed analysis of TADairy’s NEO postures at each successive GI implementation and the 
circumstances surrounding its five GI implementations suggests that TADairy suffered a 
cognitive–lock in, a feature typical of the “green wall” syndrome.  Based on TADairy’s the 
experiences, a preoccupation with dealing with only visible immediately-term institutional 
pressures and ignorance of the long-term implications of the environmental problems created 
by their production and business operations would appear to be two key characteristics of the 
green wall syndrome.    
The experiences of TADairy, in short, suggest that strong coercive and normative pressures 
are antecedents for companies to develop the Green Wall syndrome.  Under these forces, 
companies tend to develop a resistive or, at best, reactive NEO toward GI implementation. As 
this remark from TADairy’s Operational Manager illustrates: “why do we have to do anything 
extra if we’re not required to”.  Their concern would centre on seeking legitimacy and social 
conformity to appease the sources of these pressures.  These NEOs and their corresponding 
behavioural intentions tend to lead organizations to a perception that green issues equate extra 
costs with little or no tangible returns.  These companies, like TADairy, view GIs as barriers 
to business development.  
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Different from TADairy, CAPigment was not under the scrutiny of regulators, customers, or 
stakeholders.  Neither did the company encounter any direct calls from the public or local and 
regional communities to deal with the environmental impacts of their operations.  However, 
CAPigment did feel that it was being watched by the union and other external interest groups, 
such as the media, especially on issues with respect to occupational hazards and safety 
(OH&S) issues.  These invisible, nonetheless real, pressures, coupled with the inherent 
objective of the company to grow their business as quickly as possible, prompted CAPigment 
to adopt “the easiest and most-straight-forward option” without giving time to consider 
alternative technologies when it implemented its first production-related GI (GI-20 Dust 
Reduction and Collection scheme).  At that stage, CAPigment’s main concern was to prevent 
OH&S issues from occurring to avoid extensive work-cover payouts as well as associated 
unwanted publicity that could affect its business operations. 
Because of its concentration on generating business opportunities and the directive from its 
mother company to reduce operations cost, CAPigment’s energy was channelled to exploring 
business initiatives which could achieve the dual objectives.  While it remained conscious of 
the watchful eyes of the media and other interest groups, the company took every opportunity 
to highlight aspects of its business initiatives that could project its image as being 
environmentally proactive, though it might not be truly attempting to do so, as suggested by 
these two statements from its General Manager: “our primary concern is business growth and 
complying with regulations” and  “we believe that as long as we comply with regulations, our 
environmental record would be clean”.  Therefore, there was no surprise that the second and 
third GIs implemented by the company (GI-21: Customized Packaging efficiency Program 
and GI-22: Pigment Recycling and Palette Reuse Program) both generated issues (i.e., 
increased production costs for GI-21 and increased water consumption and increase in 
quantity of wastewater discharged for GI-22 as shown in Table 5.1 (b)). 
As revealed, CAPigment did not move along the environmental capability building path 
either.  Its attitude toward environmental issues was “you’ve got to be pragmatic. The 
environment has a cost implication to us”.  It also, in a sense, gravitated to a cognitive lock-in 
situation, exhibiting resource inertia, as exhibited by its apparent lack of environmental 
knowledge.  This is evident from its implementation of GI-21 (Customized Packaging 
efficiency Program).  CAPigment claimed to have reduced the amount of standard packages 
used with the introduction of GI-21.  However, due to the need to provide more non-standard 
packages, its production costs increased.  Likewise, when CAPigment implemented GI 22 or 
the PR-Square (Pigment Recycling and Palette Reuse) Program, it also failed to realized that 
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its action actually led to greater use of water and generated more wastewater from its 
operations.  The outcomes of these two GIs vividly reflect the company’s lack of 
environmental knowledge in appreciating the real impact of its GIs.  
A common feature evolving from GI implementation histories of both TADairy and 
CAPigment is that they both demonstrate an inability to learning from their GI 
implementation experiences.  The lack of knowledge connectivity between successive GIs 
implemented by TADairy and CAPigment indicates that they were done in an isolated or 
disjointed manner.  In Kolb’s (1984) terminology, there was no experiential learning, which 
Kolb (1984) defined as “the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation 
of experience” (p. 41).   
From the coercively enforced practice of changing dryers in 1978 (GI-23) to the economically 
driven fat recovery program in 1984 (GI-24), the establishment of a wastewater collection 
system (GI-25), the piping of wastewater into settling tanks for subsequent salt removal (GI-
26) and the recycling of hot water (GI-27), TADairy did not attempt to reflect on the 
experiences, the mistakes they made, and the benefits they gained from those implementations 
to conceptualize what they could change to make their next implementation better.  TADairy 
merely coped with issues emerging from its business agenda.  It maintained that “EPA has 
been monitoring our environmental fallouts all the time.  If we are not told of any 
infringement, it means that we are all right.  We will … take actions when we are asked to” 
and “we work with nature. We do what is needed by law” (Operations Manager, TADiary).  
There was little difference in CAPigment’s approach.  CAPigment’s inability to realize the 
environmental consequences of its pseudo GIs (GIs-21 and 22), as explained above, is also 
reflective of the company’s failure to engage in experiential learning. 
Because of their inability to invoke experiential learning, both TADairy and CAPigment were 
drawn into a spiral of decline: as institutional pressures on environmental compliance exerted 
on these companies get tougher over time, a stronger resistive or reactive stance toward 
environmental issues ensured with minimal resources being allocated to GI development, 
leading to resource inertia.  As soon as the crisis was circumvented with the implementation 
of a quick-fix or legally-sanctioned measure, these firms would return to hibernate in their 
reactive or resistive NEO until the next issue surfaces.  As such, these companies tend to 
invest little in building environmental capabilities to deal with the roots of the environmental 
problems.  They would solve one problem at a time on a piece-meal basis, creating, in the 
process, other environmental problems, such as those arising from GI-21 and GI-22 in 
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CAPigment (i.e., reducing new palettes by increasing water consumption, or reducing the use 
of standard packages by increasing non-standard package uses).  In sum, green wall pushes 
organizations to a state of cognitive lock-in and resource inertia, constraining them to learn 
from experiences.  Organizations continue to do whatever is fastest and easiest to maintain 
their legitimacy, either legally or socially. 
 
5.3 The Knowledge Nexus 
The GI implementation histories of EDevice, CNW and Car Seat, which all commenced with 
a reactive NEO, selected an EOP approach to implement their first production-related GI, but 
did not end up facing a green wall, suggest that the key to breaking the cognitive lock-in and 
overcoming the resource inertia problem lies in a firm’s ability to see beyond the immediate 
benefits of GIs implemented, such as avoiding law suits, complying with stakeholders’ 
demand, appeasing social expectations, or boosting corporate environmental image.  These 
companies, as exemplified by the progressive steps they took in implementing their 
successive GIs, were able to ask the question: What further benefits can we get by 
implementing similar GIs in the future?  It is this ability, and the willingness, to consider how 
to move from one GI to a related next that challenged them to explore alternative capability 
building paths emanating from the implemented GIs to come up with the next set of GIs.  
This is the start of their journey toward a proactive NEO.  
After EDevice implemented their first production related GIs in 1998 (GI-6: Recycling metal 
wastes), its senior management realized how pleasant the compound within its premise looked 
without the unsightly piles of aluminium sprouting out like small hills each day.  Though the 
tangible benefits of GI-6 were limited very much to reducing metal waste disposal costs, 
EDevice’s senior management had been debating how recycling should be extended to other 
business processes within the company after that.  When the State Government introduced a 
water restriction program to suppress the liberal use of water for discretionary purposes 
following a prolonged draught in the state, EDevice not only conformed by implementing a 
water-wise policy to reduce water consumption, it extended its water saving effort to 
minimize use of other input materials by introducing Lean Manufacturing (GI-7: Reducing 
material wastes via Lean Manufacturing). 
Its implementation of GI-8 (Replacing leaded soda with lead-free soda in soldering process) 
in 2000 followed by GI-9 (Progressively introducing lead-free, weather-resistant car power 
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converters) in 2002 had a similar knowledge connection background.  Before implementing 
GI-8, EDevice initiated a pilot lead-free soldering process for 3 months to gauge its outcomes 
as well as its impacts on the business.  Spurred by the success of its lead-free soldering 
program (GI-8), EDevice commenced investing heavily in research and innovation (R&I) in 
lead-free components, convinced that it could succeed in its quest for a complete lead-free 
production process.  “If lead-free program was successful with one manufacturing stage, it 
should be possible for other stages to be lead-free,” said  EDevice’s General Manager.  This 
statement summarizes the sentiment level EDevice senior management had toward lead-free 
production.  One of the EDevice’s R&I initiatives was to conduct a series of trials to find the 
“best” lead-substitute for ceramic capacitors that eventually led to the launch of GI-9.  
Further, EDevice did not limit the program to itself, as it was conscious that for its green 
movement to work, it needed to enlist the participation of its suppliers in its lead-free 
campaign to produce a lead-free supply chain.  It believed that the new age of electronic and 
associated automotive products for the transportation industry lied in the production of lead-
free products.  For this, it had just positioned itself to secure that new competitive edge. 
The environmental capability building path of Car Seat may be different from EDevice’s, the 
fabric that underpinned its transformation, however, also displayed knowledge links between 
successive GIs implemented.  Car Seat introduced its first GI - installing an in-built filtering 
system (GI-14) – soon after commencing production under the intense scrutiny of 
environmental regulators.  To keep its legitimacy, the company reacted almost spontaneously 
toward meeting the legal requirements.  “We should do what they asked us to,” recalled the 
Technical Manager, as he summarized the company’s views about environmental issues then. 
Being new, Car Seat was too preoccupied with establishing and building its production 
capabilities. Other issues, including environmental matters, were not considered an integral 
part of its production and business agenda.  Therefore, when it realised, from the practice of 
its sister companies, that it could reuse and recycle the large quantity of boxes that came with 
component supplies, Car Seat again reacted quickly in conformance by launching its 
recycling and reusing supply packages program (GI-15). The Technical Manager said that “if 
recycling is affordable to us, there’s no harm in it, as other companies are also doing that”.  
More importantly, the company saw this as an opportunity to demonstrate to the local 
authority its “proactive” stance toward environmental issues and also to its mother company 
its efforts to minimize operation cost by being environmentally responsible at the same time. 
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Because GI-15 was implemented in a hurry, without much planning and giving due 
consideration to the logistics created by the extra handling involved, Car Seat found its 
package handling costs actually increased after the implementation of GI-15.  In addition, the 
recycled supply packages did not provide adequate protection to the contents once they were 
slightly worn.  As a result, additional packaging, hence additional handling, was needed to 
provide extra protection.  Car Seat was frustrated with its efforts and began to question the 
real benefits of corporate environmental programs, which they had been hearing so much 
about from their mother company.  “It is like we have been cheated by being environmentally 
responsible”, were the words of Car Seat Technical Manager. 
As Car Seat’s senior management mulled over their apparent failure with GI-15, they realized 
that it was not the program that failed.  It was them, the senior management team, who 
implemented the initiative rather hastily, without giving sufficient thought to all associated 
processes which could possibly be affected by the procedural changes resulting from the 
implementation of the GI.  At that point, Car Seat’s senior management recognized that its 
biggest mistake was to react spontaneously by following what others had been doing.  The 
company was determined to learn from its mistakes. It also wanted to prove to itself that Car 
Seat could, too, do as good a job as any other companies that had implemented recycling and 
material reuse programs.  It began to put in efforts to explore ways to minimize wastes within 
the company, concurrent with its desire to face the challenges of increasing production 
efficiency.  This dedicated drive led to the introduction, in 2000, of GI-16 (Redesigning 
Kanban containers for internal material movements), another GI with the objective of 
minimizing wastes. 
It was also during this period that Car Seat decided to acquire the ISO 14001 status by 2001.  
It devoted considerable resources, including sending key personnel to training, organizing 
environmental education programs and seminars for its workers, and investing in R&I with a 
view to building up its environmental response capability.  It also modified its factory lighting 
system to accommodate the installation of energy-efficient bulbs to lessen power 
consumption in 2000. 
Within the same year, Car Seat implemented another GI (GI-17: Reengineered production 
process), the fruit of its R&I investment.  The GI was an internally designed state-of-the-art 
fully automated assembly system aimed at speeding up assembling operations as well as 
reducing production wastes.  As its Technical Manager explains, “when redesigning our 
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production lines, we took the opportunity to see how some of the production wastes could be 
eliminated.”  
By now, Car Seat had become very proactive in its NEO.  To conserve energy usage, Car Seat 
changed its factory roofing to tough transparent Perspex to reduce electricity consumption in 
2003.  Concomitantly, its environmental capability had also grown from strength to strength.  
Its R&I investment was bearing fruits, with the announcement, in 2004, of a new 
environmentally friendly foam formulae (GI-18) to reduce its product end-of-life disposal 
impact on the environment.  To facilitate car seat production under the new foam formulae, 
the company changed its conveyor belt system to support a faster assembly with the rolling 
out of the new foam design. 
Car Seat’s R&I activities continued to show result.  In 2006, the company changed its 
traditional “mig” welding system to laser welding (GI-19), which had been widely recognized 
by the manufacturing industry as a cleaner production technology than “mig” welding.  Car 
Seat was convinced that, with its state-of-the-art assembling system, new foam formulae, and 
laser welding, it had created a new environmental standard for car seat production.  It had 
redefined the competitive arena for green manufacturing. 
Similar to Car Seat, CNW also moved from a reactive NEO, to an accommodative and 
eventually a proactive posture with progressive GI implementation.  The turning point was 
when the company changed its attitude from “GI must be financially beneficial” to “GI can be 
financially beneficial”.  The “GI must be financially beneficial” mind-set reflects a 
preoccupation centered on “whether implementing a particular GI could bring benefits to 
business”.  It is an “evaluative” posture with a distinct focus on “what or where the benefit 
is”.  By contrast, the “GI can be financially beneficial” attitude directs an organization to 
explore, rather than question, the benefits.  In other words, its focus is on building the right GI 
to obtain the desire benefits.  The question asked is: What could the GI be to get the intended 
benefits? 
In the early 1990s, CNW held the view that “being green means meeting financial viability 
and legislatively accommodating criteria” (CNW’s Supply Chain Manager).  All business 
initiatives, GIs included, must be subjected to a cost-benefit evaluation.  When it 
implemented the first GI (GI-10: Package Efficiency (PE) Program: recycling plastic 
packaging and metal wastes) in 1990, it staged it in steps by first trialling it out over three 
months as a pilot project.  On the surface, the company argued that it wanted to demonstrate 
the benefits to the community to garner their support, as it intended to include its supply chain 
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partners in the program.  In reality, it was a cautious attitude to check the extent of the 
benefits the company could reap from the practice. 
This attitude persisted.  GI-11 (Reusing cooled recycled hot wastewater for casting process), 
implemented in 1994, was an “accidental GI”.  It was the result of a simple cost-benefit 
analysis, which demonstrated the potential savings involved by using less recycled water in 
relation to a one-off investment in extra piping.  As CNW’s Supply Chain Manager 
admitted,” our real motive was to reduce operation cost”. 
This “GI must be financially beneficial” attitude that CNW held in the 1990s was overthrown 
when the company continued to experience cost increases in material and logistic costs, 
despite its PE Program (GI-10).  CNW began to question its approach toward GI 
implementation, asking how the company “can make it sGIs financially beneficial”.  As it 
made plans to extend the scope of its original PE Program to include reduce and reuse as their 
additional features, CNW also realized that it could take a lead role in the Local Council’s 
Green Environment Initiative, which was then soliciting sponsor to champion the 3R practice 
of reduce, reuse, and recycle in the local council area.  CNW demonstrated its commitments 
by garnering the participation and cooperation of its suppliers and distributors.  “Making the 
right move at the right time” was how CNW’s Supply Chain Manager put it.  The company 
also began to view any actions consistent with the interests in protecting the environment they 
could take would be “a move in the right direction”, changing its reactive NEO to an 
accommodative one.  CNW also became an active sponsor of its Local Council’s Tree 
Planting Day and Environment Day Appeal. 
Since 2000, CNW had hired a dedicated person to take responsibilities on environmental, 
health and safety issues within the company. It also invested considerable resources in 
investigating and developing an environmentally-friendly corrosion protection system for 
their zinc-plated castor ranges, resulting in the implementation of GI-13 (Introducing an 
environmentally-friendly corrosion protection system for a new range of greener products) in 
2004.  CNW’s Supply Chain Manager reckoned that GI-13 would propel the company “ahead 
of its time and other competitors in going green”. 
The ability of Car Seat and CNW to turn-around without being dragged into a cognitive lock-
in after implementing their first few GIs lies in their ability to acknowledge their mistakes, 
which transformed their NEO.  The change in NEO, in turn, led them to engage in a process 
of experiential learning.  In the process, these two companies upgraded their environmental 
resources accordingly to build the needed environmental capabilities. 
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The stories of GVCordial and BAPlastic are different from the above three cases.  They did 
not commenced with a reactive attitude or adopted a quick-fix method in implementing their 
first GI.  However, they, too, demonstrated an ability to build on the knowledge base of a 
previously implemented GI to plan and develop their next GI.   
GVCordial implemented its first GI (GI-1: Using recycled bottles and packaging for 
production and distribution) in 1996 to appease community’s expectations.  As the company 
only changed ownership, the new management was mainly concerned with getting its 
business on track and had little knowledge about environmental impact.  The initiative (GI-1) 
entailed collecting bottles and packages from distributors and retailers, and sending the used 
bottles to an external company for rinsing and sterilizing.  The General Manager explained 
that they had to outsource the rinsing and sterilizing functions, which indirectly saved them 
from the burden of treating wastewater, because they needed to focus on developing other 
production competencies during that time.  While this initiative helped reduce the use of new 
bottles, it shifted wastewater resulting from rinsing and sterilizing to another manufacturing 
site.  GVCordial General Manager admitted that this initiative, though cost-effective from 
GVCordial’s perspective, was not a green solution in the true sense.   
GVCordial cherished the long-standing community support the previous management had 
been able to enjoy and was determined to grow the relationship.  After putting its production 
operation in place, GVCordial began actively seeking ways to reduce production wastes and 
losses as part of its aim to improve product quality and to appease the local community.  “We 
wanted to ensure that our actions coincided with community expectations as far as 
environmental issues were concerned,” proclaimed its General Manager.  When a prolonged 
draught hit the Murray Darling region, where GVCordial’s cordial bottling plant was located, 
the company stood up to “do everything it could to conserve water resources”. 
Though GVCordial’s production operation was on track, the company was plagued with high 
incidence of bottle breakages during capping of bottles already filled with finished products.  
Further, GVCordial was not too pleased with its inability to perform bottle rinsing and 
sterilizing as part of its production process, which had to be outsourced.  Through its 
investigation, GVCordial was able to find a bottling technology that could assist the company 
to address the problem of high bottle breakages and also enabled bottle rinsing and sterilizing 
to be incorporated into the production process.  Changing its bottling technology (GI-2) to 
allow four tasks – rinsing, sterilizing, bottling, and capping - to be performed sequentially, 
GVCordial also took back the rinsing and sterilizing functions into its own hands and utilize 
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recycled water for part of its bottle washing and equipment cleaning process (GI-3: Recycling 
wash water). 
BAPlastic implemented two production-related GIs, both in 2001: GI-4: Using recycled 
plastic resins for package manufacturing and GI-5: Replacing self-stick labelling method with 
in-mould labelling technology.  The knowledge connection between these two GIs lies in the 
knowledge base that BAPlastic had been accumulating arising from its vision and undivided 
commitment toward the use of recycled plastics for re-manufacturing.  The commissioning of 
a local research institute to investigate the tolerance limits for re-manufacturing of recycled 
plastics was the key to the building up of its knowledge base on recycled plastic. 
GI implementation experiences of the above five case companies described above suggest that 
it is the knowledge connections between GIs that helped them to create the synergy needed to 
progress.  The knowledge accumulated between the GIs implemented represents a synergistic 
link between environmental management know-how and environmental impact implications, 
and an organization’s choice of relevant GI implementation technology. 
Knowledge connections between GIs provide the basis for knowledge creation.  According to 
Chen (2008), knowledge creation is a process of functioning and balancing three elements: 
knowledge duplication, knowledge diffusion, and knowledge storage.  At CNW, the 
knowledge creation process occurred primarily via duplicating the initiatives (recycling 
package, material and water – GI-10, GI-11 & GI-12).  The knowledge on recycling acquired 
by CNW through the implementation of three related GIs convinced its senior management 
that GIs could bring as much benefits as any other business activities.  It is this understanding 
that propelled CNW into adopting a proactive NEO, leading to the implementation of a value-
seeking GI (GI-13).  With this understanding, CNW reached the knowledge diffusion point: 
its recycling experiences were shared between supply chain partners and business associates. 
The concept of recycling further became a major part of the program content for CNW’s new 
employee induction and training. 
The fit between organizations and their environments would be created when they duplicate, 
diffuse and store knowledge about their production, business and the environment.  The 
notion of fit or fitness, discussed in Folke et al. (2007), is defined as functions of 
effectiveness and robustness between social institutions and the biophysical and social 
domains in which they operate.  Folke et al. (2007) contend that the fit between institutions 
and their environment co-evolves.  Organizations embark on activities deemed to fit well with 
their resource pools or institutional pressures.  
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Car Seat’s GI implementation path provides evidences of implementing GI that fit the 
company’s resource levels.  The process of preparing for ISO 14001 accreditation offered Car 
Seat a valuable opportunity to learn about its production process and related environmental 
impacts. The company could reflect on the knowledge gained through the adoption of GIs 
(i.e., GI-14 & GI-15).  The lessons Car Seat management learnt from its first two initiatives 
were about issues related to foam dust emission, and waste reduction via recycling. Learning 
from these experiences allowed Car Seat to continue exploring options to reduce material 
losses during material movement within departments (GI-16).  There is thus a synergy 
between Car Seat’s learning of its previous GI implementation experiences, strategic business 
plans, and its in-progress GI, i.e., GI-16. This synergy is, again, transmitted to the company’s 
effort to reengineer its production process (GI-17). 
Finster et al. (2002) contend that the road to beyond-compliance environmental practices 
requires synchronizing the voice of the environment to the business mainstream (i.e., 
incorporation of environmental features into product designs).  According to Finster et al.’s 
(2002) notion of “beyond-compliance” GI, both Car Seat and CNW had managed to reach 
this stage with their GIs: GI-18 (introducing a new foam formula) for Car Seat, and GI-13 
(developing an environmentally friendly corrosion coating for castors and wheels). The two 
GIs may be considered the synergy formed from experiential learning, environmental voices, 
and business strategies.  The new foam formula initiative (GI-18) embraced waste 
minimization experiences gained from previous initiatives via Design for Manufacturing, 
considered the end-of-life impacts of foam, and helped create a new market niche for Car 
Seat.  The environmentally-friendly corrosion protection coating for castors and wheels (GI-
13) incorporated the participation of customers and local councils.  GI-13 was the first GI that 
CNW did not examine the cost-benefits of GI implementation with a short-term view (i.e., 
short time frame for financial payback).  It may be viewed as the case of environmental voice.  
Prior to implementing GI-13, CNW had envisioned that it would be able to create a new 
market niche on launching products with environmentally friendly coatings.  
In sum, the five companies which demonstrated an ability to accumulate environmental 
knowledge were found to share three comparable experiences.  First, they were able to create 
synergy between their NEO and environmental resources. Second, they were able to transfer 
knowledge between successive GI implementation.  These knowledge connections provide a 
basis for knowledge creation and renewal.  Third, they were able to fit their resource pools 
and environmental capabilities to implementing the GI needed to derive operational 
advantage. 
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5.4 Redefining Competition 
Three of the case companies – BAPlastic, EDevice, and Car Seat – demonstrated an ability to 
go beyond experiential learning.  The main distinction between these companies and the other 
two, i.e., GVCordial and CNW, was that they all possessed a prominent vision: GI 
development would eventually be driven by markets and customers’ requirements.  This 
vision, of course, hinges on the belief that customers would be willingness to pay for green 
products, and the market segments for environmentally friendly products would increase.  
Such a conviction is not without basis.  Already, many studies (e.g., Gilley et al., 2000) have 
found that customers react more positively toward product-oriented GIs compared to process-
focused ones.  BAPlastic’s intention of using exclusively recycled plastics for manufacturing 
plastics packages in the future, EDevice’s notion of a range of lead-free electronic and 
electrical components for automotive transport, and Car Seat’s environmentally-friendly 
foams for future car seats signify the vision that these three companies had. 
Both GVCordial and CNW did not appear to have such a revolutionary vision.  Their GI 
focus seemed to be restricted to either meeting existing market requirements or improving 
operational performance.  By contrast, BAPlastic, EDevice, and Car Seat appeared to have 
ascended to the stage at which their GIs were directed toward both current and future market 
demands.  These three companies had entered into a new arena where the GIs adopted could 
help them reshape their competitions.  
Another feature that these three companies had in common was that they had come to accept 
issues of the natural environment as an integral part of their business issues. As EDevice’s 
General Manager explained, “the relationship between business operations and the 
environment is viewed as the ‘inseparatability’ of a body and its soul”. Likewise, BAPlastic’s 
CEO also mentioned that “ignoring the environmental impacts of plastics is like reaching a 
stage of denial. If you refuse to accept that reality, your business would hit both short- and 
long-term consequences”.  Car Seat’s Technical Manager also revealed that “the natural 
environment has become a part of the company’s business environment”.  These three 
companies not only recognised the environmental impacts of their production processes, but 
had also been transforming their environmental management capabilities as one of their core 
competencies to redefine their competitions.  
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Unlike multinational corporations, such as Xerox and Monsanto who have the capabilities to 
rewrite competitive rules for their markets (Reinhardt, 2005), SMMEs, like Car Seat, EDevice 
and BAPlastic, could only redefine the nature of their competitions.  Perhaps, this is the first 
step to restructure a market.  Though rudimentary, there had been evidence to suggest that 
after EDevice adopted their lead-free soldering practice (GI-8), and gradually phased out lead 
content in their power converters (GI-9), a number of medium-sized electronic firms had also 
started exploring lead substitutes for their products.  When EDevice launched their first lead-
free product, similarly, many other firms in Australia also announced their on-going or 
would-be efforts to explore other lead substitutes.   EDevice’s lead-free soldering and lead-
free products ignited an industry-wide competition in which EDevice already secured a 
leading position.   
By the examples of Car Seat, EDevice and BAPlastic, it appears that companies with the 
vision to redefine competition through the launch of green products were not constrained by 
time frames and budget allocation, compared with those which do not have such a vision.  
Companies aiming to redefine competition attempt to fit neither GI parameters to business 
objectives nor business strategies to GI parameters.  They create the fit between business 
strategies and GI parameters.  BAPlastic’s use of recycled plastic resins for manufacturing 
(GI-4), EDevice’s introduction of lead-free weather-resistant car power converters (GI-9), and 
Car Seat’s new foam formulae (GI-18) are exemplars that had created the fit between business 
strategies and GI parameters. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
6.1 A green capability building model 
The within-case and cross-case analyses support the conceptual framework developed from 
the theory of planned behaviour theory.  The theory of planned behaviour posits that 
subjective norms, manifested by the strengths of coercive and normative pressures, and 
attitudes, reflective of a firm’s salient beliefs about corporate environmentalism, exert a 
significant effect on intention, which is interpreted as equivalent to a firm’s NEO.  The GI 
implementation histories of the seven case companies, in combination, show that under strong 
coercive pressures, firms tend to adopt either a resistive or reactive NEO.  When normative 
pressures are strong, a firm’s NEO would tend to be either reactive or accommodative, 
depending on how much the firm’s regard the importance of the stakeholders from which the 
normative pressures originate.  For the fact that cognitive pressure essentially represents a 
firm’s internally generated norms or belief systems about the environment, expectedly, when 
the cognitive pressure is strong, a proactive posture ensues.  In fact, the findings from the 
experiences of the seven case companies show that in the joint presence of strong coercive, 
normative, and cognitive pressures, a firm typically held a proactive NEO.  This suggests that 
a firm essentially “listens” more to what its cognition tells it.  Indirectly, it implies that a 
strong cognitive pressure can essentially render any externally imposed coercive and 
normative pressures ineffective. 
The case findings further reveal that the green capability building paths of SMMEs are 
dependent upon the NEOs they hold, as depicted in Figure 6.1.  When firms holds a resistive 
NEO, they had the tendency to head toward adopting one of the most convenient, least-cost, 
quick-fix legally-sanctioned environmental solutions available.  Firms clinging to a resistive 
attitude are also more inclined to treat each GI as an isolated project, which is looked upon as 
a set of activities to be completed within a set time frame purely to fulfil organizational 
environmental obligations sanctioned by laws.  This means that these firms would not be 
motivated to invest in resources to build their environmental capabilities.  Their resistive 
attitudes thus form an obstacle, inhibiting them to learn from their GI implementation 
experiences.  As a result, their anti-environment attitudes are less likely to change over time.  
These firms will continue to do the minimum when it comes to dealing with environmental 
imperatives, taking necessary actions only when they are next confronted with external 
pressures to comply with environmental legislations.  Because of their inability to learn from 
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their GI implementation experiences, these firms exhibit a cognitive lock-in and would find it 
hard to break out from the green wall that appears to have entrapped them into a spiral of 
decline without being able to appreciate the beneficial aspects of GIs.  Accordingly, the 
following propositions are offered: 
Proposition 1: Strong coercive pressures have the tendency to encourage firms to opt 
for least-cost, quick-fix environmental solutions with the sole objective of complying 
with legislative requirements. 
Proposition 2: Firms holding a resistive NEO would be inclined to treat GI 
implementation as a project, a set of activities to be completed within a set time frame 
purely to fulfil organizational environmental obligations sanctioned by laws. 
Proposition 3: Firms holding a resistive NEO would likely to regard environmental 
resource building as diverting and divesting valuable organizational resources away 
from profitable business imperatives and would not be motivated to invest in 
resources to build their environmental capabilities. 
Proposition 4: Firms holding a resistive NEO would not be able to learn from their GI 
implementation experience, rendering them to a cognitive lock-in and inhibiting them 
to appreciate the beneficial aspects of GIs. 
Firms espousing a reactive approach would also be likely to focus on measures that are 
publicly acknowledged as effective when selecting a GI solution, though the measures being 
considered may not be the most convenient or least-cost solutions.  Typically, these firms also 
treat GI implementation as appeasing stakeholders, apart from meeting legislative 
requirements.  While their views of GIs may not be as adverse as their resistive counterparts, 
including exhibiting a tendency to embrace actions consistent with interests in protecting the 
natural environment, they do regard environmental resource building as a necessary evil: 
something that have to be done but are performance debilitating.  Depending on whether there 
are triggers, such as realizing the beneficial fallacies of their implemented GIs, like what Car 
Seat and CNW were able to identify, these firms may be able to free themselves away from a 
cognitive lock-in situation and be able to commence learning from their past mistakes.  In this 
case, they would engage in a process of experiential learning, traversing the environmental 
capability building paths taken by firms with either an accommodative or a proactive NEO.  
To capture such a scenario, the following proposition is put forward: 
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Proposition 5: When firms adopting a reactive NEO realize the beneficial fallacies of 
their implemented GIs, they would be able move away from a cognitive lock-in 
situation and be able to commence learning from their GI implementation 
experiences. 
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FIGURE 6.1: A MODEL OF GREEN CAPABILITY BUILDING PATHS OF SMMEs 
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Firms developing an accommodative NEO would most likely be embracing environmental 
solutions that go beyond compliance, including those that may not have perceptible 
commercial benefits in the short term.  Unlike those with a resistive or reactive NEO, these 
firms treat GI implementation as a moral and social obligation and see values in 
implementing them.  Appreciating there are values embedded in GIs thus motivates them to 
learn from their GI implementation experiences.  As such, these firms would regard 
environmental resource investment as “reserving the right to play” with the possibility of 
building up capabilities and developing GIs that generate competitive advantage.  The ability 
to learn from their GI implementation experience, or experiential learning, holds the key to 
developing pollution prevention GIs with the aim of creating competitive advantages or even 
value seeking GIs.  It therefore follows that: 
Proposition 6: Firms assuming an accommodative NEO would likely to treat GI 
implementation as a moral and social obligation and see values in implementing them.  
The ability to appreciate the value of GIs would motivate these firms to engage in 
experiential learning, leading to the development of either pollution prevention GIs 
aimed at competitive advantage or value seeking GIs. 
Firms that embrace a proactive NEO are environmental champions.  To these firms, each GI 
implementation is an experience that could offer rich information and valuable insights for 
future implementation.  Expectedly, these firms would have a predisposition to explore GIs in 
anticipation of changes in market trends, social norms or policy directives to protect or even 
regenerate environment quality.  They would regard environmental resource building as an 
integral part of their strategic business operations with a potential to introduce green 
processes or innovate new green products.  The environmental solutions these firms devise, 
not surprisingly, would command the capability to shape industry trends, thus redefining 
competition to their advantage.  More significantly, success from these processes would 
further strengthen the proactive stance held by the firm, feeding back into the cognitive 
dimension of institutional pressures.  This would, in turn, help strengthen the unwritten 
internalized belief system of the firm, buttressing the cognitive pressures further to inculcate 
into the firm a deeper sense of commitment toward environmental imperatives.  In this light, 
the following propositions are identified: 
Proposition 7: Firms holding a proactive NEO would view each GI implementation as 
an experience that could offer rich information and valuable insights for future 
implementation.  These firms would build on these experiences to explore GIs in 
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anticipation of market changes, social reforms or policy amendments to protect or 
even regenerate environment quality. 
Proposition 8: Firms holding a proactive NEO would regard environmental resource 
building as an integral part of their strategic business operations with a potential to 
introduce green processes or innovate new green products that shape industry trends, 
thus redefining competition to their advantage. 
Proposition 9: A proactive NEO has a reinforcing ability to strengthen the cognitive 
pressure that impinges on the firm’s desire to be environmentally responsible, lifting 
its NEO to a higher level of proactiveness. 
Table 6.1 summarizes the attitudinal and behavioural inclinations of firms embracing the four 
plausible NEOs post GI implementation. Given that knowledge gained from the experiences 
of GI implementation is a resource, the above nine propositions, in combination, thus suggest 
that mode of response to GI implementation could augment the bundles of green resources an 
organization has in at least three different ways.  First, the experiences accumulated in 
successive GI implementations could trigger a change in NEO, which could, over time, result 
in a shift in the cognitive pressures that beset the firm.  Understanding the value fallacies of 
some of the counter-productive GIs, such as the case of CAPigment, typifies this learning 
cycle. 
Second, the experience gained with each GI implementation would directly enlarge the green 
knowledge base of an organization.  Since GI implementation behavior is itself a function of 
the resource base of the organization, the reinforcing power of GI implementation experience 
thus creates yet another learning cycle of proactive corporate environmentalism. 
Third, the experience acquired from each GI implementation could lead firms to embark on a 
program of green resource investment (e.g., the case of CNW), or renewal (e.g., the case of 
EDevice), or extension (e.g., the case of BAPlastic), including reorganizing the associated 
processes (e.g., the case of GVCordial).  Programs of green resource investment, renewal or 
extension would further augment the green resource bundles of the firm, making them more 
environmentally-friendly or less environmentally destructive. 
Set in the context of the theoretical framework of the TPB (refer Figure 2.2), this implies that 
the accumulated experiences in GI implementation could create a series of learning cycles, 
feeding back into the green resources and capabilities of the organization and strengthening 
the proactiveness of its NEO through a process of environmental resource building, as Figure 
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6.2 illustrates.  The barriers to that appear to lie predominantly in the inability of some firms 
to appreciate the value of information that could be gleaned from the outcomes of GI 
implementation.   Indirectly, this implies missing opportunities that could be capitalized to 
gain competitive advantages.  In sum, the propositions put forward in this research unpack the 
processes by which an organization’s green capabilities may co-evolve with changing market 
conditions, institutional pressures, and organizational resource status.  The study has unveiled 
that experiences gathered from GI implementation do provide a feedback mechanism that 
generates a number of learning cycles, each of which offers opportunities for organizations to 
further strengthen their green capability and to benefit from future GI implementation.  In an 
age where emphasis is being placed on building green resources, capabilities and processes as 
a source of competitive advantage, this study has identified how firms’ could effectively 
“catch the wave” through their GI implementation experience to redefine competition.  
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TABLE  6.1:  TENDENCY TOWARD GIs SELECTION AND ATTITUDINAL CHANGE POST GI IMPLEMENTATION BY NEO 
 
Natural 
Environmental 
Orientation 
(NEO) 
Tendency toward selection of GIs 
as environmental solutions 
(Entrepreneurship) 
Attitudes toward GI 
implementation 
Plausible change in NEO post GI  implementation Attitude toward environmental 
resource building post GI 
implementation 
Resistive Adopt easiest, least-cost, quick-fix 
legally-sanctioned  environmental 
solutions 
Treat each GI as individual, 
isolated project.  Completion 
of project fulfils 
environmental obligations 
stipulated by laws. 
Tend to: 
• remain resistive toward external pressures 
• continue to evade responsibility for impact of its activities 
on natural environmental but may admit duty of care toward 
natural environment if some new business initiatives 
happen to have a beneficial effect on environment 
• take necessary actions only under external pressures 
Regard environmental resource 
building as diverting and divesting 
valuable organizational resources 
away from profitable business 
imperatives: strictly performance 
debilitating  
Reactive Adopt environmental solutions that 
are publicly acknowledged as 
effective 
Treat GI implementation as 
appeasing secondary  
stakeholders, in addition to 
meeting legislative 
requirements and will be 
perceived as conforming to 
social norms 
Exhibit tendency to: 
• revise view on GI implementation from performance-
inhibiting to progressive 
• see duty of care toward natural environment as important to 
extent of accepting greater responsibility for environmental 
impact of its activities 
• commence embracing actions consistent with interests in 
protecting natural environment, especially those 
conforming to social norms 
Regard environmental resource 
building as a necessary evil: they 
have to be done but remain 
performance debilitating 
Accommodative Adopt environmental solutions that 
green business processes, including 
those not necessarily having 
perceptible commercial benefits 
Treat GI implementation as a 
moral and social obligation 
and see values in 
implementing them 
Exhibit tendency to: 
• defend external pressure to extent of promoting their 
importance to business associates 
• accept full responsibility for environmental impact of its 
activities 
• explore GIs that could create competitive advantage  
Regard environmental resource 
building as “reserving the right to 
play” with possibility to generate 
competitive advantage given the 
opportunity  
Proactive Device environmental solutions that 
built green processes or innovate 
new green products to shape 
industry trends 
Treat GI implementation as 
an experience that could offer 
rich information and valuable 
insights for future 
implementation 
Exhibit tendency to: 
• capitalize on external pressure to promote green image 
• expand its role as champion of environmental quality  
• undertake programs in anticipation of changes in market 
trends, social norms or policy directives to protect and/or 
regenerate environment quality 
Regard environmental resource 
building as an integral part of 
strategic business operations with 
potential to redefine competition 
  177 
FIGURE 6.2: DYNAMIC MODEL OF GI IMPLEMENTATION 
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6.2 Conclusion 
This study explores how institutional pressures influence and shape organizational NEO to 
give rise to corporate environmentalism, defined as the process in which firms organize, 
deploy, align or realign their environmental resources to deal with environmental imperatives.  
It extends Hart’s (1995) “natural resource-based view of the firm” by identifying why some 
firms were able to leverage on GI implementation to create the green advantage and why 
others were less able to.  In a wider theoretical context, the findings contribute to an 
understanding of the sources of organizational responses to environmental imperatives, 
including both inertia to change, and adaptation ability to gain competitive advantage.  
Among the antecedents that induce SMMEs to favour the selection of a particular GI 
implementation approach, coercive pressures have been significant in prompting SMMEs 
toward opting for quick-fix, least-cost, most convenient EOP solutions.  As have been 
demonstrated, quick-fix, least-cost measures are typically short-term solutions with limited 
benefits.  This finding points to a paradox in terms of increasing the stringency of 
environmental regulations: the more stringent the environmental regulations (stronger 
coercive pressures), the more likely it would be for SMMEs to embrace a resistive, or at best 
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reactive, NEO, leading to the selection of quick-fix, least-cost, convenient EOP solutions.  It 
thus contradicts the view of authors like Newton and Harte (1997) and Porter and van der 
Linde (1995), who argue that more stringent regulations are needed to uplift the standard of 
environmental management practices, since environmental regulation is instrumental to 
promoting best practice in environmental management. 
A core theoretical contribution of the study is the revelation that experiential learning is the 
key factor that separates SMMEs able to capitalize on the values of their implemented GIs to 
gain competitive advantages and redefine competition from those that are immersed in a 
cognitive lock-in unable to free themselves from an unproductive green wall.  This finding 
mirrors those unearthed by Sharma and Vredenburg (1998), who found that, among 
companies in the oil and gas industry in Canada, 1) those adopting proactive environmentally 
responsive strategies have a greater likelihood of developing organizational capabilities; and 
2) the greater the level of firm-specific capabilities emerging within a company, the more 
benefits would flow from those capabilities.  Among the firm-specific capabilities uncovered 
by Sharma and Vredenburg (1998), continuous higher order learning and continuous 
innovations were two of the most prominent.  To the extent that this study also reveals that 
SMMEs who moved from a resistive or reactive NEO to an accommodative and, eventually, a 
proactive NEO were most capable of engaging in experiential learning, leading to developing 
GIs that enabled them to redefine competition, the importance of policy initiatives in enticing 
environmentally ignorant firms to engage in organizational learning to become more 
environmentally proactive is accentuated.   
Garvin (1993, p. 80) contends that learning organizations are “skilled at creating, acquiring 
and transferring knowledge and at modifying behaviour to reflect new knowledge and 
insights”.  The ability of EDevice, Car Seat and CNW to turn from an organization with a 
reactive NEO, heading toward the green wall, to an organization leading the charge to shape 
its industry in green product development indicates that to succeed in corporate 
environmentalism, a firm needs to learn to become a learning organization.  Given that 
learning organizations have been found to associate positively with innovative behaviour 
(Farrell, 1999), firm performance (Stewart & Mavondo, 2004), and high growth (Sadler-
Smith et al., 2001), the need to promote SMMEs to become learning organizations in 
enhancing environmental best practices cannot be ignored. 
The similarity in finding between this and Sharma and Vredenburg’s (1998) study on the 
criticality of organizational learning thus supports the notion of offering reward rather than 
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administering punishment (i.e., giving the carrot rather than the stick) when it comes to 
promoting environmental best practices in industries.  Coupled with the finding that coercive 
pressures tend to generate the opposite effect in terms of engendering better environmental 
practices and that strong cognitive pressures could neutralize the effects of coercive pressures 
in affecting a firm’s decision to adopt a specific GI implementation technology, the nurturing 
approach to encouraging organizational learning is thus considered a more effective policy 
alternative to help firms achieve the joint pursuit of best practices in corporate 
environmentalism and financial profitability. 
While Sharma and Vredenburg (1998) also highlighted the importance of learning in 
engendering a proactive environmental posture, they have not mentioned the pre-conditions to 
trigger an active interest and commitment in prompting organizations to engage in active 
learning.  This multiple case study discloses that SMMEs’ appreciation of the real values of 
GIs is an important trigger to experiential learning.  It is not important if SMMEs 
implemented their first GI under the posture of a resistive or reactive NEO.  So long as these 
firms were able to reflect on their implementation approach and see through the potential 
value fallacies of those quick-fix, least-cost solutions, they would most likely be able to 
realize the cause(s) of the issues, should these GIs turn out to be non cost-beneficial.  The 
ability to recognize the value fallacies of quick-fix, least-cost solutions could help SMMEs to 
identify the real value of carefully thought-out GIs geared to blending environmental 
solutions with business strategies and processes.  Such realization is a valuable part of the 
experiential learning process.  It could motivate SMMEs to review their GI implementation 
approaches, explore alternative implementation options, and, perhaps, even be willing to 
experiment with un-tested alternatives, as the experiences of EDevice, Car Seat and CNW had 
demonstrated.  By contrast, the inability of CAPigment to recognize and accept the accidental 
environmentalism it was practising had been instrumental in placing the company in a 
cognitive lock-in, surrounded by green walls. 
In sum, this study has made a number of theoretical contributions, including extending the 
natural resource-based theory (Hart, 1995), by exploring the manner in which, and the reasons 
for which, organizations select different GI implementation approaches.  It has, in a sense, 
provided a rudimentary view of “a dynamic resource-based view of the firm”.  A second 
contribution of this study is that it has used the conceptual underpinnings of the TPB as an 
integrative framework to combine the tenets of a number of theories to explore the question 
relating to why some organizations have been able to achieve beneficial effects from their GI 
implementation while others have not.  In the process, through a multiple case study of seven 
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SMMEs, this study has found that a firm’s NEO is the critical initiating point from which 
green capability building paths would evolve.  While resistive and reactive NEOs would less 
likely lead to the adoption of well crafted GIs that are both environmentally ameliorating and 
performance enhancing, such NEOs could be transformed through a process of experiential 
learning.  The trigger to instigate organizations to learn from their GI implementation 
experiences lies in making them recognize the value fallacies of quick-fix, least-cost, 
convenient solutions firms with a resistive or reactive NEO would commonly embrace.     
 
6.3 Limitations and Further Research 
Typical of case study research, findings from this study could not be generalized to the case 
of all SMMEs, let alone to the larger context, including other industries or firms of other 
sizes.  More extensive studies in other settings are obviously required to test the generality of 
the findings from this study.  The green capability path building model (Figure 6.1) developed 
from the GI implementation histories of the seven case companies could provide a useful 
theoretical framework from which a structural model of green capability building could be 
developed for testing using techniques such as structural equation modelling.  Green 
capability building is an important and yet less well understood area, especially from the 
process perspective. 
In line with the notion of developing structural models for exploring green capability building 
paths of organizations, dimensions of experiential learning in the context of acquiring tacit 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1966) in green capability development and environmental management 
also need examination.  The acquisition of tacit knowledge, such as realization of the value 
fallacies of quick-fix GIs, has been shown to be an important factor distinguishing not just 
successful managers from their less successful counterparts (Nestor-Baker, 1999; Wagner & 
Sternberg, 1985), but also high performing organizations from laggards (Baumard, 1999; 
Hall, 1993; Lubit, 2001; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).  Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) have 
pointed out that, in the context of organizational learning, tacit knowledge is derivative of 
experiential learning from incidents that affects performance.  Given that this study has also 
found that the trigger to experiential learning is the acquisition of tacit knowledge in 
environmental management, an understanding of the dimensions of tacit knowledge 
acquisition in influencing experiential learning in green capability development would be an 
important contribution to further the idea of the natural resource based view of the firm 
advanced by Hart (1995). 
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APPENDIX A: PRESCIBED CONSENT FORM FOR PERSONS PARTICIPATING 
IN RESEARCH PROJECTS INVOLVING INTERVIEWS, QUESTIONAIRES OR 
DISCLOSURE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 
 
Name of participant    ____________________ 
 
Project Title Building green capability in Small-to-medium-sized enterprises 
(SMMEs) 
 
Name of Investigator(s) (1)  Mai Thi Huong Phan_________ Phone  9925 5550__ 
 
 
1. I have received a statement explaining the interview/questionnaire involved in this project. 
 
2. I consent to participate in the above project, the particulars of which – including details of the 
interviews or questionnaires – have been explained to me. 
 
3.   I authorise the investigator or his or her assistant to interview me or administer a questionnaire. 
 
4.   I acknowledge that: 
 
(a) Having read the Plain Language Statement, I agree to the general purpose, methods and 
demands of the study. 
(b) I have been informed that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time and to 
withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied. 
(c) The project is for the purpose of research and/or teaching. It may not be of direct benefit 
to me. 
(d) The confidentiality of the information I provide will be safeguarded. However, should 
information of a confidential nature need to be disclosed for moral, clinical or legal 
reasons, I will be given an opportunity to negotiate the terms of this disclosure.  
(e)  The security of the research data is assured during and after completion of the study. The 
data collected during the study will not be published, and a report of the project outcomes 
will only be used for internal assessment. Any information that will identify myself will 
not be used. 
 
 
Participant’s Consent 
 
Name:  _____________________________________________  Date:  ______________ 
     (Participant) 
 
Name:  _____________________________________________  Date:  ______________ 
    (Witness to signature) 
 
Where participant is under 18 years of age: 
 
I consent to the participation of _____________________________________  in the above project. 
 
Signature: __(1)_________________(2)______________________  Date:  ______________ 
       (Signatures of parents or guardians) 
 
Name:  _____________________________________________  Date:  ______________ 
               (Witness to signature) 
 
Participants should be given a photocopy of this consent form after it has been signed. 
Any complaints about your participation in this project may be directed to the Chair, RMIT Business 
Human Research Ethics Committee, RMIT Business, GPO Box 2476V, Melbourne, 3001. The telephone 
number is (03) 9925 5594, the fax number is (03) 9925 5595 or email address is rdu@bf.rmit.edu.au  
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APPENDIX B: PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT 
Dear Participant, 
 
My name is Mai Thi Huong Phan, undertaking PhD studies under the supervision of Associate Professor Booi 
Kam in the School of Marketing, RMIT University 
 
The aim of my project is to investigate the impacts of GIs on organisational performance. As your company can 
be identified as a Victorian-based member of Transport, Logistics and Manufacturing industries, you are invited 
to participate in this research 
 
This study involves interviewing manufacturers, and transport and logistics providers. Interviews will focus on 
exploring factors that influence firms’ green practices and how green practices affect firm performance. The 
procedure should take approximately 60 minutes of your time, and at your office. Your participation is entirely 
voluntary. You will not be exposed to any risk or stress during this interview, and you are free to suspend or end 
your participation at any point in time. 
 
Your information will be treated with strictest confidence. The results of this interview will be used for my 
research, in the form of a thesis, academic papers and presentations. Without your written consent, no findings 
will be published which could identify any individual participants. Coded data will be kept securely for a period 
of five years in the School of Marketing, and can only be accessed by my supervisors and me. You will also be 
able to access your information at any time during the five-year period. 
 
If you have any queries regarding this study, please contact my supervisor, Associate Professor Booi Kam, 
Phone: 03 9925 1326, Email: booi.kam@rmit.edu.au. Alternatively, you might want to discuss this project with 
the Research Director of the School of Marketing, Professor Kosmas Smyrnios, Phone: 03 9925 1633, Email: 
kosmas.smyrnios@rmit.edu.au; or the chair of the RMIT Business Human Research Ethics Committee, 
Professor Robert Brooks, Phone: 03 9925 5594, Email: robert.brooks@rmit.edu.au. 
 
Thank you for your participation and co-operation, 
 
Yours sincerely, 
Mai Thi Huong Phan 
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
Date: ..................................................Time start: ...................................... Time finish: ........................................  
Company’s name: .............................................................Respondent: ......................................................................  
Position: ...........................................................................Department: .....................................................................  
Knowledge & attitude toward environmental issues 
1. Would you view your company as a non-compliant, compliant or proactive player in the GIs? Why do 
you think so? 
2. Did your company change its attitude toward environmental issues overtime? Can you explain? 
Factors affecting GI adoption 
3. Can you tell me a bit about the history of some environmental programs? When did you start your first 
program? What triggered the first environmental initiative at your company? 
4. What were the major factors that influenced your firms’ GI adoption? 
5. What about other factors that you believe significantly influenced your firm’s environmental planning 
and practice?  
6. Do these factors and their influences on your company’s GI introduction change over time? Can you 
provide details on these changes? 
Impacts of GIs on firm performance 
7. Are there any environmental indicators developed and integrated in your firm’s overall performance? 
Can you please tell me more about them? 
8. Can you tell me a bit more about how environmental programs have created 
financial/reputation/renovation gains/losses for your company in the short term and long term? Were 
these gains or losses within or out of your anticipation? 
9. For the programs that resulted in negative outcomes, what were the main purposes? Similarly, what 
were the main purposes of programs that resulted in positive outcomes? 
10. Are you aware of environmental programs implemented by your competitors or other industrial 
players? 
11. Do your company compare itself to other industrial players in terms of its GIs and performance? Can 
you explain how and in what way your company learn and compare your GIs with those implemented 
by other companies? 
12. How do you initiate and develop a business plan? Does your business plan include environmental 
goals? If yes, in what way? If no, does your company intend to include environmental objectives in the 
future? 
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13. Tell me more about the production activities of your firm. How do these activities impact on the 
environment? Do you have any measures to assess the efficiency of production processes and 
environmental impacts? If yes, tell me more about these measures. If no, does your company intend to 
introduce in the future? 
14. In general, how have any changes been made to your firm’s production technologies over the last three 
years affected your environmental and overall performance? 
15. What do you think about changes happening in your firm’s health & safety aspect over the last three 
years? Are there any milestones for these changes? 
16. Do you want to add further comments about your company? 
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APPENDIX D: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Part A: Knowledge, attitudes and concerns for the environment 
 
1. Do your firm have any environmental policy? 
 a. Yes  b. No. Go to Question 4 
Examples: wastewater reduction (1996), leakage prevention (1997), water recycling (1999). 
 If Yes, please list environmental management 
policy and year of issuing: 
 
1.    
2.   
 
2.  Do the policies indicated in the previous question support the achievement of your company’s 
business goals? 
Not supportive at all   Highly supportive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Does your company have an environmental management department or a dedicated group, which 
regularly examines issues related to environmental practices?  
a. Yes  b. No. Go to Question 4 
3.1 Does your company have any measurement standards to assess the environmental impact of the 
production processes? 
a. Yes  b. No 
If “Yes”, please indicate the measurement standards used:…………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
3.2 How many people are employed in the environmental management department or a dedicated group 
in total? _____________ 
3.3 Has the number of people in the environmental management department or function changed over the 
previous three years? 
a. Decreased significantly b. Decreased slightly 
c. Remained the same d. Increased slightly 
e. Increased significantly   
    
3.4   Does the head of environmental management department have a position on the equivalent Board 
of Directors? 
a. Yes b. No 
  
4.   Which of the following best describe your company’s approach to Environmental Programs? Please 
circle ONE ONLY 
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TYPE 1: Effort and activities to reduce negative impacts resulted from manufacturing 
processes on the surrounding environment to meet environmental regulations 
1 
TYPE 2: Effort and activities to focus on redesigning production processes to be less 
polluting, substituting less polluting inputs, recycling by-products of processes and 
innovating less polluting processes. 
2 
TYPE 3: Effort and activities to consider environmental impacts of operations throughout 
the entire life cycle of products (from product design through manufacturing, use and 
disposal) 
3 
  
5. How do you view your company’s implementation of Environmental Programs? Please circle ONE 
ONLY 
 
Positive programs, such as use and encouragement of recycling, alternative energy sources, 
waste reduction, etc. A record of relative clear of major regulatory violations. 
1 
Some positive programs such as use and encouragement of recycling, alternative energy 
sources, waste reduction, etc. Problems such as accidents, regulatory infractions, fines, 
complaints, etc. 
2 
Poor public record or significant violations, major accidents and/or history of lobbying 
against sound environmental policies. 
3 
  
Part B: Attitudes towards Gaining Competitive Advantages  
 
17. How many sites/branches are practising environmental management? ........................................................   
18. How do the following factors influence your company’s environmental activities? 
 
 Not at all significant      Extremely significant 
a. The company which owns 
your company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Management Board 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Employees 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Trade unions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Suppliers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Distributors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Buyers (firms)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Consumers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Retail companies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. Consumer organizations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
k. Competitors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
l. Owners/Shareholders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
m. Banks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
n. Insurance companies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
o. Trade associations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
p. Environmental enforcement 
authorities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
q. Local communities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
r. Research institutes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
s. Press/media 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
19. To what extent the environmental activities reduced the environmental impacts of your company. 
 
 Not at all significant  Extremely significant 
a. Use of water 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Use of energy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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c. Use of non-renewable 
resources 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Use of toxic inputs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Solid waste 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Soil contamination 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Waste water 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Emissions to air 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Noise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. Odour 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
k. Landscape damage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
l. Risk of accidents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
m. Hazardous waste 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
20. Please assess the impacts your company’s environmental activities have on the following factors 
 
 Not at all significant  Extremely significant 
a. Competitive advantage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Company’s image 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Product image 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Sales 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Market share 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. New market opportunities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Return on investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Cash flow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Cost savings 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. Productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
k. Improved insurance 
conditions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
l. Better access to loans 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
m. Owner/Shareholder 
satisfaction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
n. Management satisfaction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
o. Employee satisfaction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
p. Recruitment and staff 
retention 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part C: Impacts of environmental practice on firm performance  
 
1. Please estimate how the following measures have changed from 2000 to 2003? 
 
 Decreased 
significantly 
  No 
change 
  Increased 
significantly  
a. Net cash flow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Profits 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Losses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Sale volume 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Market share 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. Please estimate how the following measures have changed from 2000 to 2003?. 
 
 Decreased 
significantly 
  No 
change 
  Increased 
significantly  
a. In-house research and development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Machinery and equipment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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c. External research and development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Industrial design 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Purchase of technologies (i.e., 
licenses, trade marks) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Marketing the introduction of new 
goods or services 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Employee training 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Environmental initiatives  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Other (please specify): 
________________ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3. Please indicate to what extent your company’s innovation activities during the previous three years 
have resulted in: 
 
 Not used at all      To a large extent 
a. Increased range of goods/services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Increased market/market share 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Improved quality in goods/services 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Improved production flexibility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Increased production capacity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Reduced labour costs per produced 
unit/transaction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Reduced materials and energy per produced 
unit/transaction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Improved environmental impact or health safety 
aspects 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Met regulations/standards 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4. How do you compare your company to the major competitors in the same industry? 
 
 Lower than competitors   
 Higher than 
competitors 
a. Total costs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Flexibility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Product or service 
innovation 1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 
e. Social responsibility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Customer satisfaction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Employee 
satisfaction 1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 
 
5. How do the following factors have impact on your company’s performance in the last three years? 
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 Extremely negative   
   
Extremely positive 
a. Automation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. “Just in time” (materials delivered shortly 
before use) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
7 
c. Machine set-up time reduction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Warehousing and materials management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Production planning and control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Preventive maintenance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Statistical process control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Production work team 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part D: Business Settings  
1. Planning 
1.1 Does your company have a formal planning process , outlining  
Long-term goals: a. Yes  a. No 
If yes, what is the most important long-term goal? 
 .......................................................................................................................................... ……………… 
Short-term goals: a. Yes  b. No 
If yes, what is the most important short-term goal? 
 ..................................................................................................................................................................  
1.2 In developing goals, how often does your company incorporate the requirements of: 
 Never      Always
a. Customers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Investors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. 
Stakeholders 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Employees 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1.3 Does your company have any risk management strategy?  
a. Yes  b. No. Go to Question 1.6 
 
1.4 For how many years do you plan ahead? ______years 
 
2. Production Activity 
 
2.1 In general, how do you rate the consumption efficiency of input materials as well as the production of 
by-products and output materials in your organization? 
 
Very 
inefficient
  
   Very efficient 
a. Consumption of input materials (as a ratio of 
material consumed to material inputs) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Production of by-products (as a ratio of by- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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products to total outputs) 
c. Production of outputs (as a ratio of outputs 
to inputs) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2.2 What is your company doing to minimise major environmental impacts of production process? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
3.  Production Technologies and Renovation 
3.1 Over the last 3 years, has your company changed manufacturing technology? 
a. Yes  b. No 
 
3.2 If yes, please indicate the main reason(s) for the changes (please select as many of the items as 
applicable): 
a. Out-of-date technology d. Reduce environmental impacts 
b. Increase productivity e. Response to legislations 
c. Cut production cost f. Others 
 
3.3 Over the last 3 years, to what extent has your company improved: 
 
Not at all      Significantly 
a. Production costs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Product quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Flexibility of production processes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. On time delivery to customers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Product design 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Product brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
g. Product marketing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Product or service innovation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Product pricing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3.4 Over the last 3 years, to what extent have the following factors contributed to your company’s 
competitive advantages? 
 
Not at all      Significantly 
a. Leadership 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Planning strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. Management skills 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Innovation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
e. Technology adoption 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
f. Employee relations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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g. Customer relations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
h. Supplier relations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
i. Marketing capability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
j. Operation management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       
 
3.5 Over the last 3 years, to what extent has your company introduced: 
 
Not at all      Completely 
a. New products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
b. Improved 
products 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
c. New 
processes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
d. Improved 
processes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4 Health and safety 
 
4.1 Does your company have any health and safety schemes in place (i.e, OSH training program, provision 
of information) for employees? 
 
a. Yes b. No 
  
4.2 Please estimate how the expenditures for health and safety as a proportion of the total expenditure have 
changed over the previous three years?  
 
 Decreased 
significantly 
  No 
change 
  Increased 
significantly  
Health and safety expenditure 
proportion of total expenditure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4.3 In your opinion, employees’ understanding of health and safety issues is: 
 
Very Poor 
   
Very well-educated 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part E: Company’s Background and Management  
1. Please confirm your company address: 
 ........................................................................................ 
2. Company website: ...................................................... 
3. In which year was your company established:............ 
4. Number of employees: 
Full-time: ______  Part-time: ______ 
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5. Which industry best describes your operation? (PLEASE SELECT ONE) 
a Food, Beverage and Tobacco 
Manufacturing 
e Petroleum, Coal, Chemical and Associated Product 
Manufacturing 
b Textile, Clothing, Footwear and 
Leather Manufacturing 
f Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 
c Wood and Paper Product 
Manufacturing 
g Metal Product Manufacturing 
d Printing, Publishing and Recorded 
Media 
h Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 
  i Other Manufacturing 
6. What is the legal form of your company? 
a Private company d Sole trader 
b Partnership e Public company 
c Family trust f Other 
    
7. Is your company a part of a larger company or is it completely independent? 
a Completely independent c Wholly owned subsidiary 
b Part of a larger 
company 
d Other (please specify): 
……………………… 
    
Thank you for your time and cooperation. 
 
 
 
